Proposed Title: What Do You Think?

Sort:
Avatar of pocklecod

MindWalk,

Here is a quotation from Evagrius of Pontus, used by Kallistos Ware as an epigram to one of this chapters.

"God cannot be grasped by the mind.  If he could be grasped, he would not be God."

I was just flipping through The Orthodox Way and noticed this, and realized that it is basically a perfect way of summarizing what is core to my essential point about mystery (a point to which you seem not to have responded as yet).  The basic thrust of this is that any God who is graspable is not God...thus whatever other theists are trying to "prove" is, ipso facto, not God.

So that now puts our conversation in a strange bind - anything we could prove to you to exist would not be God, because the provability of a thing is a demonstration of its not being God!  And yet, we are also arguing that the existence of God, God being Existence itself, is as plain as your own existence is to yourself. 

God is the same kind of contradictory problem as proving that there is something rather than nothing, or trying to prove by logic that logical reasoning is the right way of proceeding (if you say "it makes predictions!" I will only ask why predictions are a good).  It is, indeed, the same kind of question as that essential Platonic problem of "what is the Good?"  We know it to be, yet we seek it infinitely without ever grasping the whole. 

Indeed, God is the Good, is Existence and is Logic, according to scripture and the Fathers, so not only are these questions similar, but they are one.  

In sum, when you think about the problems of existence, or logic, or the Good, or many other similar issues, you are thinking about the same thing as we are when we talk about God...so I remain insistent that we find ourselves at the exact same starting point.  The differences between you and the Orthodox Tradition are in our manner of describing what is at the centre of that question, and in our beliefs about what human life is, and is meant to be, in light of the Eternal Existent.

Avatar of pocklecod

Okay, one more quick one.

What if I were to introduce the idea of a distinction between the statement that "God Exists" vs. "God exists," with the former bearing the meaning I keep trying (and, of course, failing) to get at in my posts, and the latter bearing the meaning that God is what I've previously called an "entity?"  The difference in capitalization is an innovation I'm introducing right here in this very forum - do you find some sense in it?  If we accept the vocabulary, I would propose that virtually all of the people that you usually talk to about this are attempting to prove that "God exists" while we Orthodox are not teaching that at all, but instead we teach that "God Exists."

Avatar of pocklecod

A last quotation.  From St. Gregory of Nazianzus [d. 390], Oration 28 (translation Browne and Swallow).  I want to give a sense of how ancient the ideas are that I'm trying to express here....it's the other "Christian" arguments you are used to, MindWalk, which are novelties.  Our Orthodox position predates them by millennia.  Here's Gregory:

"X.  Now since we have ascertained that God is incorporeal, let us proceed a little further with our examination.  Is He Nowhere or Somewhere.  For if He is Nowhere, then some person of a very inquiring turn of mind might ask, How is it then that He can even exist?  For if the non-existent is nowhere, then that which is nowhere is also perhaps non-existent.  But if He is Somewhere, He must be either in the Universe, or above the Universe.  And if He is in the Universe, then He must be either in some part or in the whole.  If in some part, then He will be circumscribed by that part which is less than Himself; but if everywhere, then by one which is further and greater—I mean the Universal, which contains the Particular; if the Universe is to be contained by the Universe, and no place is to be free from circumscription.  This follows if He is contained in the Universe.  And besides, where was He before the Universe was created, for this is a point of no little difficulty.  But if He is above the Universe, is there nothing to distinguish this from the Universe, and where is this above situated?  And how could this Transcendence and that which is transcended be distinguished in thought, if there is not a limit to divide and define them?  Is it not necessary that there shall be some mean to mark off the Universe from that which is above the Universe?  And what could this be but Place, which we have already rejected?  For I have not yet brought forward the point that God would be altogether circumscript, if He were even comprehensible in thought:  for comprehension is one form of circumscription."

This probably sounds like an argument for your position, MindWalk...and yet this, Gregory's understanding of the Divine, led him to a life of Christian holiness, and he became one of the great defenders of Trinitarian theology in the history of the world.

Avatar of erotokritos

I know Fathers who lyed in order to save someones life (see Lausaikon), but noone in order to prosilitize.

We dont want great numbers, we want quality members.

Avatar of Anastasios

But those are always the questions I am interested in: "What do you (NOT) believe? And why do you (NOT) believe it?" In other words, what do you think is true, and why do you think it's true? It sounds as though you will answer such questions for me.

In red are MindWalk’s and the whole text with blue additions are mine questions to MindWalk. and I am still waiting…

Law and Ethics is the same for you. It isn’t for me. I asked where you base your ethics.

Holy light

The church is philanthropist and is not a charitable institution.

There are¶ThereT ocular witnesses of Resurrection, appearances of Christ for 40 days after and finally the Undertaking. However all these students could have "interest" (?!). Paul however that was a terrible persecutor of Christians, how is explained his change?

Generally however it is not subject of reasonable comprehension but faith. The blind in the Temple was known from everybody from when he was a small child that was given birth blind and however when became the marvel, reveled who remained blinds in their heart. Until his parents they were terrorized in order to say that made lying the blind all his life. Each one believes what wants to believe…

Avatar of Jebcc

Great point Anastasios the witnesses of Christ are recorded in the bible.  the devil worshippers and atheists have no answer for that.

Avatar of MindWalk
pocklecod wrote:

MindWalk,

I have to concur with Anastasios regarding the issue of lying to people in order to convert them.  In the first place, we really would need to see the quotation, for two reasons.  1) Context of what's said to see if we agree with your reading of the quotation, 2) It may or may not be from a Father who is well-regarded in Orthodoxy...it may not even be from someone Orthodox at all... *If* I am correctly remembering that one of the authors I've read--possibly Ehrman or Carrier or even Rev. Spong--mentioned this, I have no confidence whatsoever that it was someone Orthodox who was supposed to have said it. None. And that's *if* I'm remembering correctly. or it may be something said by a particular Father that has been subsequently agreed upon to be wrong [it's very important than in the Orthodox Church the Fathers, though highly highly regarded, are not infallible].  Many Fathers, even some of the most highly regarded, have had certain teachings refuted by the Church (for example, Gregory of Nyssa) either explicitly by Council, or implicitly over time. I happily accept that Orthodox orthodoxy (smile) is that lying to convert people to the faith is definitely *not* viewed as somehow praiseworthy or even acceptable. I accept, on your word, that it isn't viewed as acceptable by the Orthodox. That pleases me.

As for Chrysostom, you're taking what's he's said to apply somehow to a conversation like this one (about the existence of God) when he is talking about his relationship to his friend and his decision to reneg on a promise to receive ordination at the same time as his friend.  We can parse out that particular issue with St. John - and maybe he's wrong that it was okay to lie to his friend in this instance...I half-agree and half-disagree about Chrysostom. In reading the passage, I thought it was just as you said--an explanation to his friend of why he did what he did. But he mentions what seems to be intended as Paul's dissembling to spread the Gospel; he makes certain statements that seem to be blanket approvals of deceit in the cause of righteousness. So, I half-agree and half-disagree. But I don't view it as terribly important. He wasn't the fellow I thought I remembered, anyway, and I am most definitely not claiming that deceit is any kind of universally approved practice among the Orthodox. I don't remember the context in which I made the statement, but I feel sure it was almost an aside, and I'm certainly not trying to cast anyone here in a bad light by it. I'm rather sorry I mentioned it at all, especially since I can't even find what I thought I remembered--but mostly because I don't think it really matters to our discussion. If someone said such a thing--well, you're always going to find the odd statement here or there that somebody makes but shouldn't have. You can't hold that against an entire faith community. And maybe my memory's just wrong. but regardless it has no application to something like a philosophical or theological discussion.  I agree. Moreover, the translation sounds archaic to me, so it would be important to see the Greek. Ah--I can't help you there! I don't read Greek.

