Postmodernism has a lot to answer for

Sort:
Avatar of MindWalk
Zechek wrote: MindWalk replies in blue:
dareyou2win wrote:
Without science, your everyday decision making would consist of "Do I hunt an animal or clean myself off at the pond?".

I acknowledged that in the sentence preceding the one you marked, don't play smart.

If postmodernist is an idiot that chooses to ignore stuff arbitrarily to suit his fantasy than you are right MindWalk.

But, I have a different person in mind. Maybe that's not your postmodernist, maybe we can call it a sceptic. I'm a skeptic, meaning that I generally do not hold beliefs without good reason, and that the degree of confidence with which I hold a belief depends on how strong the evidence and arguments for it are. We'll see if that's what you mean.

Firstly it's a person with no claim on universality. His philosophy is applicable only to him, and he doesn't care if it's applicable to any other human being. I'm not quite sure what "applicable" means here.

Secondly, he aims to find things that make sense. In terms of science, that means he'll use that refrigirator because it keeps his food fresh, he'll accept the law of gravity if he can use it to accuratly determine how to hit his neighbours cat. Let me point out that in so doing he is accepting that there is an objectively existing reality of which his senses give him reasonably reliable information. He has also, presumably, learned that other people also seem to gain reasonably reliable information about it via their senses, and that other people's observations can count as evidentiary if error does not infect them. He learns that sometimes, care is necessary in properly interpreting what we observe. But if the other fellow tells you that he just watched a play at the local theater, and if you have no reason to think he's lying, it's reasonable to suppose that there really was just a play at the local theater. But he will also take the newest finding on brain funcionality with a grain of salt, because from his experience that doesn't quite work like that, and he can afford to do that, until more is known on the subject. The *newest* finding is one he should probably have some reservations about, because it hasn't yet been confirmed by other researchers. Whether or not to tentatively accept it with a fair degree of confidence depends on what he knows about the research and the researchers and how surprising he finds the result in light of that knowledge. On the other hand, he should accept well-confirmed scientific findings, even counterintuitive ones, with a much higher degree of confidence. It would be perverse to withhold belief in them simply because he did not personally carry out the research, as long as he knows that the findings are in fact well-confirmed. He might also find that astrology is incredibly accurate in his hands and can use it to great effect. You let me know when someone actually finds that to be true.  Perhaps he thinks the world is indeed just a computer program like in Matrix, and finds that incredibly relevant to his everyday life. I don't know why anyone would think that. I can easily see why someone might withhold judgment as to whether or not there was an objectively existing reality of which his senses gave him reasonably reliable information--i.e., as to whether or not he was *not* merely experiencing a virtual reality--but the everyday living of his life requires him to treat even a virtual reality exactly as though it were not merely virtual. And if he wants to assign moral worth to other people, then he needs to assume that there are actually are other people, which means assuming that he is not merely experiencing virtual reality.

It's a man that doesn't ignore the bullet science created that killed him, but a man who whishes he had just a little more time to meditate, because he would then be able to stop that bullet with his mind. Good luck stopping bullets with your mind. Presumably, that man has scads and scads of evidence that bullets can kill and that minds do not stop bullets, so it's hard to see why he would think that having a little more time to meditate would help.

That is not a man that is against science and doesn't wish to denounce it, but is also walking on the fringes of science and even beyond where that is applicable. It looks to me as though he's either ignoring quite a bit of it or else simply ignorant of quite a bit of it. If he's simply ignorant of quite a bit of it, then he has good reason to be cautious about holding beliefs in the areas of which he is ignorant. But he also has good reason to accept with a fair degree of confidence well-confirmed scientific results in even those areas, so that if he learns that scientists regard something as a fact, he should, too, and if he learns that scientists regard a theory as very well-confirmed, he should, too.

Avatar of MindWalk

About the construction of mental world-models....

We form mental world-models. We form a Star Trek-world mental world-model, in which Capt. Kirk and Mr. Spock are treated as real. We form a Harry Potter-world mental world-model, in which Dumbledore and Voldemort are treated as real. And we form a mental real-world world-model, in which Mom and Dad are treated as real.

My mental real-world world-model is formed from sensory impressions. When I find that my sight and touch coordinate, I treat the orange in my hand as real, and I treat the table as real, and so on--the things right around me, that I can sense right now, are treated as real. When I learn that other people can still stumble over blocks left in the living room even when I'm asleep, I start learning to see objects as persisting in an objectively existing reality of which my senses give me reasonably reliable information.

I go on to include more and more in my real-world mental world-model. I learn to trust my neighbor's senses, too. She says she saw a hawk in yonder tree yesterday? OK, there was a hawk in yonder tree yesterday. She says she traveled to China last year? OK, there is such a place as China. And so on. My mental real-world world-model expands. It includes even faraway objects like the Sun and the Moon. I also learn that the senses with which we detect features of objectively existing reality can be extended by scientific instruments. Geiger counters can detect gamma radiation. Doctors and dentists can use X-rays to take pictures of the inside of my body. Magnetic fields can be detected by the appropriate instruments. I also learn that we are able to gather clues about the past. I learn that once, there were dinosaurs. And I trust that that's so because I trust that other people really have dug up dinosaur bones and really have used refined techniques developed by many scientifically-minded people to figure out how old they are and what sorts of animals they were. I trust that "science knows more than I do." And the more my real-world mental world-model aligns with well-established scientific facts and well-established scientific theories, the closer my real-world mental world-model comes to accurately reflecting objectively existing reality, in all probability.

Now, I *could* go all the way back and simply *not* think of the blocks that it seems someone else can trip over even while I'm asleep as persisting objects in an objectively existing reality. I *could* restrict the statements I make, carefully speaking only of my mental images and mental sounds and mental tactile sensations and never speaking of apples or oranges or tables or chairs or lions or tigers--or other people. Mine would then be a much more limited real-world mental world-model, of course--but I could do that. And then there just wouldn't be much that I agreed was true.

I should note that I generally do not object to the saying of "I don't know." If we don't know, that's what we should say. Sometimes, it seems as though ridiculously high bars are being set for agreement that thus-and-such is true, but OK, if someone wants to set a ridiculously high bar for belief, he certainly may. But I do want to see consistency. I don't want to see a ridiculously high bar set for one belief (say, belief that evolution happened) but a ridiculously low bar set for another belief (say, belief in God).

Avatar of dareyou2win

Wow, I was just going to leave his ignorant response alone. It's obvious he wants to live in a fantasy world where rules don't apply.

