Chess will never be solved, here's why

He's suggested that he is insecure. We can assume that he does it a lot, because if you look at what he quoted, I certainly wasn't talking about my intelligence level. But I let that pass because I thought the other approach was more apt. 

Likewise Bayesian reasoning is the provably only fully consistent way of quantifying belief by reasoning from the specific to the general (inductive reasoning), and no amount of evidence can ever reduce a finite amount of uncertainty to zero uncertainty by Bayesian inference.

This is a (meta)fact about knowledge about the real world (such as all science) and also applies to questions that are in principle possible to decide by exhaustive analysis but presently impractical to do so. (I hope it is obvious that solving chess falls into that category).

The reason that AIs like Leela are designed to quantify uncertainty and not to ignore it is that that is appropriate.

@5193
"you know the outcome that white loses" ++ Yes 1 e4 e5 2 Ba6? loses for sure.

"pragmatically reasonable as a chess player playing the odds, but inadequate for a proof"
++ On the contrary: I would not bet on some chess players winning it as black against Stockfish.
For the proof it is adequate as it is sure knowledge white loses it with best play from both sides.
The use of knowledge is allowed and beneficial.
A solution of chess is no better with a full tree of 1 e4 e5 2 Ba6? to checkmate than without.

Elroch

Really? Let's take a closer look at this so-called "provably only fully consistent way of quantifying belief by reasoning from the specific to the general (inductive reasoning)."  First, let's unpack what is meant by "belief." Belief, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, is "an acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof." So, in order to believe something, we don't necessarily need proof; we just need to accept that it exists or is true.  Now, let's look at "reasoning from the specific to the general (inductive reasoning)." Inductive reasoning is defined as "inference in which the conclusion about a whole is drawn from facts about some of its parts." In other words, it is the process of making a generalization based on specific observations.  So, what Bayesian reasoning is saying is that we can make a generalization about something (i.e., believe something) without proof, simply by observing some of its parts.  This may sound reasonable at first glance, but upon further examination, it is clear that this is not a sound way to form beliefs.  For one thing, it is based on the fallacy of induction, which is the mistaken belief that because something has always been true in the past, it will always be true in the future. This is clearly not the case; just because something has always been true in the past does not mean it will always be true in the future.  Additionally, Bayesian reasoning relies heavily on probability, which is inherently uncertain. As noted by statistician George Box, "all models are wrong, but some are useful." In other words, no model is perfect, and all models contain some degree of uncertainty.  Therefore, to say that Bayesian reasoning is the "provably only fully consistent way of quantifying belief by reasoning from the specific to the general" is simply not true. It is based on fallacious reasoning and uncertain probabilities, and is therefore not a sound way to form beliefs.

@5197
"Belief, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, is
"an acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof."
++ And also
"Proof is the evidence that compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or fact"
"Evidence is matter submitted in court to determine the truth of alleged facts"
 

I think that the qualification regarding proof is unnecessary and maybe even incorrect. We don't necessarily accept something as true if it's proven to be true in circumstances where the proof may be faulty. There's a potential, infinite regression, regarding proof that the proof is true and proof that the proof of the proof is true.

Ultimately, belief is something else. Yes, it's the fundamental belief in the existence of something; or acceptance of the existence of that something. It's even ok to define belief by using the same word, since it is the existence of that something which is seen as true. 

The Platonics had it that belief is true, justified, confirmed belief but "true" is assumptive and circular and justification is a slightly different form of confirmation. So knowledge is highly confirmed belief.

So knowledge is highly confirmed belief.>>

More accurate to add "which we see as true", rather than "which is true", if we see the need to go down that road.

Only inductive knowledge (eg all scientific knowledge) is "highly confirmed belief".

Deductive knowledge results from the application of logical deduction to axioms.

For example, the fact that there is not a finite number of prime numbers is a proven theorem, not a "highly confirmed belief".

[To be pedantic, you do need to believe in the consistency of a formal system to trust it. Consistency means that there is no proposition in the system that is provably true and provably false. Consistency is never decidable (hence never a matter of known fact) for any system powerful enough to represent the natural numbers. But few believe Peano's axioms are inconsistent. This is based both on intuitive basis - Peano's axioms seem valid - and the lack of any inconsistency in all of mathematics built on them (an example of "highly confirmed belief")].

For finite systems, consistency is (in principle) checkable by exhaustive elimination. All questions about chess can be expressed within such a system.

No. You don't need to believe in the consistency of a formal system to trust it. You only need to believe that it is consistent if you want to use it to prove things. Consistency is not required for trust, only for proof.  Formal systems are useful because they allow us to explore what is true and what is false in a controlled way. We can use them to test our hypotheses and see what follows logically from what we assume. But we don't need to believe that they are consistent in order to do this. We can still use them to explore, even if we think there is a chance they might be inconsistent.  In fact, it is often useful to explore inconsistent formal systems, as they can help us to understand what goes wrong when a system is inconsistent. They can also help us to develop new ways of thinking about problems.

Chess is simply infinite as it will be based on infinite mindsets.

You're certainly on the right track, but are blatantly confusing the trees for the forest. A formal system is not just some opaque structure, but one that we create and understand. The rules of a formal system are not some ethereal set of guidelines that we have no control over, but something that we design deliberately to achieve specific goals.  The main point you seem to be missing is that a formal system is a tool, and like any tool, its efficacy is determined by how it is used. A hammer is a great tool for driving nails, but a terrible one for painting a picture. In the same way, a formal system is a great tool for proving things, but only if it is used correctly.  Just because a formal system can be used to prove things, that doesn't mean it will always get the correct answer. If the rules of the system are not followed correctly, or if the axioms are not chosen wisely, then the system will produce false results.  Therefore, it is not the formal system itself that we need to trust, but the people using it. We need to trust that they understand the system and are using it correctly. Only then can we trust the results it produces.

We're getting to where I think you're making the signature mistake, as it were. You're seperating induction from deduction and treating them as different entities, in an absolute sense. Your entire argument rests on that.

But deduction is not deduction in isolation. Without premises, there's no syllogism. Without facts, there's no deduction, so where do facts come from? Not by deduction.

From observation, which is anecdotal and inferential. The same degree of uncertainty must be attached to the "facts" you use as premises for a syllogism as you insist on attaching to the idea that 1. d4 may lose for white. I can't personally see why you should think it may lose but it follows that you do think it, since the same argument can be used for 1. d4 as for 1. e4 e5 2. Ba6.

This means that your absolute distinction between deduction and inference is artificial and it doesn't hold. There is a distinction but it is not absolute, in the way that is necessary for your argument to stand.

I like food

Are you fat?

I mean, circumferantially challenged?

To be serious, deduction and induction are entirely distinct, and anyone who doesn't understand this needs to learn about it rather than broadcasting their ignorance.

See, that was trolling.  Please do report, it will eventually bear fruit, but only by drawing attention to how often you post things like "stupid child", so you might not like the result. 

Essentially, you've explained why you don't understand enough to be venturing your opinion, the way you do. I would like to thank you for your patience, though, because at least you gave me the chance to explain where I think you're going wrong but you aren't giving yourself a chance to understand what I'm talking about. I'm afraid it's like trying to explain something to a goat, or treacle. Not that I did ever try either but I have imagination.

One thing. Do you agree that we don't know that 1. d4 doesn't lose by force for white? That's the crux of it because, if you could manage to answer that clearly and honestly, then we would be able to see whether there's any consistency in what you're saying. If you can demonstrate consistency then certainly you would be letting yourself in for a bit of jollity at your expense but at least it would demonstrate intellectual integrity.