I have never encountered, in the Orthodox Church, any tradition of embracing lies or deceit in order to win converts at all costs.  OK. Indeed, one of the key markers of Orthodox mission and apologetics which distinguishes Orthodoxy from many Evangelical movements, for example, is precisely that Orthodoxy refuses to engage in the "growth no matter what" mindset and rely on tools like emotionality, fire-brand preaching, threats of hell or whatever else in order to gain converts.  Instead, Orthodoxy plods along slowly, and we are encouraged time and again to bear witness to Christ mostly through our lives, our love for each other and all human beings, and the real presence of God in us. Now and then we find opportunities to use words - but that's rare.  You'll just about never see an Orthodox Christian preaching to all comers on a street-corner.  You're far more likely to see him quietly bringing a sandwich to the homeless man nearby instead.  That is a very large part of why someone like you has never really heard of Orthodoxy or been exposed to our theology.  The vast majority of us are simply seeking to live quiet lives of prayer and love.

There are a lot of reaons I'm Orthodox instead of some other kind of Christian, but one of them is this very fact - the Orthodox Christians I know believe in the truth of what we teach - and the real belief in that truth actually means the stakes are pretty low regarding the conversion of any given person.  The Truth carries on with me or without me, it carries on with you or without you...mission and outreach are not something we do to "save" you (as though anyone but God could save you) but rather are an invitation to a way of life which will bring you to See.  There is never a need to lie to someone as a means of simply inviting them in. I like most of that, but I'm puzzled at the very low priority given proselytization. If the Orthodox believe in Hell, and in the need to accept Jesus as Saviour in order not to wind up there, I would think they would try to convert as many people as possible. I certainly would (in this way, maybe it's good that I'm not a believer--would you really want me knocking at your door and trying to convert you?). I understand the notion of living a good life and of trying to lead by example, but I would think that some direct effort at conversion would be made, too.

Avatar of MindWalk
pocklecod wrote:

MindWalk,

Here is a quotation from Evagrius of Pontus, used by Kallistos Ware as an epigram to one of this chapters. It's clear that I have a fair amount of new reading to do. I want to fairly address all sorts of God-believers and not merely those who believe in *this* kind of God or in *that* kind of God. And, of course, all sorts of versions of deity should be considered when asking whether or not a God exists.

"God cannot be grasped by the mind.  If he could be grasped, he would not be God." This is what I thought I had commented was *taking God seriously as God* (of which I approve, in case that wasn't clear). It's important to do so; sometimes, in other conversations with other people, it seems as though I'm taking God more seriously as *God* than they are. One must not simply imagine God as one would imagine Superman--an extra-powerful human being. If God exists, I imagine he is something that in most ways I would not know how to describe, and certainly I do not imagine that I could picture God in any way matching the reality of him.

I was just flipping through The Orthodox Way and noticed this, and realized that it is basically a perfect way of summarizing what is core to my essential point about mystery (a point to which you seem not to have responded as yet).  Timotheous likes that terminology--he used to refer to God as "the Great Mystery." The basic thrust of this is that any God who is graspable is not God...thus whatever other theists are trying to "prove" is, ipso facto, not God. Um, maybe. It seems to me that to "grasp" God--to be able to imagine God as one might imagine a tiger or a nebula--is not the same thing as to *provide some description of God*. One might not be able to say, "God is amorphous," if by that he means that God has a very unclear form--because, after all, form might not be something God has at all--but one can still say, "God's creative power is unlimited." He has not thereby grasped God--but he has still said something true about (his version of) God. I will require some convincing that the ungraspability of God entails the complete impossibility of giving even a partial description of God.

So that now puts our conversation in a strange bind - anything we could prove to you to exist would not be God, because the provability of a thing is a demonstration of its not being God!  I see why you compared your God to the Tao. I am not convinced that the project of demonstrating your God's existence is quite as hopeless as you seem to think, for just the reason I gave above: I do not see the ungraspability of (the idea of) God (or anything else--it's not just God I'm saying this about) as necessarily implying the complete indescribability of God. And yet, we are also arguing that the existence of God, God being Existence itself, is as plain as your own existence is to yourself. I sense a verbal disagreement coming on, and whether there is a verbal confusion corresponding to it will be an interesting question to investigate. In fact, this is why I brought up yellowness and hiccups and jokes! Unless one means "that which exists" (or "all of that which exists") by the term "Existence"--which seems unlikely--I see a sentence like "God is Existence" as taking something (namely, Existence) to be a metaphysical existent that isn't. There might be an important difference between what you denote by "existence" and what you denote by "Existence," though.

God is the same kind of contradictory problem as proving that there is something rather than nothing, or trying to prove by logic that logical reasoning is the right way of proceeding (if you say "it makes predictions!" I will only ask why predictions are a good).  It is, indeed, the same kind of question as that essential Platonic problem of "what is the Good?"  We know it to be, yet we seek it infinitely without ever grasping the whole. But I *don't* know the Good to be. Were I a Platonist, I might--but I'm not a Platonist. There are actions which we praise, and there are ends which we consider worthwhile, but I don't see that anything we might call "the Good" metaphysically exists. (Anastasios: Please don't think I'm saying that murdering little children and helping them with their schoolwork are equally good because there is no good. I will be happy to explain my version of ethics, but not just this moment.) I will note that we do have to make certain fundamental metaphysical and epistemic assumptions, among which are that our own basic thought processes are at least reasonably reliable (or else we couldn't trust any of our own conclusions) and that there really is an objectively existing reality of which our senses give us reasonably reliable information (so that we really can make ordinary knowledge claims about lions and tigers and tables and chairs and apples and oranges). Is that what you have in mind--that the existence of God is a foundational metaphysical assumption for you?

Indeed, God is the Good, is Existence and is Logic, according to scripture and the Fathers, so not only are these questions similar, but they are one.  As mentioned (but in different terms), I regard this as a commission of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

In sum, when you think about the problems of existence, or logic, or the Good, or many other similar issues, you are thinking about the same thing as we are when we talk about God...so I remain insistent that we find ourselves at the exact same starting point.  The differences between you and the Orthodox Tradition are in our manner of describing what is at the centre of that question, and in our beliefs about what human life is, and is meant to be, in light of the Eternal Existent. Not that I want to get to this problem before hashing out what's meant by "God" for the Orthodox, but this seems not to jibe very well with belief in the Trinity or in Jesus Christ as Saviour. But that can wait for another day. Let's work on getting across to me what "God" means for you first.

Avatar of MindWalk
pocklecod wrote:

Okay, one more quick one.

What if I were to introduce the idea of a distinction between the statement that "God Exists" vs. "God exists," with the former bearing the meaning I keep trying (and, of course, failing) to get at in my posts, and the latter bearing the meaning that God is what I've previously called an "entity?"  I understand that when you say, "God exists/Exists," you don't mean that God exists as an object in the universe. My impression so far is that you have in mind some sort of something underlying or sustaining the universe's physical existence. But I definitely understand that you don't have in mind an object in the universe. If you prefer to use "God Exists," that's fine with me, but we'll still have to work out what *that* means. (The "exists/Exists" distinction reminds me of Heidegger's "being/Being" distinction. I don't understand Heidegger well--I'm not yet sure that he understood himself well--but the distinction between an object in the universe (which has being) and...well, something else (which has Being) is a verbal distinction I understand.) The difference in capitalization is an innovation I'm introducing right here in this very forum - do you find some sense in it?  If we accept the vocabulary, I would propose that virtually all of the people that you usually talk to about this are attempting to prove that "God exists" while we Orthodox are not teaching that at all, but instead we teach that "God Exists." I'm not entirely convinced yet that there's a real difference, although I certainly accept that in your mind there's a difference. To me, "God exists" applies whether God is thought of as an object in the universe or not, just as long as God is claimed to be real. (An unreal God couldn't create a universe, couldn't sustain a universe, couldn't judge souls, couldn't answer prayers, and so on. Only a real God could do that--one of whom it would be true to say, "God exists," understanding that God's existence isn't like that of a tiger or a nebula.)

Are you sure that ontological arguments, despite failing to do what they're supposed to do, aren't attempts to prove the Existence of God (capital "E")?

