Debate between Theism (NOT Christian Theism) and Atheism.

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Lincoy3304

Only whether a God exists, not the Christian God.

Festerthetester

This topic is purely opinion since there is no proof one way or the other. However, if one simply reflects on the hundreds of previous incarnations of god that humans have invented it can easily be discarded as belief in magic and nothing more.

Furthermore, although as stated there is no proof, science marches on and bit by bit we have learned how things work which squeezes a belief in a creator or any such thing into an increasingly tiny corner of reality.

On the other hand, if there is a god who has the slightest concern for the existence of humanity, where is the evidence? To be clear, by evidence I don't mean lack of a better explanation. I mean actual evidence.

Lincoy3304
Festerthetester wrote:

This topic is purely opinion since there is no proof one way or the other. However, if one simply reflects on the hundreds of previous incarnations of god that humans have invented it can easily be discarded as belief in magic and nothing more.

Furthermore, although as stated there is no proof, science marches on and bit by bit we have learned how things work which squeezes a belief in a creator or any such thing into an increasingly tiny corner of reality.

On the other hand, if there is a god who has the slightest concern for the existence of humanity, where is the evidence? To be clear, by evidence I don't mean lack of a better explanation. I mean actual evidence.

That’s pretty fair, the hundreds of thousands of previous Gods. 
However, I think philosophical thinking would be helpful, not just scientific. I’m not nearly as scientifically well-versed compared to how philosophically well-versed I am. I prefer Plantinga’s Ontological Argument and Leibniz’s Cosmological Argument rather than the Kalam or Teleological Argument. Scientific Evidence could be very well brought up, but a scientific explanation is too easily put together. I think I can put up a good defense for the Kalam and Teleological argument, but not nearly as good as the other, more philosophical arguments.

Lincoy3304

I’m too tired right now, so I’ll do it tomorrow. It’s 11:50 pm where I am currently.

Lincoy3304

Sorry I didn’t write it today. I’m currently at a camp with my family and did not expect to have that much time out of my day taken up. I’ll try to find time tomorrow to write a bit.

Lincoy3304

I don’t think the ontological argument slips in premises. It’s a logically valid inference.

Within modal logic, if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessarily true. I think it is plausible that God exists in some possible world, and, given that a characteristic of God is being necessary existent, God exists in all possible worlds and thus exists in the actual world. I can list out Plantinga’s argument in full if you want me to, but I doubt I need to.

Maybe for future references I could

Lincoy3304

The Kalam argument, I think, is an elementary form of logical validity.

Premise 1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

Premise 2: The Universe began to exist.

Conclusion: The Universe has a cause of its existence.

Logically put, the argument can be formulated as such:

Premise 1: (x)(Ex—>Cx)

Premise 2: Eu

Conclusion: Cu

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:

Yes although I don't think we can claim that premise one is necessarily true.

In any case, the second and third premises seem redundant and everything rests on the judgement someone will make regarding the first premise. I've seen the Kalam attempted with more stages and quite an effort to hide the part where the reader is invited to arrive at the desired conclusion, that God cause the universe to exist and that, therefore, God exists.

Yes, Premise 1 is a *slightly* controversial premise because of quantum mechanics. However, only 2 interpretations out of the many different interpretations of the laws of quantum mechanics include uncaused causes. Regardless, believing that the entire universe came into being from quantum fluctuations is even more improbable than 1 in 10^(10^100). The steady state theory commits some philosophical problems that the new Kalam arguments address.

Lincoy3304

I read that in a journal somewhere, so I’ll find the quote soon.

Also, you can accept Premise 1 and reject Premise 2, which the Steady State Theory does. Premise one only applies to things that begin to exist, not everything that exists.

Lincoy3304

Are you a modal skeptic then? That will likely influence a later discussion.

For premise 1, it just seems intuitive that everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

Also, everything can be determined and God still be necessarily existent.
Elroch likely is agnostic, but probably leaning toward the atheist side.

