Why are we here?

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MindWalk
Gabriel1326 wrote:

Lets ask a serious question. We have two theories that attempt to explain our origins. Creation says an intelligent designer created and designed the earth to support life. Evolution says it happened by a series of accidents. Be honest. Which one makes sense? Isn't it obvious that somebody had to have done this?

Look at the beauty and the symmetry--yet with endless variety--of snowflakes. Look at the beauty and complexity of the stalactites and stalagmites in crystal caves. Look at the regular shapes of the geological formation known as the "Giants Causeway." Isn't it obvious that somebody had to have designed and made each of these? Well, no, it's not. What you would label "accidental events"--what I would label "events occurring in accordance with natural law and therefore not fundamentally accidental"--led to all of them. 

"It's obvious" doesn't always turn out to be true. 

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote:

The whole "who created the Creator?" response has always struck me as a red herring and non-response/nonsensical.  If X created Y, then the question who created X, even if left unanswered, would not change the fact that X still created Y.  But besides that, pretty much everyone understands "God," however defined, as a noncontingent being, and a non-contingent by definition can never not exist, and is an uncreated, uncaused ("prime/first mover") cause as a matter of course.  Now someone may complain that this is convenient, but those who do so, still end up postulating their own non-contingent, uncaused cause (such as a "universe" or "multiverse" that has always existed).  Whether one adopts metaphysical naturalism or supernaturalism, an infinite regress of endless causes doesn't make sense.  Ultimately, it would seem we have to ground reality in some initial, uncaused non-contingency, whether that be the "universe/multiverse" or God.

It isn't the understanding of what the word "God" means (and you are choosing a meaning not everyone gives it) that puts God beyond the asking of the question, "Where did God come from?" What does it is first, asserting that there can be no causal or explanatory loops or infinite causal or explanatory chains, so that any causal or explanatory chain must have a terminator (so that, in particular, the causal or explanatory chain involved when inquiring as to the cause or explanation of the universe's existence must have a terminator), and then, second, labeling that terminator "God." But if one does so, then in order to avoid equivocation, he must make the word "God" *mean* "the terminator of the causal or explanatory chain (in particular, the one involved when inquiring as to the universe's own causal or explanatory chain), whatever that terminator might be"--and then *NOT ALSO MEAN* "a sentient/sapient being who cares about humanity, listens to prayer, has a divine plan, sent his only begotten son to Earth/spoke to Mohammed/appeared as a flaming bush, decides who gets into which afterlife (assuming there to be an afterlife), and so on." One cannot simply assume that the terminator is the being which he conceives God to be. As you rightly note, one is free to dream up his own terminator--but one may *not* simply assume that the terminator is whatever he chooses it to be, and one may *not* place his own chosen terminator beyond such questions as "What caused it" until he has established that his chosen one actually *is* the terminator.

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote:
stephen_33 wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:

It's certainly within your right to disagree, but the "argument" itself of "who created God?" is still a bit of a strawman, since theists don't posit a contingent, created God, but posit a non-contingent, uncreated one.

That always seems a rather arbitrary explanation, insisting on a cause for the material Cosmos that itself requires no cause. But then much the same can be said of the material, that it came into existence from some precursor state that itself requires no cause.

Correct.  That was my point.  If not God, then something else.   If we can't have an endless, infinite number of causes in the past, then at some point we must reach an initial uncaused cause: a non-contingent (i.e., some X that must exist necessarily; that can't *not* exist).

I will point out that we have no precedent for matter/energy's coming into being by any means at all--the "creation" of a painting or the "creation" of a table is really the conversion of pre-existing matter/energy from one (or several) forms into another (or several other) forms--and therefore our intuitive reason for insisting upon the universe's being caused is rather weak. The closest one might say we have is the continual popping into existence of virtual particles, which have at best unknown cause and at worst no cause at all.

MindWalk
Gabriel1326 wrote:

God has existed forever and is eternal. That is impossible for us to grasp because we are His creation. Just as it is impossible for a dog to understand why a man would read a newspaper, it is impossible for us as created beings to comprehend the infinite God.

(1) The belief that God has existed forever and is eternal rests on the belief that God exists. I accept that you characterize God that way. I do not accept that anything matching that characterization actually exists.

(2) The impossibility of our "grasping" God is not good reason to believe that he exists.