Avatar of MindWalk
erotokritos wrote:

I know Fathers who lyed in order to save someones life (see Lausaikon), I would never consider that morally wrong or hold that against anyone. but noone in order to prosilitize. OK. Perhaps my memory is wrong; and perhaps even if it is right, it was not one of the Orthodox Church Fathers. Clearly, even if it was said, it was an aberration, so I'm not worried about it.

We dont want great numbers, we want quality members. That's an interesting way of putting it! There seems to be an assumption among Western evangelicals that simply by becoming "saved," one is automatically a "quality member." Do I gather that works count for more in the Orthodox Church than in those branches that simply say, "Believe in Jesus and you will be saved"?

Avatar of MindWalk
Anastasios wrote:

But those are always the questions I am interested in: "What do you (NOT) believe? And why do you (NOT) believe it?" In other words, what do you think is true, and why do you think it's true? It sounds as though you will answer such questions for me.

In red are MindWalk’s and the whole text with blue additions are mine questions to MindWalk. and I am still waiting… OK, I'm replying in red:

Law and Ethics is the same for you. Oh, no! Oh no no no no no! Law is essentially enforceable custom. Law is what society says you must (or, usually, must not) do. That is far different from ethics, which tells you what is permissible or impermissible, obligatory or nonobligatory, quite independently of what the law says. I would never say that ethics was simply law. It isn’t for me. I asked where you base your ethics. Go to post 99 of the "Continuation of Richard Dawkins debate" in the Open Discussion group--here: http://www.chess.com/groups/forumview/continuation-of-richard-dawkins-debate?page=5 --and scroll down to the heading "Value." Read the rest of that post. What's in black is from the user John_Galt. What's in red is from me. Also, see post 130 and scroll down to the heading "Morality"--here: http://www.chess.com/groups/forumview/continuation-of-richard-dawkins-debate?page=7 (You might, in fact, want to look at all of posts 96, 97, 99, 100, 111, 114, 130, and 132--and perhaps also 139 and 161-63--in which I replied to John_Galt's various arguments.)

Holy light

The church is philanthropist and is not a charitable institution.I'd understand saying that the church took people's money and redistributed it, often to do socially good things; but how is it a philanthropist and not a charitable institution?

There are¶ThereT ocular witnesses of Resurrection, appearances of Christ for 40 days after and finally the Undertaking. Were it so clear, historians of Biblical times would all agree, and we would all learn about the Resurrection of Jesus in school as a historical fact. However all these students could have "interest" (?!). Paul however that was a terrible persecutor of Christians, how is explained his change? How should I know? Maybe he had temporal lobe epilepsy and felt himself to be in contact with God during (after?) a seizure (not uncommon among temporal lobe epileptics). In any event, the change in his belief is hardly good evidence that a miracle happened.

Generally however it is not subject of reasonable comprehension but faith. The blind in the Temple was known from everybody from when he was a small child that was given birth blind and however when became the marvel, reveled who remained blinds in their heart. Until his parents they were terrorized in order to say that made lying the blind all his life. Each one believes what wants to believe… I'll bet you don't believe that tigers are striped because you want to. I'll bet you don't believe that refrigerators hold food because you want to. I'll bet you don't believe that Jupiter is the largest planet in the Solar system because you want to. People believe what they are convinced is true.

Avatar of MindWalk
Jebcc wrote:

Great point Anastasios the witnesses of Christ are recorded in the bible.  the devil worshippers and atheists have no answer for that.

I have an answer. Were it so clear, historians of the Biblical era would agree that the Resurrection happened, and we'd learn about it in history class in school. Historians of the era do not agree that it happened. We don't learn about it in history class. If the experts are not agreed that it happened, why should I be convinced that it did?

Avatar of pocklecod

MindWalk,

1.  (The salvation issues you allude to)  No, Orthodoxy does not view salvation as something like "believe in Jesus and you will be saved" and, conversely, there is no assumption that all those who do not believe in Jesus in this lifetime are necessarily hell-bound.  We are entirely agnostic with regard to other religions.  We know that God loves all human beings, and we know that our Faith leads to salvation.  That's all we know - and for us, it's all we need to know...this path leads to salvation, so we're not interested in looking around for others.  What your fate, for instance, will be in the afterlife, I have no possible way of knowing - I pray for you like anyone else.  Some Fathers of the Church (Gregory of Nyssa) actually thought that all people, and even Satan would be saved in the end!  The Church ultimately refuted Gregory's point on this and teaches that we must acknowledge that those who truly hate God will not be in his kingdom (it would be cruel of God to put them there, after all, since they truly hate him), but that's as far as we can go.  Anything further is simply speculation.

We also do not maintain the view that those who have made a declaration of loyalty to Jesus are automatically "saved" permanently.  We view salvation as a continuing process to theosis.  In that sense "works" are more important, as you mention, but it's important to note that Orthodoxy was never a party to the Western faith/works debate.  The Orthodox view on this is pretty well summarized in the letter of James (which Luther so hated) the two are really inconceivable without each other.  What does it mean to have a faith that results in no good works?  How can good works for Christ not draw us, conversely, towards a stronger faith?  The Western debate there creates a false dichotemy.

2. (Existence etc.)  So here we may have gotten down to some bedrock in our conversation. I see a sentence like "God is Existence" as taking something (namely, Existence) to be a metaphysical existent that isn't. There might be an important difference between what you denote by "existence" and what you denote by "Existence," though.  I do not think of "Existnce" as itself a metaphysical existent, and my grounds for saying this return to the foundational importance of mystery.  Even a statement like "God is Existence" is kataphatic in nature - it is a way of human language pointing towards that which exceeds human language.  The idea that Existence exists is question-begging - what my language is attempting to point to is the idea that the unnamable foundation of existence itself is God.  If there appears to be a false attribution of certain characteristics to Existence in there (making me out to be, perhaps, a Stoic of some sort) then that is a result of the poverty of (my) language on this point.  But when I say God is Existence, I do not mean that Existence itself is any kind of existent thing.

If you personally buck a lot of trends and accept the idea that infinite regress is an accetable philosophical explanation for something, then I would say that the infinity into which all regresses is thus itself foundational, and therefore is God, while if you do not accept infinite regressive arguments, I will note that the point at which it all stops, which point is beyond our description or comprehension (you've noted this), is God.  In my mind, those two things are the same.


Is that what you have in mind--that the existence of God is a foundational metaphysical assumption for you?  In a certain way, yes, but not in the sense of having just decided I want to believe in God, and thus making that a foundational assumption for me.  My point is basically that there are foundational metaphysical assumptions which we all make...one of which is that there is something rather than nothing, but there are more (here's where the Trinity starts coming into play, but more on that later).  Neither you, nor I, nor anyone can get away from making a certain set of assumptions.  Now, I have a fairly high regard for human experience as governed primarily by real things.  So, a true Cartesian skeptic will never admit that he knows he's not a brain in a vat, or living in "The Matrix," but I am not a Cartesian skeptic in that way (neither are you, it's clear).  So, it is my view that some of the key metaphysical assumptions at the core of any human thought are reflections of reality - not necessarily physical reality, of course.  What these assumptions reflect is a reality which cannot be described, but which is known by all human beings who in any way engage in thought.  Thus I keep harping on 'Existence' because predicate to all that we say and think is the idea that there is first something.  The reality which underlies that metaphysical assumption made by all people (even those Cartesian skeptics!) is God.

3.  (Describing God)  As an Orthodox Christian, I describe and talk about God all the time (this is called kataphatic theology).  I say all kinds of things about God's nature, God's Love, God's mercy, God's Grace.  I'll even talk about God's thoughts and feelings, and ask with the Psalmist questions that, from a very technical point of view, should seem absurd like "How long will [God] sleep?"  But in the Orthodox tradition all these kinds of statements, acceptable and normal as they are, are also tempered strongly with the apophatic approach, and the realization that God is Mystery.  The idea that "God sleeps" is not something that is techincally accurate...rather it is language that captures something about the human experience of God - in this case, the sense that we sometimes have of God's absence.  The truthfullness of the statement can't be judged except in regard to what it's actually trying to communicate.  When I tell my wife she's the "most beautiful woman in the world" neither of us makes the mistake of thinking that after decades of research, seeing pictures of every woman on the planet, I've concluded that my wife tops them all in terms of phyiscal attractiveness.  We know I'm trying to express that the sight of her is, to me, the most beautiful sight I know.  We would totally misjudge the statement if we didn't account for its intent.