Lincoy3304

Yes, they definitely do. Skeptics aren’t skeptical of skepticism.

Lincoy3304

A modal skeptic is someone who does not believe that modal logic is a useful tool to help with descriptions of reality or anything else.

Modal logic deals with necessary (true in all possible world), possible (true in at least one possible world), and contingent truths (true in some worlds but false in others). It’s a more advanced system of logic, and most people who get a bachelors in philosophy don’t take a class on it. I only studied it for Plantinga’s Ontological Argument. Gödel’s Ontological Argument is still beyond me, for now.

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:
Lincoy3304 wrote:

A modal skeptic is someone who does not believe that modal logic is a useful tool to help with descriptions of reality or anything else.

Modal logic deals with necessary (true in all possible world), possible (true in at least one possible world), and contingent truths (true in some worlds but false in others). It’s a more advanced system of logic, and most people who get a bachelors in philosophy don’t take a class on it. I only studied it for Plantinga’s Ontological Argument. Gödel’s Ontological Argument is still beyond me, for now.

Yes, Modal Logic is a right load of rubbish, which is true at least in my world. I don't see it as advanced logic. It has more to to with pseudo-logical tricks in rhetoric.

Interesting… few philosophers are modal skeptics. Also, if the S5 axioms of modal logic are true, then Plantinga’s argument is valid.

Also, I was able to show that Plantinga's argument isn't deductive logic at all, and why it isn't. Since then, others have agreed with me. I may have read Gödel's one. I'll find it and post it here.

Can you tell me why Plantinga’s argument isn’t valid?

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:

Unfortunately, the only copy of Gödel's proof I could find is in symbolic notation. Secondly, it's also clear that his arguments aren't accepted in philosophy or by philosophers because his axioms are unsound. Since the article tells us that he used Anselm's arguments as a basis, we can assume that it's identical, except that it's "tarted up" by means of applying his Many Worlds nonsense to it. All he has done, in essence, is to thoroughly disguise the flaws in Anselm's arguments, so it isn't worth learning logical symbolic notation to understand it, since it will be an incorrect argument, in disguise. I think that if it was of any use, that the Wiki article would have rendered it into English. Gödel has a cult status but I'm convinced he was a fake and that his PhD was unearned. His incompleteness theorem is another example of his ability to deceive, which adds nothing to human understanding because it's intuitive anyway and he just found a novel way to represent intuition pseudo-formally.

Strong critique of Gödel, which I disagree with. He did more than the incompleteness theorem and his ontological argument; however, even if is he truly insane, that does not undermine his argument.

We may as well, therefore, consider Anselm's argument, which, by memory, goes something like "any Being that we may imagine to be a greatest real entity is a greater entity than the same Being when it is imagined to exist only in the human understanding. Therefore such a Being is real".

Obviously, I put it in my own words; but I think that's an accurate portrayal of his argument. Equally obviously, it isn't a logically deductive argument but simply an invitation to believe something. Therefore we can assume the same about Gödel's attempt to deceive philosophers. I actually believe that Gödel was probably insane. I believe that Plantinga made a better attempt.

The problem with Anselm’s argument is that he defines God into existence. Not a good argument. Kant showed existence is not a predicate, and Anselm used it as one.

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:

Incidentally, here's another paragraph from the same wiki article. In another discussion we were speaking about computer verification and I argued that it cannot necessarily be trusted, because they are context-dependent. The issue is that the model or Modal logic that was being used is fundamentally incorrect. Now, that should be obvious to anyone after a ten seconds glance at it. It's rhetorically based gibberish, heavily prone to all sorts of sliding meanings. It's linked, of course, to Many Worlds Theory, since Modal logic means model logic or logic that's only applicable to models of reality, with various inbuilt boundaries or sets of properties.