Avatar of MttWaldron

The premise of a scientific worldview is that the scientific method, rational observation and description of objective truth, is the epistemological foundation that supports a way of knowing and living which is True. Science has enabled humanity to know of and to embrace astounding insights into nature, the universe, and human health. Science has also paved the way for the very technology that I am using to write this post. It seems that one would then reasonably conclude that, in the great meritocracy of useful (versus un-useful) ideas, science is (and ought to remain) preeminent.

While I admire much of what science has done, I do not hold to the scientific worldview as I outlined it above. Yes, it is possible to admire and benefit from science and not have to adopt the entire philosophy espoused by science’s ardent defenders. As a citizen I sometimes benefit from the legislation of political parties whose views differ from my own - just because some policies are helpful does not mean that I then must reorient my life; change parties. Is this a dubious analogy? Those who think that the insights and benefits of science are impeccable most certainly would find this analogy wanting. But science is not impeccable. Scientific truth has been tragically wrong at times, and technology has at times had horrifically unintended consequences. One responds, 'Yes, but these errors are corrected in time.' It is believed that a scientific worldview, self-correcting itself into future time, will bring the best and most useful yield to our species, our planet, and our cosmos. This is the belief, and it is in fact a Belief - a Faith. Namely, Faith in what science will do in the future as it continues to correct itself. I am not the first to point out that such Faith in science has all of the signs of conventional religion. Most noticeable the all-or-nothing thinking found in a lot of fundamentalist movements... i.e. saying, ‘You benefit from the Internet and now you must completely subscribe to a scientific worldview’ is case in point of this all-or-nothing view at work.

Regarding the issue of self-correcting, much is made of Galileo shattering the Church's erroneous view of the movements of planets; that the Church could not bear to change its course in the light of such damaging truth. Yet over time Christianity did change its course. When science corrects an error it is a sign of its sure footed wisdom, when a religion does this it is a sign of its inherent folly - a double standard to be sure. One responds 'Yes but, changes in religion are prompted by scientific inquiry - they are operating upon the one true playing field of science and so 'they change because science dictates the change.'' Thus concluding that when religions do make mid-stream adjustments of truths it may indeed be a sign of their inherent flaws. Not so. Not all changes in religion are prompted by science. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi, in revisiting the roots of their respective faith traditions, articulated positive social changes independent of scientific analysis; examples of religious perspective changing course not as a result of a Copernican revolution.

 

I am person of religious conviction, though not a fundamentalist. I take the opposing view in this thread not because I am post-modern but because post-modernity gives breathing room to sources of truth such as Divine revelation, traditional cultural truths - alongside scientific truth. Sure, my stance may have 'a lot to answer for.' But so does Modernity. One is quick to point out grievous errors and violence in Church history, or the misguided trails that post-modernity has led us down. I am not proud of such things but I acknowledge them. Will those of the scientific mindset acknowledge the horrendous human rights record of the Soviet Union? Will they acknowledge the horror of aligning social darwinism with ethnic nationalist pride? 

Avatar of dareyou2win
MttWaldron wrote:

The premise of a scientific worldview is that the scientific method, rational observation and description of objective truth, is the epistemological foundation that supports a way of knowing and living which is True. Science has enabled humanity to know of and to embrace astounding insights into nature, the universe, and human health. Science has also paved the way for the very technology that I am using to write this post. It seems that one would then reasonably conclude that, in the great meritocracy of useful (versus un-useful) ideas, science is (and ought to remain) preeminent.

While I admire much of what science has done, I do not hold to the scientific worldview as I outlined it above. Yes, it is possible to admire and benefit from science and not have to adopt the entire philosophy espoused by science’s ardent defenders. This is not a contest. Using the term "ardent defenders" while admitting yourself that science accomplishes real things and forwards our understanding of the world puts your position into question. As a citizen I sometimes benefit from the legislation of political parties whose views differ from my own - just because some policies are helpful does not mean that I then must reorient my life; change parties. Is this a dubious analogy? I don't know. Good question. Those who think that the insights and benefits of science are impeccable most certainly would find this analogy wanting. But science is not impeccable. Scientific truth has been tragically wrong at times, and technology has at times had horrifically unintended consequences. You're misusing the word "truth" A truth can't be wrong by definition. Some theories held by science have been proven wrong over the years, but nobody claimed they were absolute truth. The only people I see claiming absolute truths are religious people. One responds, 'Yes, but these errors are corrected in time.' It is believed that a scientific worldview, self-correcting itself into future time, will bring the best and most useful yield to our species, our planet, and our cosmos. This is the belief, and it is in fact a Belief - a Faith. Namely, Faith in what science will do in the future as it continues to correct itself. I am not the first to point out that such Faith in science has all of the signs of conventional religion. Yes, all except one. We know science exists. Faith is identical to itself in all cases of faith. However, like you pointed out earlier, science has produced real technologies and affected our reality. Most noticeable the all-or-nothing thinking found in a lot of fundamentalist movements... i.e. saying, ‘You benefit from the Internet and now you must completely subscribe to a scientific worldview’ No one's saying this. The internet is simply an example of one invention science has caused. is case in point of this all-or-nothing view at work.

Regarding the issue of self-correcting, much is made of Galileo shattering the Church's erroneous view of the movements of planets; that the Church could not bear to change its course in the light of such damaging truth. Yet over time Christianity did change its course. When science corrects an error it is a sign of its sure footed wisdom, when a religion does this it is a sign of its inherent folly - a double standard to be sure. I agree and disagree at this point. Objectively speaking, you're correct to say this. However, when science asserts a theory, it is done (generally) without ego. It's possible religion's seemingly dogmatic stances are to blame for such backlash, while science doesn't get as bad of a rap because they only ever state "theories". One responds 'Yes but, changes in religion are prompted by scientific inquiry - they are operating upon the one true playing field of science and so 'they change because science dictates the change.'' Thus concluding that when religions do make mid-stream adjustments of truths it may indeed be a sign of their inherent flaws. Not so. Not all changes in religion are prompted by science. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi, in revisiting the roots of their respective faith traditions, articulated positive social changes independent of scientific analysis; examples of religious perspective changing course not as a result of a Copernican revolution.

 

I am person of religious conviction, though not a fundamentalist. I take the opposing view in this thread not because I am post-modern but because post-modernity gives breathing room to sources of truth such as Divine revelation, traditional cultural truths - alongside scientific truth. As long as you're not close-minded about which sources of truth you personally want to accept, this is actually a mature view. Sure, my stance may have 'a lot to answer for.' But so does Modernity. One is quick to point out grievous errors and violence in Church history, or the misguided trails that post-modernity has led us down. I am not proud of such things but I acknowledge them. Will those of the scientific mindset acknowledge the horrendous human rights record of the Soviet Union? Will they acknowledge the horror of aligning social darwinism with ethnic nationalist pride? Not sure what you're getting at here.