This is also true with kataphatic talk about God.  So, you're right, we can say a lot about God, but we Orthodox also do it with a very strong sense of what we don't mean by these things.  This creates a natural and holy tension in our minds when approaching God.  God is something we talk about all the time, but in a sense can never say anything about.  "God loves you" is far more true than "God hates you," but not in the sense that God has either of these human emotions as I understand them - from that perspective both statements are absurd and false. 

I will require some convincing that the ungraspability of God entails the complete impossibility of giving even a partial description of God.  Thus, as per above, we cannot give a "partial description" of God that bears any resemblance to the kind of truth we're getting at when we say that that tiger has stripes.  The "truth" attained in kataphatic statements about God is of a different kind entirely.  We cannot observe the kinds of truths about God that we can about a physical object.  That would be "grasping" God.  Instead, when we speak kataphatically about God, we knowingly speak from our own highly delimited human point of view.  We aren't fool enough to think that "God sleeps" but we say this because it expresses another truth.  Even the most sublime theological statements like, "The Son is one in essence with the Father," do not express the same kind of "fact" about God that the statement "a banana is yellow" expresses. I think the traditions you're used to interacting with have really lost a sense of the distinction here, which goes down again to the apophatic/kataphatic issue.

4.  Are you sure that ontological arguments, despite failing to do what they're supposed to do, aren't attempts to prove the Existence of God (capital "E")?  Yes, I'm sure about that given what I'm trying to express with things like "Existence."  The arguments for God's existence listed by someone like Dawkins are not designed to address what I mean by "God Exists."  Now, if it's not coming across why there is a distinction there, then I'm still not doing my job well enough in expressing myself, but when it comes to how my thought functions on this point, these two are not at all the same.

My impression so far is that you have in mind some sort of something underlying or sustaining the universe's physical existence.  Well, not a "something" though, and I mean this radically.  A "something" is still in the realm of something I can conceive.  What I mean is not a "something" at all (this seems like Stoicism again), it's not like a "something" - it's Mystery in the absolute sense...we have no conception for it, but that is the point...if it were a something it would not be God.

Avatar of Anastasios

http://www.oodegr.com/english/ekklisia/holylight.htm

http://istologio.org/?p=120

Avatar of Anastasios

I want to see the text in prototype language (I know Greek!).

Even it is genuine John Chrysostom; I haven’t found anything to prove that Orthodoxs use deceit in order to proselytize.

From the text, I understood that he is talking about Old Testament and he is talking about something undeniable bad, war and killings. What he says is “if you have to go to war in order to avoid something worst, you better win and for winning you could use whatever trick, deceit, etc. against your enemies”. I don’t find anything bad with that interpretation.

“pocklecod”, your quotation From St. Gregory of Nazianzus [d. 390], Oration 28 (translation Browne and Swallow) is great!

pocklecod wrote:The Truth carries on with me or without me, it carries on with you or without you...mission and outreach are not something we do to "save" you (as though anyone but God could save you) but rather are an invitation to a way of life which will bring you to See. There is never a need to lie to someone as a means of simply inviting them in.”

MindWalk answered: “ I like most of that, but I'm puzzled at the very low priority given proselytization. If the Orthodox believe in Hell, and in the need to accept Jesus as Saviour in order not to wind up there, I would think they would try to convert as many people as possible. I certainly would (in this way, maybe it's good that I'm not a believer--would you really want me knocking at your door and trying to convert you?). I understand the notion of living a good life and of trying to lead by example, but I would think that some direct effort at conversion would be made, too.

Proselytization is illegal in Greece! We Evangelize and preach the Logos of God and try to bring everyone to Orthodoxy by our own example.

erotokritos wrote:We dont want great numbers, we want quality members.”

MindWalk answered: “That's an interesting way of putting it! There seems to be an assumption among Western evangelicals that simply by becoming "saved," one is automatically a "quality member." Do I gather that works count for more in the Orthodox Church than in those branches that simply say, "Believe in Jesus and you will be saved"?

We never become saved in this life but always after physical death and it is always a gift of God and not a “righteous” payment for our “good” acts of Law. Of course we have saints which had a “flavor” of Paradise in this life and as I already said somewhere before, if you don’t feel Paradise in this life you won’t live it in the other either. As you should have already understand, I believe in Jesus but in no way I see myself as already saved.

If God exists, I imagine he is something that in most ways I would not know how to describe, and certainly I do not imagine that I could picture God in any way matching the reality of him.

We can describe God from whatever His Love revealed to us by his energies and actions but we can’t define Him. If you mean the physical reality, you are right.

There might be an important difference between what you denote by "existence" and what you denote by "Existence," though.

With “E” we mean the Cause or Reason of all the other “existences” which without Him we are not existed. He is the Life! Without Him there is nothing.

Please don't think I'm saying that murdering little children and helping them with their schoolwork are equally good because there is no good.

What if by doing something bad like killing small scouter kids you avoid something worst like losing your army, losing the war and let the enemy slaughter your country mates, rape your family, etc?!

God is thought of as an object in the universe or not,….

Universe is an object in God! God is no object; He has nothing in common with material. Even His Angels (which are spirits) are materials in compare with Him.

The church is philanthropist and is not a charitable institution.I'd understand saying that the church took people's money and redistributed it, often to do socially good things; but how is it a philanthropist and not a charitable institution?

Big story… 2 tips:

1)    Church want to save your soul (and of course your reborn body) and don’t try to save your belly! Many saints died in tortures, in caves, with illnesses, cancer, in poverty, etc. They didn’t ask from church to save their bodies.

2)    Good human and good Christian is not the same. There is a book in Greek with that title!

I said: “There are ocular witnesses of Resurrection, appearances of Christ for 40 days after and finally the Undertaking.”

MindWalk answered: “Were it so clear, historians of Biblical times would all agree, and we would all learn about the Resurrection of Jesus in school as a historical fact.” and “If the experts are not agreed that it happened, why should I be convinced that it did?

I add that we have resurrections also in Old Testament also believed by Jews.

It is a historical fact in Greece! Although we don’t examine the life of Jesus Christ in the lesson of history but of Theology it is examined (in theology) in the sector of history with other historical persons like Mohammad, Buddha, etc.

The experts are the Fathers of our Church and not university teachers.

Your “experts” will never agree for anything.

What do you want for proof?

How we know that Socrates said whatever his students wrote that he said? How we know that Socrates really existed?! How we know for sure that man, beyond each doubt, really stepped on Moon?

Hebrews 11,1

Avatar of pocklecod

Anastasios,

I'd add that, at least in North America, there are plenty of University professors who find the idea of Jesus' resurrection persuasive as a historical fact.  As a historian I would argue that the only reason to disbelieve it is if you don't believe resurrection is ever possible - and certainly, a lot of people don't believe it is.  But, if you have any willingness to accept that truly extraordinary things like a resurrection happen in the world now and then, then the resurrection of Christ is one of the better attested historical events of the period.

There are a lot of very loud scholars who will say highly skeptical things.  People like the "Jesus Seminar" for example.  Yet, these same people make their own leaps of faith.  For example, they believe whole-heartedly in the existence of an early Gospel that no one has ever seen ("Q").  They also believe that a bunch of people removed from the historical events of the Gospels by 2000 years sitting in a room and voting produces a more historically accurate picture of Jesus than consulting with the many sources much closer to those events.  What's most curious about ther approach is that it treats New Testament texts as fundamentally special historical sources - different from any other sources that exist.  It's the same thing that an Evangelical might believe, but it's then used in reverse.  The NT is fundamentally special, and so can never be trusted!  This is where you get arguments like, "these events are not attested anywhere outside the NT" which is actually a false statement anyway, but rings absurd to, for instance, a Roman Historian who has to rely constantly on single-source attributed events as actually happening.  Here people are saying that thing attested in four sources are invalid without even more attestation.  No other historical document is treated as though it is invalid de facto without outside attributions, and I know of absolutely no other historical events attested by four separate primary witnesses that are placed in the "false until proven true" category.