Computer-verified versions[edit] (of Gödel's obviously incorrect Ontological Argument):

Christoph Benzmüller and Bruno Woltzenlogel-Paleo formalized Gödel's proof to a level that is suitable for automated theorem proving or at least computer verification via proof assistants.[20] The effort made headlines in German newspapers. According to the authors of this effort, they were inspired by Melvin Fitting's book.[21]

In 2014, they computer-verified Gödel's proof (in the above version).[22]: 97 [note 9] They also proved that this version's axioms are consistent,[note 10] but imply modal collapse,[note 11] thus confirming Sobel's 1987 argument.

In the same paper, they suspected Gödel's original version of the axioms[note 12] to be inconsistent, as they failed to prove their consistency.[note 13] In 2016, they gave a computer proof that this version implies ◊◻⊥ , i.e. is inconsistent in every modal logic with a reflexive or symmetric accessibility relation.[24]: 940 lf  Moreover, they gave an argument that this version is inconsistent in every logic at all,[note 14] but failed to duplicate it by automated provers.[note 15] However, they were able to verify Melvin Fitting's reformulation of the argument and guarantee its consistency.[25]

Link the wiki article please

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:
Lincoy3304 wrote:

The problem with Anselm’s argument is that he defines God into existence. Not a good argument. Kant showed existence is not a predicate, and Anselm used it as one.

Apparently, G based his arguments on Anselm, so we can assume that they are unsound. Unlike Elroch and others, I don't assume that an argument given in formal logic is correct. My scepticism leads me the other way: I assume that if they don't put it in English, it may well be faulty and they want to hide that.

Well his argument obviously isn’t only in formal logic. He wrote a treatise on it but never published it. It was found later, and someone corrected his logical proof because it was initially incorrect. That assumption (because he based it on something faulty the new thing is faulty) is itself wrong. He fixed many problems with Anselm’s argument. 

I don't think one can show that existence is not a predicate. I take that to mean that existence doesn't alter the quality of something. If the object of an idea exists, it would certainly seem to make it different from the same thing that's only an idea and doesn't exist. We can have an idea of something, whether or not it exists: but then we're only talking about the qualities of our ideas. If Kant was only discussing his ideas of something (either existing or not existing) then he wasn't talking about a "thing", except inasmuch as an idea is a thing.

If existence is a predicate, Anselm’s argument is valid. You can only define things into existence if existence was a predicate.Even then, if we have an idea of a thing and that thing is found to exist, then our idea is part of our picture of reality. If it doesn't exist, it's merely imagination. It seems pretty clear that Kant's idea that existence is not a predicate is an example of having an idea which isn't based on any reality; and so Kant has merely defined into existence the idea that existence isn't a predicate, because to him, all his ideas are good, even if they are not realistic or accurate. That falls in with a picture of Kant, which I gained when studying for my philosophy degree, which was of someone undoubtedly clever; but who pulls the axioms he uses out of thin air. Ultimately, his ideas are meaningless and rather useless.

I’d suggest you not use an argument from authority (or lack of) here. It has no effect on the truth value of Kant’s ideas. His axioms are addressed in his tomes as well. If they aren’t, someone would have identified them and explained them in the introduction, before each chapter, or in footnotes.

I certainly wouldn't trust Kant's ideas any more than those of Gödel.

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:

People also ask "what is modal knowledge?"
 
 
 From ANSWERS ON THE INTERNET:
 
 
"Modal reasoning is central to human cognition, since it is pervasive both in philosophy and in every-day contexts. It involves investigating and evaluating claims about what is possible, impossible, essential, necessary, and contingent."

Sounds like scientific reasoning dressed up in several new dresses at once.

Modal logic came way, way before any sort of modern science.

I think it's drivel and should be rejected as such. The problem is that it's clearly an invitation to opinionatedness and even bigotry. Of course people, in context, try to decide on these things regarding specific cases. A typical modal retort to what I'm writing here and now might be that what I'm writing is impossible.

Wait a minute, they even think essential and necessary are different.