Avatar of MindWalk

 

MttWaldron wrote: MindWalk replies in red:

The premise of a scientific worldview is that the scientific method, rational observation and description of objective truth, is the epistemological foundation that supports a way of knowing and living which is True. No. A way of knowing is not true. A way of living is not true. The proposition expressed by the sentence "Jupiter is the most massive planet in the Solar system," under its natural interpretation, is true. The proposition expressed by the sentence "Two plus two equals four," under its natural interpretation, is true. About some things, there is a fact of the matter--they really are so or they really are not so. There are facts: a fact is what really is so. There are states of affairs: what could, at least for the sake of argument, possibly be so or possibly not be so. We say that states of affairs obtain or fail to obtain. When states of affairs obtain, we label them "facts." When states of affairs do not obtain, we do not. (We might think of them as "wannabe facts.") When a sentence is used to assert the obtaining of a state of affairs, it is either true or false--true, if the state of affairs it says obtains really does obtain; false, if the state of affairs it says obtains really does not obtain. So, the sentence "Jupiter is the most massive planet in the Solar system," naturally interpreted, is true; "Saturn is the most massive planet in the Solar system," naturally interpreted, is false. (As long as we understand the intended meanings of each other's sentences, we can drop the reference to interpretation and can forget about propositions and can just say that sentences are true or false, as long as they are of the right sort, i.e., the sort intended to assert the obtaining of a state of affairs.) Now, a way of drawing conclusions may be entirely reliable, in which case we think of it as a way of knowing, or it may be generally reliable, in which case we may trust it generally as a way of knowing while recognizing that we might sometimes be mistaken, or it may be unreliable, in which case it is not a way of knowing at all. We do trust our senses and scientific instruments to give us generally reliable information about the world around us, and we do trust our rational thought processes to give us generally reliable information about logical and mathematical truths. So, we trust science, conducted by those who understand how to properly apply logic to statements and who have a good knowledge of logical and mathematical truths, as a way of generally reliably arriving at truths about the world. *This is independent of any use to which our understanding of scientific truth might be put*. As for ways of living, a way of living may be found useful, or it may be found satisfying; it may serve some end or ends, or it may simply please us. Although beliefs are justified by evidence and argumentation--epistemic justification--actions are justified by their ends or simply by our being motivated to perform them. We may choose ways of behaving that involve the denial of scientific truths, if we wish; but the scientific truths remain truths. Science has enabled humanity to know of and to embrace astounding insights into nature, the universe, and human health. Science has also paved the way for the very technology that I am using to write this post. It seems that one would then reasonably conclude that, in the great meritocracy of useful (versus un-useful) ideas, science is (and ought to remain) preeminent. Notice that these are two distinct points: (1) science has given us a great deal of knowledge about the world--indeed, *only* science gives us knowledge about the world; (2) scientific understanding has enabled the creation of much technology, some beneficial, some harmful, some both.

While I admire much of what science has done, I do not hold to the scientific worldview as I outlined it above. Yes, it is possible to admire and benefit from science and not have to adopt the entire philosophy espoused by science’s ardent defenders. As a citizen I sometimes benefit from the legislation of political parties whose views differ from my own - just because some policies are helpful does not mean that I then must reorient my life; change parties. Is this a dubious analogy? One may, of course, place no value on scientific understanding but still derive benefit from technology developed on the basis of scientific understanding. Sure. But not to place value on scientific understanding is to misunderstand the nature of scientific understanding, for science just learns about the world the way we all do, except in a more careful, systematic, thorough way. Those who think that the insights and benefits of science are impeccable most certainly would find this analogy wanting. But science is not impeccable. Scientific truth has been tragically wrong at times, and technology has at times had horrifically unintended consequences. Scientific truth has never been wrong. However, what has been accepted as true by the scientific community has sometimes turned out to be wrong. One responds, 'Yes, but these errors are corrected in time.' It is believed that a scientific worldview, self-correcting itself into future time, will bring the best and most useful yield to our species, our planet, and our cosmos. This is the belief, and it is in fact a Belief - a Faith. It's not unjustified belief. How do you make sure that what you believe is true? You keep checking what you think is true, and if you find you're mistaken, you revise your beliefs. Uncle George is coming over; you hear a knock at the door; you think, "Ah, Uncle George is here"; you open the door and see the FedEx guy instead; you revise your belief. Keep looking, check what you believe, check it again, keep looking--that's how you gain knowledge. Namely, Faith in what science will do in the future as it continues to correct itself. I can't help it if you don't think that continued observation and checking and re-checking of beliefs will help weed out the false ones. I am not the first to point out that such Faith in science has all of the signs of conventional religion. It does, to people who don't understand the difference between justified belief and unjustified belief, or between well-justified belief and poorly justified belief, or between empirically testable belief and empirically untestable belief. Most noticeable the all-or-nothing thinking found in a lot of fundamentalist movements... i.e. saying, ‘You benefit from the Internet and now you must completely subscribe to a scientific worldview’ is case in point of this all-or-nothing view at work. Although the fact that science demonstrably enables us to do things that no other method has enabled us to do, which serves as confirmation of the predictions of scientific theories and therefore gives us confidence in them, it is not what is done with scientific understanding that justifies belief that science really does get us knowledge and understanding of the world. Scientific understanding, on one hand, and the uses to which scientific understanding is put, on the other, must be kept strictly separate when evaluating science as a way of getting at what is true about the world.

Regarding the issue of self-correcting, much is made of Galileo shattering the Church's erroneous view of the movements of planets; that the Church could not bear to change its course in the light of such damaging truth. Yet over time Christianity did change its course. When science corrects an error it is a sign of its sure footed wisdom, when a religion does this it is a sign of its inherent folly - a double standard to be sure. When scientists change their beliefs about how the world works, it is because evidence compels them to, and that's just the scientific method at work. What seemed most likely turned out not to be true--well, OK, that's one way science makes progress. When religious leaders do the same thing--and because of evidence--they are doing something manifestly different. Scientific understanding is *supposed* to be tentative, probabilistic, and subject to revision to accord with future observation. Religious understanding is supposed to be God's revealed truth and is *not* supposed to be tentative or to be subject to revision. One responds 'Yes but, changes in religion are prompted by scientific inquiry - they are operating upon the one true playing field of science and so 'they change because science dictates the change.'' Thus concluding that when religions do make mid-stream adjustments of truths it may indeed be a sign of their inherent flaws. Not so. Not all changes in religion are prompted by science. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi, in revisiting the roots of their respective faith traditions, articulated positive social changes independent of scientific analysis; examples of religious perspective changing course not as a result of a Copernican revolution. Religions may change for reasons other than evidential ones. Of course, it is hard to take them seriously as sources of God's revealed truth when they do.