But, more to the point, I don't think that the hard-core skeptics even represent the mainstream of scholarship anymore, to say nothing of the wisdom of the Fathers (obviously).  There are very serious problems with the entire hermeneutical approach of 19th and 20th Century Liberal Christian scholarship, and more and more people are taking notice of that.  The result is that those who want to do historical study of the NT period have started treating NT texts like they would treat any other texts...and the strange irony of doing that is that what they contain becomes much more historically plausible when you do that. 

If you believe resurrection is absolutely impossible, then you will find other explanations for these texts, but it is not a cogent argument to say that the resurrection is insufficietnly attested as a historical event - it more than clears the bar set for any other subject in ancient history.  Even scholars have really started to realize that, and as the previous generation steps aside in the Academy, you'll see more and more people saying this, I believe.

Avatar of MindWalk


pocklecod wrote:

MindWalk,

1. (The salvation issues you allude to) <snip> We know that God loves all human beings, and we know that our Faith leads to salvation. That's all we know - and for us, it's all we need to know...this path leads to salvation, so we're not interested in looking around for others. That's all you know about God, or that's all you know about God with respect to salvation? <snip>

<snip> What does it mean to have a faith that results in no good works? How can good works for Christ not draw us, conversely, towards a stronger faith? The Western debate there creates a false dichotemy. "Faith" is a word that I have almost stopped using, because it means so many different things to different people and even to the same person. (The Buddhist monk I once mentioned gave four different meanings of the word--and he did not exhaust the possibilities.) One can easily believe *that God exists* but do not good works. I gather you have something more (or something *else*) in mind by "faith"? As for good works--you say "good works for Christ," and maybe that would automatically increase your faith (in the sense in which you mean it); but good works generally hardly have to increase one's faith, in the sense of "belief that God exists."

2. (Existence etc.) So here we may have gotten down to some bedrock in our conversation. I agree. I see a sentence like "God is Existence" as taking something (namely, Existence) to be a metaphysical existent that isn't. There might be an important difference between what you denote by "existence" and what you denote by "Existence," though. I do not think of "Existence" as itself a metaphysical existent, OK. and my grounds for saying this return to the foundational importance of mystery. (I've been misremembering, proving once again the fallibility of my memory. Timotheous might possibly have used the term "mystery" in reference to God, but it was someone else, on another discussion board, who years ago used the term "Great Mystery" to refer to God.) Even a statement like "God is Existence" is kataphatic in nature - it is a way of human language pointing towards that which exceeds human language. The idea that Existence exists is question-begging - what my language is attempting to point to is the idea that the unnamable foundation of existence itself is God. If there appears to be a false attribution of certain characteristics to Existence in there (making me out to be, perhaps, a Stoic of some sort) then that is a result of the poverty of (my) language on this point. But when I say God is Existence, I do not mean that Existence itself is any kind of existent thing.

If you personally buck a lot of trends and accept the idea that infinite regress is an accetable philosophical explanation for something, I don't. then I would say that the infinity into which all regresses is thus itself foundational, and therefore is God, while if you do not accept infinite regressive arguments, I will note that the point at which it all stops, which point is beyond our description or comprehension (you've noted this), is God. In my mind, those two things are the same. But why can't the point at which the causal chain stops be the initial state of the universe? Why can't the stopping point of explanation be the universe's existence by itself? (You sound as though you would find this Einstein quotation, which I just stumbled across in Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, amenable to your taste: "I have never imputed to Nature a purpose or a goal, or anything that could be understood as anthropomorphic. What I see in Nature is a magnificent structure that we can comprehend only very imperfectly, and that must fill a thinking person with a feeling of humility. This is a genuinely religious religious feeling that has nothing to do with mysticism." Einstein also said--still quoted in Dawkins's The God Delusion [see, Anastasios, there's not nothing of worth in the book!]--"I am a deeply religious nonbeliever. This is a somewhat new kind of religion." This does not sound quite like what you believe, but it still sounds as though it would appeal to you.)

Is that what you have in mind--that the existence of God is a foundational metaphysical assumption for you? In a certain way, yes, but not in the sense of having just decided I want to believe in God, and thus making that a foundational assumption for me. My point is basically that there are foundational metaphysical assumptions which we all make... And foundational epistemic assumptions, too--like the reasonable reliability of our own basic thought processes, for instance. I enumerate a few in my essays. one of which is that there is something rather than nothing, but there are more (here's where the Trinity starts coming into play, but more on that later). Yes. The assumption that there is an objectively existing reality of which our senses give us reasonably reliable information allows us to make ordinary knowledge claims about lions and tigers and apples and oranges and tables and chairs. Neither you, nor I, nor anyone can get away from making a certain set of assumptions. Moreover, I think there's a certain set of basic metaphysical and epistemic assumptions that virtually all of us make, enabling theists and nontheists to discuss matters from a common philosophical starting point. Now, I have a fairly high regard for human experience as governed primarily by real things. So have I. I begin from a position of Cartesian doubt and then build up to ordinary knowledge claims by the making of assumptions that seem to be necessary for reaching conclusions, for reaching conclusions about the past and the future, and for reaching conclusions about the world around us. So, a true Cartesian skeptic will never admit that he knows he's not a brain in a vat, or living in "The Matrix," but I am not a Cartesian skeptic in that way (neither are you, it's clear). Well, I am and I'm not. I think there's no way to tell whether we're brains in vats or not, and I don't even see a way to assign even a ballpark probability to it; I think we just have to assume there is an objectively existing reality (OER) and that it corresponds roughly to what our senses tell us about it (although there is presumably vastly more to it than what our senses tell us about it) and then go from there. But I don't think the assumption is a vicious one, if false; if it's false, we're just describing what appears to be so rather than what is so. So, it is my view that some of the key metaphysical assumptions at the core of any human thought are reflections of reality - not necessarily physical reality, of course. We'd certainly like them to be, from the standpoint of hoping we're right in our beliefs about the world. Of course, some of what seems to be true might be so bad that we'd actually hope that our assumptions were false! What these assumptions reflect is a reality which cannot be described, but which is known by all human beings who in any way engage in thought. Why do you think it cannot be described? You must mean something different by "describe" than I would mean. Perhaps you mean "described in full detail"? Or maybe you have in mind the inaccessibility of the Kantian things-in-themselves? Thus I keep harping on 'Existence' because predicate to all that we say and think is the idea that there is first something. The reality which underlies that metaphysical assumption made by all people (even those Cartesian skeptics!) is God. Hmm. I simply think of it as "metaphysical reality." Why would one also give it the name "God"?

3. (Describing God) As an Orthodox Christian, I describe and talk about God all the time (this is called kataphatic theology). I say all kinds of things about God's nature, God's Love, God's mercy, God's Grace. I'll even talk about God's thoughts and feelings, and ask with the Psalmist questions that, from a very technical point of view, should seem absurd like "How long will [God] sleep?" But in the Orthodox tradition all these kinds of statements, acceptable and normal as they are, are also tempered strongly with the apophatic approach, and the realization that God is Mystery. The idea that "God sleeps" is not something that is techincally accurate...rather it is language that captures something about the human experience of God - in this case, the sense that we sometimes have of God's absence. I can only have the sense of metaphysical reality's absence if my sensory connection to the world is somehow interrupted--as can happen. But I wouldn't take that to be the withdrawal of metaphysical reality--just my own mentality's apparent--and illusory--disconnection from it (illusory because in order to think I require the operation of my brain, and my brain is part of metaphysical reality). I take it this is evidence that you do not quite mean by "God" what I mean by "metaphysical reality." The truthfullness of the statement can't be judged except in regard to what it's actually trying to communicate. When I tell my wife she's the "most beautiful woman in the world" neither of us makes the mistake of thinking that after decades of research, seeing pictures of every woman on the planet, I've concluded that my wife tops them all in terms of phyiscal attractiveness. We know I'm trying to express that the sight of her is, to me, the most beautiful sight I know. We would totally misjudge the statement if we didn't account for its intent. I understand the idea of expressing oneself in language that is only metaphorically true or that does not literally capture what one would like to express, if only he could. And I understand the idea of sort of fumbling for ways of talking about what is fundamentally inexpressible. (As for your wife, I'm sure she's the most beautiful woman in the world, hands down.)