Necessary holds a special place in modal logic; essential does not. Regardless, they just use two similar words with slightly different meaning. All they do is reference two different concepts. 

The point is that modal philosophy was rejected as being a tool of religious apologists. I'm sure the internet will be full of it but that doesn't mean it's philosophically useful. It's an unnecessary invention, used to hide arguments from the unwary. So I would be an extreme modal sceptic. Into the same waste bin with it as Gödel and Kant. It's fake.

Modal logic and reasoning is accepted by the majority of atheist philosophers, so I don’t know where you’re getting this idea of modal reasoning as a “tool of religious apologists”. There’s more arguments involving modal logic than just Plantinga’s Ontological Argument, or Gödel’s. Even then, the intent of the creation/discovery of the idea also has no effect on the truth value of the idea. You’d need to point out to me where you think modal logic fails as being truthful.

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:
Lincoy3304 wrote:
Optimissed wrote:
Lincoy3304 wrote:
 

Interesting… few philosophers are modal skeptics. Also, if the S5 axioms of modal logic are true, then Plantinga’s argument is valid.

Can you tell me why Plantinga’s argument isn’t valid?

His "argument" isn't constructed as an argument should be, with propositions that lead unerringly to the desired conclusion. So not only are his axioms incorrect but the way he deals with them doesn't amount to a properly valid argument.

Under modal logic, his propositions do lead unerringly to the conclusion. It’s a logical necessity. You can say his axions are incorrect, but fewer axioms in modal logic are inconsistent when applied to his argument than consistent. I don’t know where you’re getting this “it’s not a properly valid argument” either. It definitely is, under most sets of axioms of modal logic. You would be illogical if you actually committed yourself to that.

Lincoy3304

I think we should get back a bit and settle a fundamental issue: “What does it mean to believe in God?”

You just told me it’s a matter of faith. I don’t know if you mean that to be exclusive to all other things, but I hope you do not. All we are talking about here is if a God exists, not a specific type of God. It could be a God that wants us to find out if he exists using our rational mind. 
Also, I reject your axiomatic definition of the existence of God. There is definitely evidence for (variety of cosmological arguments, etc…) and against (variety of problem of evil arguments, etc…) God’s existence. You only asserted that the existence of God is axiomatic, and provided no reason behind it. Even if our entire belief in God was is supposed to be “just by faith” then that does not rule out using rational arguments to start off your belief in God. Can you provide some evidence for God’s existence being axiomatic?

Lincoy3304
Optimissed wrote:

I think that if you would wish to use modal logic to prove anything, you would have to show that such a proof fulfils the demands of syllogistic logic. Otherwise you or anybody haven't proved a thing. If an argument cannot be tracked logically, it's fraudulent.

Well, modal logic isn’t sentential logic. All statement used with modal logic such as possible worlds, contingent truths, possible truths, necessary truths, etc… are all just ways of recognizing that the philosopher is using modal logic instead of regular logic.

It seems to be the case that modal logic attempts to use inductive reasoning where induction is incorrect or inapplicable, probably by attempting to set up a series of situations or models where it has a façade of correctness and then smuggling in a syllogism. Ontological arguments use slippage of meaning, ambiguity and/or straightforward deception to achieve that. It's impossible to prove that God exists and it should be thought undesirable to try.

Why is it impossible to prove that God exists?

Sorry I'm arguing in a very robust fashion but after all, it's an important subject and should be treated seriously. I'm very aware that Elroch and/or some others might approach this differently from me but the way we argue depends on what we're capable of seeing and understanding clearly. Deduction is deduction and if a modal argument intimates that God exists, it certainly isn't via deduction and therefore it cannot be a proof.

Under the S5 axioms of modal logic, Plantinga’s argument is completely valid and that is accepted by all academic philosophers. The question is if one of his 5 initial premises are false. His original variation has many more premises than WLC’s version meant to teach philosophical uneducated people.