 

I am person of religious conviction, though not a fundamentalist. I take the opposing view in this thread not because I am post-modern but because post-modernity gives breathing room to sources of truth such as Divine revelation, I would be interested in learning what reason there is to think that there is such a thing as divine revelation, especially given that I do not see good reason to think that a sentient, universe-creating God who cares about humanity exists at all. traditional cultural truths I do not know what you mean by "traditional cultural truths," unless you have in mind such things as knowledge of how to make a certain food or of how best to construct an arch or some such. - alongside scientific truth. Sure, my stance may have 'a lot to answer for.' But so does Modernity. One is quick to point out grievous errors and violence in Church history, or the misguided trails that post-modernity has led us down. I am not proud of such things but I acknowledge them. Will those of the scientific mindset acknowledge the horrendous human rights record of the Soviet Union? Will they acknowledge the horror of aligning social darwinism with ethnic nationalist pride? Of course we concede such things. Neither of those militates *in the slightest* against acceptance of the scientific enterprise as our best way of learning about the world. Scientists are not responsible for politicians' abuses of technology or, in the case of social Darwinism, for the misunderstanding and misapplication of scientific theory.  

Avatar of MttWaldron

Response to MindWalk

In the first paragraph I am trying to establish the viewpoint of a scientific worldview because I would like establish what the other person is thinking (as best as I am able) before I state my own claims. Regarding your response to my first sentence I am still pondering if the ontological difference between what is 'fact' and 'states of affairs' does not mean that the latter cannot be labeled true. After some thought I believe the best word would be 'authenticity' regarding states of affairs.

A few other responses to what you wrote:

Justified faith verses Unjustified faith. MindWalk your faith is not as justified as you think. Faith that the progress of science is making the world better is based on the assumption that the side effects of technology or conclusions drawn from faulty theories (which have not been corrected yet) will not be more disastrous as the future unfolds. That is a pretty big assumption to take and makes your faith in science less justified. A nuclear disaster would derail the whole scientific enterprise because we would all be dead and could not continue on into the brave-new-and-improved world that science promises to bring us.

 

You wrote, 'Religions may change for reasons other than evidential ones. Of course, it is hard to take them seriously as sources of God's revealed truth when they do.' I disagree. It shows a striving for authenticity. I shows that truth (religious or scientific) is often nuanced and takes discernment to get at its essence ever more fully.

 

You say that, 'Scientists are not responsible for politicians' abuses of technology...' So they are only responsible for creating the technology and making scientific claims but from there bear no responsibility to how things are used after that? When things go right they certainly take responsibility. Moreover, politics and state-craft fall into the category of social sciences and a lot of the political disasters of the 20th century were from regimes consciously enacting social scientific understandings of governing. 

Avatar of MindWalk
MttWaldron wrote: MindWalk replies in red:

Response to MindWalk

In the first paragraph I am trying to establish the viewpoint of a scientific worldview because I would like establish what the other person is thinking (as best as I am able) before I state my own claims. Regarding your response to my first sentence I am still pondering if the ontological difference between what is 'fact' and 'states of affairs' does not mean that the latter cannot be labeled true. After some thought I believe the best word would be 'authenticity' regarding states of affairs.

No. Jupiter's being the most massive planet in the Solar system is a state of affairs; so is Saturn's being the most massive planet in the Solar system. Two plus two's equaling four is a state of affairs; so is two plus two's equaling five. Tigers' being striped is a state of affairs; so is tigers' being polka-dotted. Barack Obama's being American is a state of affairs; so is Barack Obama's being Russian. You get the idea, I hope. Of each of those, the first state of affairs obtains (and is therefore a fact); the second, in each case, does not obtain (and is not a fact, despite being a "wannabe fact"). I don't see what "authenticity" has to do with it. Facts are facts; nonfacts aren't. (And facts correspond to truths, and nonfactual states of affairs correspond to falsehoods. Truths and falsehoods are statements or beliefs or thoughts affirming the obtaining of states of affairs. If what one affirms is factual, then his affirmation is true. If what one affirms is nonfactual [but is still a state of affairs], then his affirmation is false.)

A few other responses to what you wrote:

Justified faith verses Unjustified faith. MindWalk your faith is not as justified as you think. Faith that the progress of science is making the world better I did not say that science was making the world better. I said that scientific understanding of the world was progressing. Those are two different things. Confusing them is likely to lead to absurd conclusions. Of course, we may also say that technology is progressing, in that we are able to construct more and more devices of more and more different kinds--but that doesn't mean that our doing so is always a good idea or that every time we do so we make the world better. is based on the assumption that the side effects of technology or conclusions drawn from faulty theories (which have not been corrected yet) will not be more disastrous as the future unfolds. That is a pretty big assumption to take and makes your faith in science less justified. Since I did not make that claim, I did not make that assumption, and it does not affect my "faith" in science. I am concerned with scientific understanding of how the world works. And that understanding does progress, and the belief that it does is certainly justified both by past experience and by simple examination of the method of making observations, drawing inferences, and checking them and rechecking them. A nuclear disaster would derail the whole scientific enterprise because we would all be dead and could not continue on into the brave-new-and-improved world that science promises to bring us.

 

You wrote, 'Religions may change for reasons other than evidential ones. Of course, it is hard to take them seriously as sources of God's revealed truth when they do.' I disagree. It shows a striving for authenticity. I shows that truth (religious or scientific) is often nuanced and takes discernment to get at its essence ever more fully. (1) It would be nice to know what you meant by "authenticity." (2) Different people hold different religious beliefs. I do not know yours. Those whose religious beliefs are based on what is supposedly God's revealed truth (as in the Bible or the Qur'an)--especially if they are based on something like the Pope's infallible interpretation--have the problem that any change in doctrine that is contrary to previous doctrine constitutes a reversal of what is supposedly God's revealed word. Perhaps your approach to religious belief is not like that. (3) How do you know when you've "[gotten] at its essence more fully"? I know what kind of testing you do to check your beliefs in science; but what kind of testing do you do to check your beliefs in religion?

 

You say that, 'Scientists are not responsible for politicians' abuses of technology...' So they are only responsible for creating the technology Charles Darwin's theory of evolution did not create technology. It contributed to our understanding of how the world works. Albert Einstein's theories of special and general relativity did not create technology. They contributed to our understanding of how the world works. And so on. Of course, you may choose to hold scientists morally responsible, to some degree, for how their contributions to our understanding of how the world works are used, although I wouldn't agree with doing so; but if you do, that is a *separate question* from the question of whether or not scientific understanding progresses or the question of whether or not scientific understanding is our only reliable way of learning how the world works. and making scientific claims but from there bear no responsibility to how things are used after that? When things go right they certainly take responsibility. Moreover, politics and state-craft fall into the category of social sciences and a lot of the political disasters of the 20th century were from regimes consciously enacting social scientific understandings of governing. I don't know whether that is true or not, partly because I don't know much about what "social scientific understanding of governing" social scientists have established; but I do ask you to name one instance. (Social Darwinism won't count: it is a misunderstanding of a biological theory and a misapplication of it in a domain beyond that of which it gives us understanding. You can hardly hold scientists responsible for other people's mistaken interpretations of scientific theories.) 