This is also true with kataphatic talk about God. So, you're right, we can say a lot about God, but we Orthodox also do it with a very strong sense of what we don't mean by these things. This creates a natural and holy tension in our minds when approaching God. God is something we talk about all the time, but in a sense can never say anything about. "God loves you" is far more true than "God hates you," but not in the sense that God has either of these human emotions as I understand them - from that perspective both statements are absurd and false. As I said, I understand talking that way; but I always wonder whether there is really anything at all being expressed except a feeling. I used to be drawn to mysticism, but I eventually concluded that mystic feeling was just that: *feeling*. I concluded that it could conceivably be more--that it could conceivably be indicative of contact with a higher reality, or some such--but that since conceivability was not good reason for belief, I would not believe it.

I will require some convincing that the ungraspability of God entails the complete impossibility of giving even a partial description of God. Thus, as per above, we cannot give a "partial description" of God that bears any resemblance to the kind of truth we're getting at when we say that that tiger has stripes. The "truth" attained in kataphatic statements about God is of a different kind entirely. We cannot observe the kinds of truths about God that we can about a physical object. That would be "grasping" God. Instead, when we speak kataphatically about God, we knowingly speak from our own highly delimited human point of view. I'm always happy to agree with religious believers that we are limited in what we can know, but I'm then forced to wonder why those selfsame religious believers don't think they're too limited in what they can know to know that there is a God--let alone that he has the structure of the Trinity. If religious believers simply said, "I don't know," I'd be happy with that. No problem. I don't know, either (for certain versions of God, anyway). We aren't fool enough to think that "God sleeps" but we say this because it expresses another truth. Even the most sublime theological statements like, "The Son is one in essence with the Father," do not express the same kind of "fact" about God that the statement "a banana is yellow" expresses. I don't know of any kind of fact other than the sort that really is so. If the meaning of a sentence matches the way metaphysical reality really is, then the sentence is true, and what it says is a fact. If not, not. Certainly, one may speak metaphorically, trying to get across to another person something that he doesn't really know how to express properly--sure. But in so doing he hasn't really expressed a fact; he's tried to point the way toward an understanding of a fact that one can then attempt to express properly. I think the traditions you're used to interacting with have really lost a sense of the distinction here, which goes down again to the apophatic/kataphatic issue.
My friend Leon, who teaches philosophy (but far differently than I would) and who likes the German Idealists and process philosophy, and who once expressed surprise that he and I were able to have fruitful discussions given how differently we approached philosophy, once said of me, "Boy, you're analytic to the core, aren't you?" And I replied, "Yes. Yes, I am." (A note to others who might read this: "analytic" here only means something *close* to "analytical." Philosophy roughly breaks into Continental philosophy and analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers view many philosophical problems as arising from the misuse or abuse of language and think that often, resolving them is a matter of properly analyzing the issues involved, at which point the "problems" will simply vanish--it will be seen that they were really only linguistic problems.)

4. Are you sure that ontological arguments, despite failing to do what they're supposed to do, aren't attempts to prove the Existence of God (capital "E")? Yes, I'm sure about that given what I'm trying to express with things like "Existence." The arguments for God's existence listed by someone like Dawkins are not designed to address what I mean by "God Exists." Now, if it's not coming across why there is a distinction there, then I'm still not doing my job well enough in expressing myself, but when it comes to how my thought functions on this point, these two are not at all the same. "That greater than which none can be conceived" certainly seems close to what you have in mind. Isn't it?

My impression so far is that you have in mind some sort of something underlying or sustaining the universe's physical existence. Well, not a "something" though, and I mean this radically. A "something" is still in the realm of something I can conceive. What I mean is not a "something" at all (this seems like Stoicism again), it's not like a "something" - it's Mystery in the absolute sense...we have no conception for it, but that is the point...if it were a something it would not be God. You seem to have in mind something which neither exists nor fails to exist. The closest I can come to understanding that is by the way I think of mentality: I do not think of my mentality as metaphysically existent (although my neurons surely are), but I certainly think of my mentalizing (thinking, feeling, and so on) as really occurring. But this is only a matter of terminological convention for me--I could just as well speak of mental existents (like ideas) which occupied a nonphysical realm of metaphysical reality. I just don't like talking that way--confusions too easily arise. But if God is to have causal power, surely he must exist in some way? And if God is not to have causal power, then what difference does it make whether he exists (or is real, to use another word) or not?

Avatar of MindWalk

Anastasios wrote:

I want to see the text in prototype language (I know Greek!). I don't know what prototype language is. As for finding it in Greek, you'd probably know how to do that better than I. It's Treatise on the Priesthood, Book I (and maybe the first bit of Book II). I view it as unimportant for you to look it up, unless you somehow view this as a matter of honor, for reasons I've given and will give again below.

Even it is genuine John Chrysostom; I haven’t found anything to prove that Orthodoxs use deceit in order to proselytize. I'm happy to accept, on your and pocklecod's word, that deceit is neither used by the Orthodox nor approved of by the Orthodox in order to proselytize. I assume it's generally frowned on, except for good reason or the usual "little white lies." (It's not even entirely clear to me what John Chrysostom intended. He might have been saying, "See? It really is OK to lie for a good cause." But he might only have been saying, "See? Even good people have used a little bit of deceit in a righteous cause, so please, my dear friend, forgive me for what I've done to you with a good heart.")

From the text, I understood that he is talking about Old Testament and he is talking about something undeniable bad, war and killings. What he says is “if you have to go to war in order to avoid something worst, you better win and for winning you could use whatever trick, deceit, etc. against your enemies”. I don’t find anything bad with that interpretation. That wasn't the part I was referring to. This was the passage I had in mind:

"Thus the blessed Paul attracted those multitudes of Jews: with this purpose he circumcised Timothy, although he warned the Galatians in his letter that Christ would not profit those who were circumcised. For this cause he submitted to the law, although he reckoned the righteousness which came from the law but loss after receiving the faith in Christ. For great is the value of deceit, provided it be not introduced with a mischievous intention. In fact action of this kind ought not to be called deceit, but rather a kind of good management, cleverness and skill, capable of finding out ways where resources fail, and making up for the defects of the mind. For I would not call Phinees a murderer, although he slew two human beings with one stroke: nor yet Elias after the slaughter of the 100 soldiers, and the captain, and the torrents of blood which he caused to be shed by the destruction of those who sacrificed to devils. For if we were to concede this, and to examine the bare deeds in themselves apart from the intention of the doers, one might if he pleased judge Abraham guilty of child-murder and accuse his grandson and descendant of wickedness and guile. For the one got possession of the birthright, and the other transferred the wealth of the Egyptians to the host of the Israelites. But this is not the case: away with the audacious thought! For we not only acquit them of blame, but also admire them because of these things, since even God commended them for the same. For that man would fairly deserve to be called a deceiver who made an unrighteous use of the practice, not one who did so with a salutary purpose. And often it is necessary to deceive, and to do the greatest benefits by means of this device, whereas he who has gone by a straight course has done great mischief to the person whom he has not deceived.",

but, Anastasios, I really don't view this as important, since I'm happy to grant your point that it isn't considered OK by the Orthodox to use deceit in the cause of gaining converts.

“pocklecod”, your quotation From St. Gregory of Nazianzus [d. 390], Oration 28 (translation Browne and Swallow) is great!

pocklecod wrote:The Truth carries on with me or without me, it carries on with you or without you...mission and outreach are not something we do to "save" you (as though anyone but God could save you) but rather are an invitation to a way of life which will bring you to See. There is never a need to lie to someone as a means of simply inviting them in.”

