A man is sitting down somewhere.
A woman approaches him.
They have an exchange that goes as follows:
man: F U N E M
woman: S V F M
man: F U N E X
woman: S V F X
man: O K L F M N X
question: where are they, and who are they to each other?
A man is sitting down somewhere.
A woman approaches him.
They have an exchange that goes as follows:
man: F U N E M
woman: S V F M
man: F U N E X
woman: S V F X
man: O K L F M N X
question: where are they, and who are they to each other?
sarsaila or ozzie, I'd like some clarification for the Pirate Puzzle (#94)
If pirate #4 gets one coin from either pirate #1 or pirate #2, and getting it from pirate #2 results in the death of pirate #1, motivation number three (killing other pirates) comes into play. But I do think that there is an alternate distribution: 997,0,1,0,2, since it doesn't matter for pirate #1 where he gets his third vote from. Correct me if I'm wrong...
"The rich want it and the poor have it. If you eat it, you will die. What is it?"
Friendship-true love-true lover-a friend-a personality or something?
What number should replace the question mark?
Shouldn't it be 8/3 instead of 4/? ?And if not
40/11, 24/7, 16/5, 32/9, 4/?
I am guessing that it is 40/11,36/10,32/9,28/8,24/7,20/6,16/5,12/4,8/3,4/2,2/1
So the question mark must be 2 :D
Let's say there are 9 voters.They all get 3 votes.So 1-2-3 votes for A 4-5-6 votes B 7-8-9 votes for C.Let's also say if 1-2-3 were going to vote for B if A never ran,4-5-6 was going to vote for C if B didn't run and 7-8-9 would vote for A if C didn't run.So if B and C run for presidency B will win the election against C,but when A and B ran against eachother A would win because the people who were going to vote for C would vote for A.This specific case makes this suggestion unfair.(Assuming everyone has to vote)
What number should replace the question mark?
Shouldn't it be 8/3 instead of 4/? ?And if not
40/11, 24/7, 16/5, 32/9, 4/?
I am guessing that it is 40/11,36/10,32/9,28/8,24/7,20/6,16/5,12/4,8/3,4/2,2/1
So the question mark must be 2 :D
You are correct. The answer is 2. I got this problem out of an IQ book of problems that I have. My thought is that the author was looking to see if you can find the comparison between the numerator and the denominator. You take the numerator and divide it by 4 and then add 1 to get the denominator. Although, it probably can be turned into a sequence question with the sequence you gave. :)
Let's say there are 9 voters.They all get 3 votes.So 1-2-3 votes for A 4-5-6 votes B 7-8-9 votes for C.Let's also say if 1-2-3 were going to vote for B if A never ran,4-5-6 was going to vote for C if B didn't run and 7-8-9 would vote for A if C didn't run.So if B and C run for presidency B will win the election against C,but when A and B ran against eachother A would win because the people who were going to vote for C would vote for A.This specific case makes this suggestion unfair.(Assuming everyone has to vote)
This is if all voters vote for their top choice in any race. However, 4-5-6 could make C win (their 2nd choice) rather than A (their third choice).
Assume there are only 3 voters.
There are 2 cases: (In order of choice)
X -> A, B, C
Y -> B, C, A
Z -> C, A, B
BvC will lead to B winning, and A wins AvB.
X -> A, C, B
Y -> B, A, C
Z -> C, B, A
BvC will lead to C winning, and A wins AvC.
Therefore A's suggestion is unfair.
Assume there are only 3 voters.
There are 2 cases: (In order of choice)
X -> A, B, C
Y -> B, C, A Knowing that A would win AvB, Voter Y should vote for C. C would win AvC, and Voter Y would get his/her 2nd choice instead of his third choice.
Z -> C, A, B
BvC will lead to B winning, and A wins AvB.
X -> A, C, B
Y -> B, A, C
Z -> C, B, A Knowing that A would win AvC, Voter Z should vote for B. B would win AvB, and Voter Z would get his/her 2nd choice instead of his third choice.
BvC will lead to C winning, and A wins AvC.
Therefore A's suggestion is unfair.
If the voters don't just vote for their favorite candidate in each race, regardless of what effect this race would have on the next, then though A's suggestion is unfair, it would result in A's loss.
A is gambling on whether the voters will understand the above logic.
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Another interesting point is that it never says that the 1/3 of the voters who voted for A as their first choice all chose B (or C) as their second choice.
It could be 6 voters with the following preferences
U: A,B,C
V: A,C,B
W: B,A,C
X: B,C,A
Y: C,A,B
Z: C,B,A
apteryx: the voters do not change their minds; they have a fixed set of preferences. Say that voter X prefers A, then B. If A runs, X votes A, if A doesn't, he votes B.
@aquajet: good job!
I guess that for the sake of the puzzle, we can assume that the voters always vote sincerely (for the person they'd most like to win). That's what almost always happens in real life anyway.
However, my point was that the voters would not be changing their minds. They would be voting for a candidate that they did not like as much so that they got their second choice instead of their third choice.
If you have the preferences C,B,A and if you take action one, A wins, and if you take action two, B wins. Which would you take? Action two, obviously. now, action one is "vote for c in the first vote". action two is "vote for b in the first vote".
If you look at the single race, people using this strategy are voting against their best intrests. However, looking at the entire vote system, then the people using this strategy are actually helping their intrests. This strategy only makes sense if you look at the big picture -- not just the individual votes.
Just a point of intrest. say you have 6 voters.the first vote is when all 3 run. The second vote is the one where everyone votes for their second choice. the 3rd is the BvC proposed by A.
Vote 1 Vote 2 Vote 3
U-ABC A B B
V-ACB A C C
W-BAC B A B
X-BCA B C B
Y-CAB C A C
Z-CBA C B C
1st vote 2-2-2 tie. 2nd vote 2-2-2 tie 3rd vote 3-3 tie.
EDIT: oh, sorry, missed the stipulation "with an odd # of voters" that takes care of this idea. The 1st one still stands though.
Voters do not devise strategies. They simply pick their favorite choice.
Well, that's how most people vote, but usually assumptions not given in a problem should not be made. And the voter mentioned who had preferences, C,B,A was picking his/her favorite choice. C was not a realistic option, so between B and A, B was his/her favorite choice. And since voters can devise strategies, we can't just say "but they don't." some do, and the voters in this problem could be those.
But anyway this is not the case.The question is,is A's suggestion fair?And I gave you a specific condition where it wasn't making this suggestion fair.The question doesn't ask for possibilities but just if the suggestion is fair or not,and it's not :D
Because when A chooses not to participate in the first one, his votes favor B or C. Whichever one wins, once A returns to the polls, the voters who voted for the winning candidate are more likely to vote for A than the other candidate. That is all.
It is because A's votes decide who wins between B and C, so once A's votes are returned to him, he wins. :)
I remember being stumped by the 6, 8, 24, etc years ago. Dumb me was looking for some sort of progression, but there is no progression between 6 & 8 , only 6, 8 and then 24. Thanks, as this has bugged me for nearly 50 yrs. Shows the short comings of IQ tests, as now I've seen the solution to this problem I'd be more likely to solve similar problems.