How do you yourself learn about the world? You look around. You use your senses to gather information about it. You notice patterns and regularities--dropped objects fall, for instance. You formulate hypotheses--you hear a knock at the door, see Uncle George's car in the driveway, remember that Aunt Edna just called to say that Uncle George would be over shortly, and hypothesize that Uncle George is at the door. Then you check: you open the door. Maybe it's Uncle George--great! Confirmation. Maybe it's a broken tree limb hanging in the tree just outside the door. Oh. Not Uncle George after all--and you stop believing it's Uncle George at the door. You learn about the world the same way scientists do. Scientists are just more careful, more thorough, more systematic, and perform more extensive investigations with devices that allow them to detect more than just what your senses detect. But unless you think that you don't really gain information about the world that way, you're committed to thinking that scientists gain information about the world that way. Bingo.

Progress in scientific understanding is like the progress in a detective's understanding of how a crime occurred. Clues are gathered. Hypotheses are formed. More clues are gathered. Are they consistent with the hypothesis? Great. Are they inconsistent with the hypothesis? Hmm. A new hypothesis is needed, or an emendation of the old one. With the gathering of lots of clues, the detective gets a pretty fair idea of how the crime occurred. Scientists learn similarly.

If you don't like automation, the atom bomb, or other features of modern society depending on scientific understanding, well, OK. But that doesn't somehow mean that the *understanding* isn't there.

Avatar of Zechek

"I'm not quite sure what "applicable" means here." - Please clarify.


"Let me point out that in so doing he is accepting that there is an objectively existing reality of which his senses give him reasonably reliable information." - That is not necessarily so. He agrees certainly that there is a perception of such a reality, but the true nature of it might be different. He can accept the law of gravity without accepting the theory behind it. It is pervers I agree, but we are not talking about you or me here.


"It would be perverse to withhold belief in them simply because he did not personally carry out the research, as long as he knows that the findings are in fact well-confirmed." - Yes, but why not? I agree with you MindWalk but he may doubt how well-confirmed are they. The truth is, time passed is not a guarantee of any beliefs validity. A well established centuries old truth can be overthrown tomorrow, and in science as well.


"You let me know when someone actually finds that to be true." - it is just an example. The point is that someone can use a method that is outside of scientific understanding successfully.

"...but the everyday living of his life requires him to treat even a virtual reality exactly as though it were not merely virtual." - I agree, but again, we are not talking about you and me here, and it doesn't matter how perverse you find it. He would agree that virtual reality is for him effectivly non virtual, and here is where his acceptance of science lies, but at the same time he really wants to discover the 'true' reality. It is posssible that such a discovery would be beneficial to him, and that's why he finds it relevant.


"And if he wants to assign moral worth to other people, then he needs to assume that there are actually are other people, which means assuming that he is not merely experiencing virtual reality." - I don't understand why you make the difference between people and things, and assume that their complexity is lesser so that you can't assign moral worth to them (whatever that means), even in virtual reality.


"Good luck stopping bullets with your mind. Presumably, that man has scads and scads of evidence that bullets can kill and that minds do not stop bullets, so it's hard to see why he would think that having a little more time to meditate would help." - Again, just an example. Let's assume he does have evidence meditation might stop bullets, science might find the idea ludicrous today but a well established fact tomorrow.


"...he should, too." - Should is an ugly word. If he doesn't find it beneficial to him, why should he?


You make a point that scientific learning is just an extension of normal learning, more systematic, precise etc. I agree with you, and my  postmodernist sceptic would agree with you. So, he is not denying what you're saying. That stays true with all I say below.

But, he puts less faith in the process, is more sceptic of it. You mention reasonable belief, he might disagree about how reasonable is it. He might not trust science or more importantly people to properly apply logic. He might go other way, and believe in things outside of scientific understanding.

He believes that he's wrong about something, which can be something he's 100% sure of. That mistrust in his own resoning he extends to others.

Avatar of dareyou2win
Zechek wrote:

"I'm not quite sure what "applicable" means here." - Please clarify.


"Let me point out that in so doing he is accepting that there is an objectively existing reality of which his senses give him reasonably reliable information." - That is not necessarily so. He agrees certainly that there is a perception of such a reality, but the true nature of it might be different. He can accept the law of gravity without accepting the theory behind it. It is pervers I agree, but we are not talking about you or me here.


"It would be perverse to withhold belief in them simply because he did not personally carry out the research, as long as he knows that the findings are in fact well-confirmed." - Yes, but why not? I agree with you MindWalk but he may doubt how well-confirmed are they. The truth is, time passed is not a guarantee of any beliefs validity. A well established centuries old truth can be overthrown tomorrow, and in science as well.


"You let me know when someone actually finds that to be true." - it is just an example. The point is that someone can use a method that is outside of scientific understanding successfully. Like you keep pointing out every chance you get, something's temporary success is no proof of its future validity. This can be just as much of a coincidence as you claim science is. You have an extreme bias here as this is a blatant double standard, though I can't imagine for the life of me why that is. 

"...but the everyday living of his life requires him to treat even a virtual reality exactly as though it were not merely virtual." - I agree, but again, we are not talking about you and me here, and it doesn't matter how perverse you find it. He would agree that virtual reality is for him effectivly non virtual, and here is where his acceptance of science lies, but at the same time he really wants to discover the 'true' reality. It is posssible that such a discovery would be beneficial to him, and that's why he finds it relevant.


"And if he wants to assign moral worth to other people, then he needs to assume that there are actually are other people, which means assuming that he is not merely experiencing virtual reality." - I don't understand why you make the difference between people and things, and assume that their complexity is lesser so that you can't assign moral worth to them (whatever that means), even in virtual reality.


"Good luck stopping bullets with your mind. Presumably, that man has scads and scads of evidence that bullets can kill and that minds do not stop bullets, so it's hard to see why he would think that having a little more time to meditate would help." - Again, just an example. Let's assume he does have evidence meditation might stop bullets, science might find the idea ludicrous today but a well established fact tomorrow.


"...he should, too." - Should is an ugly word. If he doesn't find it beneficial to him, why should he?