MindWalk answered: “ I like most of that, but I'm puzzled at the very low priority given proselytization. If the Orthodox believe in Hell, and in the need to accept Jesus as Saviour in order not to wind up there, I would think they would try to convert as many people as possible. I certainly would (in this way, maybe it's good that I'm not a believer--would you really want me knocking at your door and trying to convert you?). I understand the notion of living a good life and of trying to lead by example, but I would think that some direct effort at conversion would be made, too.

Proselytization is illegal in Greece! We Evangelize and preach the Logos of God and try to bring everyone to Orthodoxy by our own example. You mean, you can't say to people, "You ought to believe what I believe?" Or is there something more specific that's illegal in Greece, like sending teams of church members door to door?

erotokritos wrote:We dont want great numbers, we want quality members.”

MindWalk answered: “That's an interesting way of putting it! There seems to be an assumption among Western evangelicals that simply by becoming "saved," one is automatically a "quality member." Do I gather that works count for more in the Orthodox Church than in those branches that simply say, "Believe in Jesus and you will be saved"?

We never become saved in this life but always after physical death and it is always a gift of God and not a “righteous” payment for our “good” acts of Law. Of course we have saints which had a “flavor” of Paradise in this life and as I already said somewhere before, if you don’t feel Paradise in this life you won’t live it in the other either. As you should have already understand, I believe in Jesus but in no way I see myself as already saved.

If God exists, I imagine he is something that in most ways I would not know how to describe, and certainly I do not imagine that I could picture God in any way matching the reality of him.

We can describe God from whatever His Love revealed to us by his energies and actions but we can’t define Him. If you mean the physical reality, you are right. pocklecod, do you agree with this?

There might be an important difference between what you denote by "existence" and what you denote by "Existence," though.

With “E” we mean the Cause or Reason of all the other “existences” which without Him we are not existed. He is the Life! Without Him there is nothing. But you think that the Cause or Reason does not exist? I don't mean merely that it does not exist as a physical object in the physical universe; I mean that you think that it does not exist in any way whatsoever? And if not, how does it have causal effects--like creating a universe?

Please don't think I'm saying that murdering little children and helping them with their schoolwork are equally good because there is no good.

What if by doing something bad like killing small scouter kids you avoid something worst like losing your army, losing the war and let the enemy slaughter your country mates, rape your family, etc?! Ah. That sort of thing is indeed a problem. One must always use his best judgment as to what is permissible in trying to achieve the morally best outcome. You seem to be pointing to something like the trolley problem (see here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem ). Intuitions differ, as noted in the article, as to which option is really most moral (or least immoral). We should note that in the trolley problem, we are always given only two possibilities--we are never given "maybe you can find another alternative" as a possibility. Do five lives count more than one life? Should you act to save five at the expense of one? It's an interesting problem--but one that faces theists just as much as nontheists.

I should note that John Stuart Mill, who wrote "Utilitarianism," also wrote "On Liberty." Both are very worthwhile reading.

God is thought of as an object in the universe or not,….

Universe is an object in God! God is no object; He has nothing in common with material. Even His Angels (which are spirits) are materials in compare with Him.

The church is philanthropist and is not a charitable institution.I'd understand saying that the church took people's money and redistributed it, often to do socially good things; but how is it a philanthropist and not a charitable institution?

Big story… 2 tips:

1)Church want to save your soul (and of course your reborn body) and don’t try to save your belly! Many saints died in tortures, in caves, with illnesses, cancer, in poverty, etc. They didn’t ask from church to save their bodies. And if the Church would not have saved their bodies if asked, then the Church would have been doing a moral wrong. This is one of the harms of religious belief: it places an imaginary "soul" 's needs ahead of a very real body's needs.

2)Good human and good Christian is not the same. They should be. If they are not, that is a weakness of Christianity. Being a good human being is what we should ask of everyone. There is a book in Greek with that title!

I said: “There are ocular witnesses of Resurrection, appearances of Christ for 40 days after and finally the Undertaking.”

MindWalk answered: “Were it so clear, historians of Biblical times would all agree, and we would all learn about the Resurrection of Jesus in school as a historical fact.” and “If the experts are not agreed that it happened, why should I be convinced that it did?”

I add that we have resurrections also in Old Testament also believed by Jews. Which only proves the gullibility of human beings.

It is a historical fact in Greece! You mean: It is believed to be a historical fact in Greece. What actually is historical fact in Greece is the same as what is historical fact anywhere else. Maybe it happened. Maybe it didn't. My money's on "No, it didn't." Although we don’t examine the life of Jesus Christ in the lesson of history but of Theology it is examined (in theology) in the sector of history with other historical persons like Mohammad, Buddha, etc. Much of it certainly can be. Although there are a few Jesus mythicists out there (and I have to disclose that Richard Carrier, whom I sometimes cite as an expert on Biblical times, is a mythicist--although when he makes his arguments against belief in the Resurrection, he clearly states that he is assuming that Jesus really did exist), most experts seem to accept that there was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth (although he might not really have been "of Nazareth"). As a historical personage, he is fit matter for historical investigation, just like Mohammed and the Buddha. It's the miraculous parts that I really doubt happened and that there isn't the sort of agreement about among historians that one would expect were the evidence really so solid.

The experts are the Fathers of our Church and not university teachers. Hmm. It's possible that some of those Fathers really are experts on the Biblical period. I'd be surprised if they all were. But even if they were, I don't see why you exclude university professors from being experts on the Biblical period.

Your “experts” will never agree for anything. Sometimes they agree really well. The experts in biology and paleontology agree really really well that evolution occurred. The experts in physics agree really really well that general relativity describes gravitation on nonquantum scales very well (with exceptions that have constituted puzzles to be solved and have led to the postulation of dark matter and of dark energy). Sometimes the experts really do agree. When's the last time a sizeable portion of historians rose up and said, "No, Abraham Lincoln was never president"?

What do you want for proof? You know, you've asked a good question. The problem is that for an extraordinary claim--like a resurrection--one demands better evidence than usual. If my sister tells me there's an apple on the kitchen counter, I'll take her word for it. If my sister tells me there's an apple flying around the kitchen and whistling "Dixie," well, sorry, I love my sister and all that, but I'm not going to take her word for it. You see the problem? I wouldn't believe a resurrection had happened right down the street from me, today, if twenty witnesses told me it had. (Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable. Everyone should become aware of that.) A couple of thousand years ago, with four people who probably weren't even witnesses swearing to it? Not enough. Just not enough. Not enough for a flying apple whistling "Dixie," and not enough for a human resurrection.

How we know that Socrates said whatever his students wrote that he said? How we know that Socrates really existed?! In fact, we don't. I found a good column on this--by someone whose expertise I know nothing about, but whose column seems reasonable to me--here: http://vridar.wordpress.com/2011/07/16/was-socrates-a-man-or-a-myth-applying-historical-jesus-criteria-to-socrates/ But in Socrates's case, it doesn't really matter whether he lived or not. We're not going to give up a religion, change how we live our lives, and so on, if we find out that Socrates was only a literary invention of Plato or Aristophanes. It makes a big difference in the case of Jesus. Besides, most historians don't say Jesus didn't exist; the part a lot of them question (the ones who aren't committed to belief because they were already Christians when they became historians, anyway) is the miraculous part. Miracles are inherently implausible. If they weren't, they wouldn't merit the name "miracle." How we know for sure that man, beyond each doubt, really stepped on Moon? How sure do you want to be? I don't think there's much rational doubt about that one.

Hebrews11,1

Avatar of Jebcc

mindwalk you do not seriously address Jesus Christ's existence.  we have more proof of his existence than we do of Julius Cesar.  We have more proof of Jesus Christ's existence that we do of your existence......

Avatar of pocklecod

But why can't the point at which the causal chain stops be the initial state of the universe?

