Greek KIA

As usual in the Botvinnik Formation, in trying to defend his light squares Black's concessions can cause him to lose his dark-square pawns (c5 and e5 - editor) and cause the collapse of his position.  The next example is characteristic of such.               

Game 1

 Game 2

Game 3

Game 5

The following pawn structure is typical when Black plays ...d5.  White usually responds exd5 opening up his LSB and not allowing Black to close the position with ...d4. 

Game 2

Game 3

The following pawn structure is possible if Black avoids ...d5 and plays ...f5 instead.  White, most of the time, should respond with e4xf5.  Black has 2 choices:

a) The most usual and the most ambitious choice is to recapture at f5 with the pawn (...g6xf5).  Black is then just a move away from dominating the center with ...d5.  White's counterstrike should be f4 and after ...e4 a piece should be positioned at the blockading square (e3).  If White manages to position a knight there, Black will have serious problems protecting f5.

(Despite mentioning two choices Michael only lists one.  Perhaps he forgot, deleted, or merely implied the second choice.  Quite possibly, it may refer to capturing on f5 with a piece like a knight or a bishop. - Editor)  

Game 1

Game 2

Game 3

                            White's d4 against the Botvinnik Formation.

White's quick d4, although tempting, is rarely a good idea against the Botvinnik Formation.  The reason is simple.  Both the c5 and e5-pawns are potential targets.  After d4 Black can exchange both pawns on d4 and the opening of the position creates an unclear tactical situation where Black's light square weaknesses are very difficult (if not impossible) to exploit.

                                 The Open D-File Pawn Structure

(I apologize for all the deleted comments below.  It turns out only 21 diagrams/games can be posted on a single page. Glitch, perhaps?  Otherwise, the remaining ones fail to show the pieces on the board.  This series continues in Greek KIA II with "Anand's Defense".)

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