You make a point that scientific learning is just an extension of normal learning, more systematic, precise etc. I agree with you, and my  postmodernist sceptic would agree with you. So, he is not denying what you're saying. That stays true with all I say below.

But, he puts less faith in the process, is more sceptic of it. You mention reasonable belief, he might disagree about how reasonable is it. He might not trust science or more importantly people to properly apply logic. He might go other way, and believe in things outside of scientific understanding.

He believes that he's wrong about something, which can be something he's 100% sure of. That mistrust in his own resoning he extends to others.

Literally everything you've said here is littered with errors or just plain untrue. Where you do have something that MAY resemble a point, your entire argument boils down to "you might be wrong even if I don't know why, therefore all other beliefs are automatically just as valid as any tested and proven one", which is just absurd.

You can't build a philosophy on doubting everything but your personal assumptions. That's called stupid. I've addressed only one point in your post because it's the only thing I feel needs to be cleared up at all here.

Avatar of Zechek

"...which is just as absurd." I agree, because that's not what I'm saying.

"That's called stupid." I agree because that's not the philosophy I'm building. 

Double standards are mentioned and consistency was mentioned as well. I'm all for consistency and no double standards, the confusion is partly my fault as I a was arguing more than one point at the same time, not necessarily mutually inclusive. That's because there's more than one way of tackling postmodernism. There is another point tho, that bias is not as clearly determined. What seems as an inconsistency to you might not to someone else. Why? Are they just stupid, ignorant, crazy? First of all, why do you care, is science threatened by any of those? I don't think so. Secondly, they might be neither right nor wrong. I'm not religious but I can see how praying to a putative god can have a tangible and real benefit to the one praying. You might say it's just a placebo effect, and I would agree with you, but for it to work, it requires real belief. Is that belief inconsistent with science if it provides just as tangible results? I myself can think of flaws in the previous statement from a theoretical aspect. But the practical reality of it is another thing. Thirdly, they might not be as crazy, Maybe the idea they have will be proven to be correct. Am I saying that puts them on par with science? No. I'm saying that even if their explanation of a truth they chanced upon is irrational, if it's true, they can live by it, and have a tangible benefit. You and me will not accept it because it's crazy, but I see no problem if they live by it, nor do I think it threatens science. 

I think people have a problem with science when it presents itself as the authority. The Bringer of Truth. When it yells how great it is, and how it is the only one, and how other truths are a priori wrong by virtue of being non scientific (enough). I'm not saying that's what's science is about, but it does happen around it. That is the real enemy of science. Science doesn't need authority behind it, it doesn't need lobbyists. It defends itself, by virtue of being an analytical experimental exploraiton of nature. Allow people to think by themselves, to judge it on their own, their is no hoax to be discovered (right? :p). 

It occured to me while writing this that the barrier of entry into science and understanding it is higher, which is a part of the problem. It has become less democratic in practice. 

Avatar of MindWalk


Zechek wrote: MindWalk replies in red:

"I'm not quite sure what "applicable" means here." - Please clarify.  Quoting what my comment was about would have been helpful. This is what you said that it was about: "Firstly it's a person with no claim on universality. His philosophy is applicable only to him, and he doesn't care if it's applicable to any other human being." (The person in question is your postmodernist/skeptic.) I do not know what "applicable" means here. Does it mean that he has a perspective on life that he's happy with but that he doesn't feel any need to impose on anyone else? Does it mean that his view might not be objectively legitimate for anyone else? Does it mean that he takes his view to be "true for him" (whatever the hell that means) but not necessarily "true for someone else"? I just don't know what it means to say that his philosophy (his skepticism?) is applicable to himself but not to anyone else. I don't know what you have in mind by that.


"Let me point out that in so doing he is accepting that there is an objectively existing reality of which his senses give him reasonably reliable information." - That is not necessarily so. He agrees certainly that there is a perception of such a reality, but the true nature of it might be different. He can accept the law of gravity without accepting the theory behind it. It is pervers I agree, but we are not talking about you or me here. Again, quoting more would have been helpful. This preceded the blue sentence: "Secondly, he aims to find things that make sense. In terms of science, that means he'll use that refrigirator because it keeps his food fresh, he'll accept the law of gravity if he can use it to accuratly determine how to hit his neighbours cat." He can't use a refrigerator to keep his food fresh if there is no refrigerator. He can't use the law of gravity to determine how to hit his neighbor's cat if there is no neighbor's cat or if there have been no observations made to lead to the understanding of gravity.

Now, what you *might possibly* have in mind is that he can be an instrumentalist about science. Let me illustrate. When you put a magnet on a table, put a piece of paper on top of it, sprinkle iron filings on the paper, and gently shake the paper, the iron filings line up in a certain way. The scientific explanation is in terms of a magnetic field and of magnetic field lines. But an instrumentalist may say, "Well, I see the lining up of the iron filings, but I don't see any magnetic field. It might be very convenient to use the language of 'magnetic fields' when talking about what's going on, so we might go ahead and use that language; but that doesn't mean we're committed to believing that there really are magnetic fields. 'Magnetic field'-talk is just a convenient form of description, that's all." Well, an instrumentalist may say that. As it turns out, postulating the existence of a magnetic field leads to all sorts of testable predictions, and those predictions are borne out, so that if there aren't magnetic fields, then somehow events and features arrange themselves so as to seem as though there were. Still, one may take an instrumentalist view of all talk of theoretical entities.

One might like to go to the extreme of taking sofas to be theoretical entities, too, and treat the use of the word "sofa" instrumentally, doing what seems to himself to be sitting on a sofa without committing himself to the actual existence of a sofa. But it gets dicey if he really wants to go so far as to be an instrumentalist about *everything*. For then he is just a solipsist, or at best, someone who has decided to withhold judgment as to whether solipsism or realism is correct.

What he *cannot* consistently be is a subjective idealist. He cannot say, "I'm withholding belief one way or the other, as to whether physical reality is merely an illusion of my mind or is objectively real--and you should withhold belief, too." For, in order to say "you," he has to assume that there is a "you" to talk about--he has to assume that you, at least, are not merely illusory. And he can't even hold out the possibility that you are merely an illusion in his own mind and that he is merely an illusion in your mind, for then he would be an illusion in your mind, which would in turn be an illusion in his own mind. He can, if he wants to, withhold commitment to their being an objectively existing reality, if he is willing to very carefully *not* speak of tables and chairs but instead speak of table-ish mental images and chair-ish mental images and the like. He can do that.