I've never met a human mind which would actually be satisfied by that.  It seems to me we are creatures of a paradox - if we present ourselves with a fundemental cause, we must ask "what came before?  what caused it?"  If we say there is no fundamental cause, we say, "everything has a cause!"  It's a paradox, which goes to my point - we very literally cannot conceive the kind of cause we are talking about here - it is removed even from our concept of cause because that concept of cause ultimately relies on a sense of infinite regress, whether we like it or not.  If you say that the universe "just is," then I will say that it's "just-isness" is what I'm talking about.

I can only have the sense of metaphysical reality's absence if my sensory connection to the world is somehow interrupted--as can happen. But I wouldn't take that to be the withdrawal of metaphysical reality--just my own mentality's apparent--and illusory--disconnection from it (illusory because in order to think I require the operation of my brain, and my brain is part of metaphysical reality). I take it this is evidence that you do not quite mean by "God" what I mean by "metaphysical reality."

No, we're in perfect agreement.  See my final comment as I think your concept of "metaphysical reality" is very much what I mean by God.  God is never actually absent - we just sometimes cause ourselves to feel that way.  But it's all on our side of things.  There are also times I feel much less real (like before I've had my coffee in the morning).  I'm not, in fact, any less real...I just feel that way.  It's all in my experience - thus with God's absence.  So, we're in simple agreement here.

As I said, I understand talking that way; but I always wonder whether there is really anything at all being expressed except a feeling. I used to be drawn to mysticism, but I eventually concluded that mystic feeling was just that: *feeling*. I concluded that it could conceivably be more--that it could conceivably be indicative of contact with a higher reality, or some such--but that since conceivability was not good reason for belief, I would not believe it.

This is a bit of another can of worms, but as an Orthodox I live a life of mysticism tempered by healthy distrust.  Not all "mystical" experiences are real.  We believe, in fact, that some are flat-out Satanic.  Our council is always: when in doubt, one must distrust any mystical experiences one has. 

So I connect with your distrust of mysticism, and certainly undirected mystical practice is not something I would ever recommend to anyone.  But I'll also raise a question to you: what other experiences in life do you attribute to the totally arbitrary feelings of the mind or body?  In my experience, virtually all of the feelings I feel have something to do with things that actually happen.  Even in dreams, my mind replays or remixes certain feelings I originally had in relation to the real world.  Now, this is not to say that my mind has nothing to do with this.  Indeed, I can even control most of my feelings about all sorts of things.  But I think one must make a defense of why mystical "feelings" are treated as distinct from other feelings by assuming that they are "just" feelings while other feelings have referents of some kind in reality.

"That greater than which none can be conceived" certainly seems close to what you have in mind. Isn't it?

That must be a deficiency in my expression because I reject the idea.  I might say something like, "that greater than the thing greater than which none can be conceived!"  That's a paradox (and rather tongue-in-cheek), reflective of the Mystery I am trying to talk about.  Don't take that as a "proof," by the way - my point is the paradox.

You seem to have in mind something which neither exists nor fails to exist. The closest I can come to understanding that is by the way I think of mentality: I do not think of my mentality as metaphysically existent (although my neurons surely are), but I certainly think of my mentalizing (thinking, feeling, and so on) as really occurring.

"Neither exists nor fails to exist" is very interesting language to me, and I like it at first blush.  Since you are, indeed, one of the most profoundly analytical people I've ever encountered, I don't want to sign on the dotted line for that statement since we remain less than totally certain what we mean by "existence."  But this seems to capture a certain sense of what I mean.

Your mental process is indeed a metaphor that captures a lot about what I'm trying to express.  In fact, it's no accident that St. Augustine uses this same metaphor in De Trinitate as foundational to his entire discussion.  Perhaps the issue of what you mean by what is "real" is something to be explored.  "existence" seems to be a bit tricky - so what is "realness" to you?  How can something be "real" and not "metaphysically existent?"

Hmm. I simply think of it as "metaphysical reality." Why would one also give it the name "God"?

This, I believe, is where the rubber hits the road.  What I've been trying to indicate is that I think (and continue to think) that you and I both believe in the "reality" that I call God.  In fact, in my many conversations with many people of all walks, creeds, intelligences and whatever else, I always walk away earnestly believing that I have never encountered a single person in my life who does not believe, in some basic way, in the God I believe in.  I've come to think that think human thought wouldn't even be even possible if one really disbelieved it.  It would be like trying to imagine someone who honestly believes that there is, actually, nothing...not something - absolutely nothing exists, not even himself.  It's, as far as I can tell, not something a human mind can genuinely think.


So, okay, you call it "metaphysical reality," and I call this God.  Now, you've asked exactly the right question...why do I call God "God?"


To be frank, I have a lot of different reasons to do that, and I don't think I could sit here and type them all out if I tried.  So I'll pick the three that seem most prominent to my mind right now.

1)  We have a relationship with metaphysical reality.  It is experienced by human beings as a personal thing.  Now, you're going to want to pick the words "relationship" and "personal" apart, which is fine.  I'll let your comments dictate how I should work to define them.  But, part of what I mean here is that metaphysical reality is not, I believe, a mere static thing - it is something that, to speak very crudely "moves" in a certain sense.  It is something that relates to me, and I to it.  To speak of ultimate reality as in a relationship with me, I must speak of God.

2)  I am grateful.  Why is this so, I do not know.  Yet I look upon my existence, my reality, and I feel a tremendous and totally unshakable sense that I am grateful for all of it.  This is what causes me to worship, and when I worship, I worship God.

3)  Most of all, so many truly great minds have called God "God."  I do not believe that I know all there is to know, and I do not believe that I am the wisest, most intelligent, best educated, or best informed person ever to live.  Since I don't believe those things, I look to other people who I think to be wiser etc. than me, at the very least in certain areas, to try and learn.  We all do this (unless we are psychotically arrogant).  The question of whom to choose to follow is an incredibly vexed one.  If we only follow those who say the things we already know, then we are not following at all.  Moreover, we are not being serious with ourselves - at some point we've listened to someone else in order to learn what we now do, in fact, think we know.  So when someone says something we do not already believe to be true, how do we know to trust him or distrust him?  I'm not actually sure how we do this, but I've often talked about the process of discerning that kind of thing about a teacher or thinker by saying that certain teachings "ring the bell of the soul." 

The first time I read Dostoeyevsky's Brothers Karamazov, many years before I became Orthodox, I put the book down, heart racing, and all I could think was "this man understands something...knows a truth that I do not know...but I know he knows it."  Years later, after becoming Orthodox, I read the book again - and all I could see was a simple Orthodox Christian teaching, written by a brilliant author.  That teaching is that real life is found when what I call the "idol of self" dies with Christ on the cross, and the real human being is born into life.  It was the same truth, I believe that I had detected, but not understood, the first time I read the book.  Those years before, I could see the arrows pointing the way long before ever coming to see what they pointed to.

I can't always rationalize why I follow whom I follow, but I would propose that you probably cannot either.  In this case, I simply somehow knew that Dostoevsky knew something that I didn't.  So, back to the point where I started this - the people whose writings have struck me as really wise and brilliant in this world (including Dostoevsky, St. Gregory Nazianzus, St. Augustine, St. Gregory Palamas, not to mention scripture) most often seem to talk about "God." 

Now, I want to make one thing clear as I make this point.  I did not grow up in a Christian home, I never attended church as a youth, and becoming Christian as an adult has only made more difficult my relationship with family and the friends I had before.  I have not been drawn to find these thinkers and teachers compelling by some social pressure.  For me, the social pressure is just the opposite.  I did not find myself here because I wanted to believe these things.  I found myself here because the best teachers I encountered in books, and, eventually, in life, all talked of God...and indeed, were very often (though not absolutely always) Orthodox on top of that.  At some point it was too great a pattern to ignore, and, in a very literal sense, I gave up and began talking of "God."  Today, in those moments when I am, for a brief time, the person I was created to be - when the world is real - I see why those thinkers would have it that way.

We choose the language of those around us who seem, to our minds, to really understand.  The point is not that this language is the most "accurate" in some sense - as I've been saying, God is Mystery, and no language captures that anyway.  We take the language of our communion, and so I take the language of God.