"It would be perverse to withhold belief in them simply because he did not personally carry out the research, as long as he knows that the findings are in fact well-confirmed." - Yes, but why not? Why not? Because he knows that the findings are well-confirmed! I agree with you MindWalk but he may doubt how well-confirmed are they. The truth is, time passed is not a guarantee of any beliefs validity. A well established centuries old truth can be overthrown tomorrow, and in science as well. This is just a failure to distinguish between *not knowing for sure*, on one hand, and *not having good reason to think it's highly likely*, on the other. You don't have to know something absolutely and for sure to believe it. You just recognize that yes, OK, it's not *dead certain*. Well, fine. It's not *dead certain* that evolution happened. But it's *really highly epistemically likely given the evidence*. So, you accept that it happened while understanding that it's just conceivable that it isn't actually true. You don't say, "It's not absolutely proven, so I'm going to treat both options, that it happened and that it did not happen, as equally likely." But that's what the postmodernist seems to want to do. You can't absolutely prove evolution happened? Well, then, any other story you tell is just as good. Well, no, other stories *aren't* just as good. They don't have the high degree of confirmation that evolution's having happened has.


"You let me know when someone actually finds that to be true." - it is just an example. The point is that someone can use a method that is outside of scientific understanding successfully. Nobody is going to "use astrology successfully" in *understanding the world* or *arriving at truths about the world*. Somebody might very well use it successfully to make a living by pulling the wool over unsuspecting customers' eyes. Someone might very well use it successfully to decide when to schedule his plane flights (because, after all, there really wasn't much of a way *not* to successfully schedule his plane flights).

Now, scientists don't know everything, and it's quite possible that someone will use intuitive methods to make decisions that work just fine. (Sometimes, they only *seem* to work just fine. Consider the woman who rejects a man because her intuition tells her he's wrong for her. She will be sure her intuition "worked for her." But when is there ever a test to see if he really was wrong for her? Maybe he was great for her, but she never gave him a chance. People can think methods of decision-making "work" for them when really they work quite badly for them *but they never find out* because they don't use reliable methods to check.) But using a method that *denies science* isn't likely to get anyone success in understanding the world.

"...but the everyday living of his life requires him to treat even a virtual reality exactly as though it were not merely virtual." - I agree, but again, we are not talking about you and me here, and it doesn't matter how perverse you find it. He would agree that virtual reality is for him effectivly non virtual, and here is where his acceptance of science lies, but at the same time he really wants to discover the 'true' reality. It is posssible that such a discovery would be beneficial to him, and that's why he finds it relevant. If he's trying to get at the Kantian things-in-themselves, good luck to him. But that's not what science tells us, and that's not what he should expect from science. Science tells us about what we observe. And it tells even the stubborn postmodernist about the world *he* observes, whether he accepts it or not.


"And if he wants to assign moral worth to other people, then he needs to assume that there are actually are other people, which means assuming that he is not merely experiencing virtual reality." - I don't understand why you make the difference between people and things, and assume that their complexity is lesser so that you can't assign moral worth to them (whatever that means), even in virtual reality. Human beings have moral worth (or should be treated as though they had moral worth) because they are thinking, feeling beings. But nothing in what is being treated as a virtual reality is being treated as thinking or feeling, because in a virtual reality there is only the veneer, the facade. If you're on Star Trek's holodeck, you're making a mistake if you assign moral worth to a holodeck-generated "person," because there's no person there. A mask has no moral worth.


"Good luck stopping bullets with your mind. Presumably, that man has scads and scads of evidence that bullets can kill and that minds do not stop bullets, so it's hard to see why he would think that having a little more time to meditate would help." - Again, just an example. Let's assume he does have evidence meditation might stop bullets, science might find the idea ludicrous today but a well established fact tomorrow. If he has good evidence that meditation can stop bullets, great. Then science will be on his side. But he has no good evidence for it, and he has plenty of evidence against it, so he shouldn't think he can stop bullets with meditation. He shouldn't hold an outrageous belief just because it's *conceivable* that it could turn out to be true. Conceivability is not good reason for belief. (If you say, "It's just an example," then please think of a better example.)


"...he should, too." - Should is an ugly word. If he doesn't find it beneficial to him, why should he? Oooooo, the "finding it beneficial" line. OK, we have to make a distinction here. Actions are properly justified by their consequences. They are even properly justified by ordinary human needs and desires. But *propositional beliefs*--beliefs about what is and is not so in matters about which there is a fact of the matter--are justified by solid evidence and valid argumentation from premises accepted as true, and when it is a matter of degree, by legitimate probabilistic arguments. They are justified, that is, by the sorts of justifications that support the conclusion that they are *true*, or at least *likely* to be true.

The guy who goes to church and prays to God because he finds it psychologically beneficial, or because he likes the company, or just because he feels like it, is completely justified in taking such action. The guy who *believes that God exists* is not justified by those considerations. He is only justified, if he is justified at all, by the solid evidence he has for thinking that God exists or by the good arguments he has for thinking that God exists. This is crucial. Pragmatism (and fideism) are appropriate when you're talking about *actions*. They're not appropriate when you're talking about *beliefs*.

Science "knows better than I do." I form my mental real-world world-model from my own experiences. But the scientific enterprise incorporates far more experiences than I have ever had, critically evaluated not just by one mind but by many, and when the experts in a scientific field say that a result is really well-confirmed, then unless I think they're liars, I should accept that the result is really well-confirmed, too. There's nothing ugly about this "should." It's just a matter of my forming the most accurate mental real-world world-model I can and using the best information I can use in filling out that model. It gives me my best model of reality.

Can scientists be wrong about what they think is well-confirmed? Yes. Is that the way to bet? It's really, really not. And you shouldn't make it sound as though it were.

You make a point that scientific learning is just an extension of normal learning, more systematic, precise etc. I agree with you, and my  postmodernist sceptic would agree with you. So, he is not denying what you're saying. That stays true with all I say below.

But, he puts less faith in the process, is more sceptic of it. You mention reasonable belief, he might disagree about how reasonable is it. He might not trust science or more importantly people to properly apply logic. He might go other way, and believe in things outside of scientific understanding. No, no, no, and again no! It is not entirely unreasonable for him to set a very high bar for acceptance of scientific results and to say, "You know, I'm just not quite convinced yet." But to then set a *lower* bar for *nonscientific* beliefs--please! You're going to withhold belief from the best-established results and theories we have but then *not* withhold belief from less well-informed purported results and theories that *aren't* as well-established? Why would anyone do that? How could it possibly be reasonable? *Not* believing what's *more* epistemically likely (because it *could conceivably be wrong*) while *believing* what's *less* epistemically likely is simply not rational.

He believes that he's wrong about something, which can be something he's 100% sure of. That mistrust in his own resoning he extends to others.

Avatar of dareyou2win

Lol, he's just someone who wants to feel special. What was the polite term for sophist? Pseudo-intellectual?

His argument is hilarious at its foundation, particularly because the foundation of his argument rests solidly on there being no knowable or reliably observable foundation of reality in general.

He then goes on to reason that while the process of reasoning just can't be relied on, this unknowable reality can occasionally be known through illogical and mystical acts exclusively.

He then uses this same "knowable mysticism theory" as evidence of there being no evidence of science's evidence for anything, and then concludes that he's correct based on a total absence of evidence being necessary according to his own beliefs.

I'm honored, really. This means that I am a mystical being in his mind. A mystical being that he feels is insulting his non-existent ego (he has transcended this so-called "reality" after all. Makes one wonder what he really thinks he's doing when he argues on a chess forum. Maybe it's like flying to him. Or maybe, since we have no evidence "flying" is what we say it is, perhaps it's more like the act of eating soup. Which, I hear, happens to be the most enjoyable mystical foodstuff across realities Particularly Tjillllp (or what we "humans" refer to as "split pea")

Avatar of MindWalk

We are compelled to make fundamental epistemic and metaphysical assumptions ("FEMA"). Presuppositions, really, but I like "FEMA" better than "FEMP." In order to trust any of my conclusions as anything more than a wild guess, I have to trust that my basic thought processes are reasonably reliable. In order to trust any of my conclusions about apples and oranges, tables and chairs, lions and tigers, and so on, I have to trust that there is an objectively existing reality of which my senses give me reasonably reliable (though highly incomplete) information. (There are other assumptions I must make, too, primarily having to do with the veridicality of memory, but let's stick to those two.)

Now, someone might want to avoid assuming that there is an objectively existing reality of which his senses give him reasonably reliable information. Well, OK, he can do that. He can then talk about his own mental states but not about an external world. He can say, "I am experiencing a tiger-ish mental image," or, "I am mentally imagizing tiger-ishly," instead of saying, "I see a tiger." And he may do this with all of his speech. OK--it's tedious, but he can do it.

If he then denies that there is an objectively existing reality, he's a solipsist; if he does not deny it but merely withholds his affirmation of it, then he is neither a solipsist nor a realist but is simply not committing himself to either.

However, the minute he starts talking about "tigers," he commits himself to the realist assumptions (that there is an objectively existing reality and that his senses give him reasonably reliable information about it). The minute he starts talking about "other people," he commits himself to the realist assumptions. So, he can't say, "I'm withholding belief from the realist assumptions, and so should you," without committing himself to the realist assumptions. Intersubjectivity is denied him unless he commits himself to the realist assumptions.

In my limited experience, people who think they are not committing themselves to realism also talk about intersubjectivity. They thereby commit themselves to the realist assumptions while simultaneously denying that they commit themselves to them. Small problem!

Avatar of brucepandolfini

Wow! Great stuff. I'm going to have tune in more often.

Avatar of Cavatine

It was partly a joke! - the problem is, I did read just a little bit of the discussion, and gave a quick response, but then it really didn't fit in.  I guess someone might find it amusing.  Even this will be inserted at the end of the discussion, and I have not yet read whatever will be preceding it. It is more than half in jest I think.

Avatar of Cavatine

I am six weeks behind now, to where Mindwalk replies in red to hapless_fool. The discussion before that is interesting. I am trying to "place" or recognize the part of the discussion relating to authority and submission. Authority presumably needs science to avoid being destroyed by some technologically superior authority from another culture. Aso an authority is never completely insulated from the illiterate masses (at least in my country). (Some of this I can understand by thinking about how Civ works) The other issue for me is about the collective not "mattering". As individuals I can't really state what the collective wants or thinks, and does that mean humanity, or does it mean the biosphere? Also to some it may mean acountry, a culture, or a family. But the smaller the concern, the less durable it will be.

I may be off-topic or otherwise outside the intended scope of discussion. And I'm six weeks behind. But in the early objections and rebuttals I want to add some reflections. First, the effort of doing science is colaborative and institutional. An individual can contribute, but the contribution has to spread somehow, either through teaching or shared technology. (In civ the schools stay open unless the kingdom is totally bankrupt.)

Also in discussing what is atruth, there's a statement and a meaning. Both of these are pretty slippery. The statement is in written language but written languages don't last eternally and translation is required. The meaning can get away like a slippery waterballoon ... in chess there's a concrete context but in the real world our detection methods are limited and our conclusions don't apply as widely as we hope. As an individual, all I really have is the present. The desire to communicate is subconscious. I don't think science can explain the subconscious.

Avatar of Cavatine

Also pages should end after five miles of scrolling. A few short posts, maybe?

Avatar of Cavatine

That statement about Civ is not correct. (I stopped at Civilization Ii. Other versions have more ways to win, I wonder if the basic structures are the same in higher versions.) A ruler in some government types can turn the science rate down to zero and then the schools produce nothing.

Avatar of Cavatine

Perhaps I can write something less confusing:

MindWalk: "The individual's thriving is *all* that matters. It's not as though the conscious being whose welfare mattered were the collective.

No. The conscious beings involved are the individuals. It is therefore their welfare that matters."

Our brains are the most complex information systems in the universe - unless we consider a collection of brains and people as a competitor.  With a group of individuals as an entity that might be considered to have consciousness, communication within it is considerably slower than communication that happens within a brain.  But given our minds' limitations, (detailed by cognitive science), and the possibilities of enhancing our minds' abilities (with computing machinery, literacy, interpersonal communication with different levels and media, social media on the Internet, gaming, current and future works with cyborg tech) might it not be mistaken to consider consciousness as exactly what can occur within an individual? 

Some people say Gaia is conscious (and humanity is like an infection of Gaia).  If consciousness is defined as an information system with memory and computational power then the universe is the biggest one, and the biosphere is pretty big compared to ours.  I'm not sure what the essential difference is.  How does MindWalk know that he's not just a brain cell inside of some gigantic information system that has thoughts like his?   Granted, there's not much evidence that Gaia thinks in words, or can see things.  It's not a fact that the biosphere has consciousness.  As an individual it doesn't matter to me whether it does or not.  From what we know of the Earth's history, the biosphere has changed radically several times, and there's no known mechanism except DNA that's scattered everywhere that the ecosystem would have of remembering any overall coherent thought.  It seems Gaia probably isn't really conscious as a whole.  That's too big a thing to have consciousness, right?

So maybe a tighter-knit group of people or machines can be said to have consciousness.   It has a lot of requirements: individuality, stability, strong interconnectedness, stability over a period of time, a sense of self, a desire for self-preservation, an experience of encountering other beings like itself (Julian Jaynes - "The origins of consciousness, and the breakdown of the bi-cameral mind" was pretty interesting!).  Maybe a Major League Baseball team has consciousness, right?