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote:
Gabriel1326 wrote:

Naturalism is just not enough to explain life. The laws of science could not have made themselves up. A creator had to do this.

Now this is a valid point.  Agreed.   We also have no convincing naturalistic explanation for the origin of life.

So: we do not know the naturalistic explanation, if there is one. We do not know the non-naturalistic explanation, if there is one. Nor have we eliminated all possible naturalistic or non-naturalistic explanations.

That by itself would be sufficient reason not to believe that a supernaturalistic explanation is correct. It would be sufficient reason to withhold belief as to whether it was one or the other that was correct.

On the other hand, we have frequently seen what has seemed inexplicable become naturalistically explained. Never has that happened for supernaturalistic explanation. That would seem to count in favor of counting it as epistemically more likely that there is an unknown naturalistic explanation than that there is an unknown supernaturalistic explanation--unless all logically possible naturalistic explanations have been ruled out.

MindWalk
Gabriel1326 wrote:

Naturalism is just not enough to explain life. The laws of science could not have made themselves up. A creator had to do this.

Let me suppose I agreed with you. What would I know about that creator? I would know that it had created life. And...that's pretty much it. I certainly wouldn't know that it was any form of Abrahamic God.

I also wouldn't know that the universe didn't, every now and then, operate in some other way than in accordance with ordinary natural law, and that it hadn't operated in that "some other way" when life got started.

It's one thing to think that X didn't do it; it's quite another to think that Y did it.

tbwp10
MindWalk wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:

The whole "who created the Creator?" response has always struck me as a red herring and non-response/nonsensical.  If X created Y, then the question who created X, even if left unanswered, would not change the fact that X still created Y.  But besides that, pretty much everyone understands "God," however defined, as a noncontingent being, and a non-contingent by definition can never not exist, and is an uncreated, uncaused ("prime/first mover") cause as a matter of course.  Now someone may complain that this is convenient, but those who do so, still end up postulating their own non-contingent, uncaused cause (such as a "universe" or "multiverse" that has always existed).  Whether one adopts metaphysical naturalism or supernaturalism, an infinite regress of endless causes doesn't make sense.  Ultimately, it would seem we have to ground reality in some initial, uncaused non-contingency, whether that be the "universe/multiverse" or God.

It isn't the understanding of what the word "God" means (and you are choosing a meaning not everyone gives it) that puts God beyond the asking of the question, "Where did God come from?" What does it is first, asserting that there can be no causal or explanatory loops or infinite causal or explanatory chains, so that any causal or explanatory chain must have a terminator (so that, in particular, the causal or explanatory chain involved when inquiring as to the cause or explanation of the universe's existence must have a terminator), and then, second, labeling that terminator "God." But if one does so, then in order to avoid equivocation, he must make the word "God" *mean* "the terminator of the causal or explanatory chain (in particular, the one involved when inquiring as to the universe's own causal or explanatory chain), whatever that terminator might be"--and then *NOT ALSO MEAN* "a sentient/sapient being who cares about humanity, listens to prayer, has a divine plan, sent his only begotten son to Earth/spoke to Mohammed/appeared as a flaming bush, decides who gets into which afterlife (assuming there to be an afterlife), and so on." One cannot simply assume that the terminator is the being which he conceives God to be. As you rightly note, one is free to dream up his own terminator--but one may *not* simply assume that the terminator is whatever he chooses it to be, and one may *not* place his own chosen terminator beyond such questions as "What caused it" until he has established that his chosen one actually *is* the terminator.

There is a general understanding of the term "God" even in philosophy.  In the most basic understanding "God" is understood to be a supernatural, uncaused being that transcends nature.  One does not need to have all the details fleshed out to posit such a being.  If someone understands "God" to be a contingent, created being, then this is the first I've heard of it.

tbwp10
MindWalk wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:
stephen_33 wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:

It's certainly within your right to disagree, but the "argument" itself of "who created God?" is still a bit of a strawman, since theists don't posit a contingent, created God, but posit a non-contingent, uncreated one.

That always seems a rather arbitrary explanation, insisting on a cause for the material Cosmos that itself requires no cause. But then much the same can be said of the material, that it came into existence from some precursor state that itself requires no cause.

Correct.  That was my point.  If not God, then something else.   If we can't have an endless, infinite number of causes in the past, then at some point we must reach an initial uncaused cause: a non-contingent (i.e., some X that must exist necessarily; that can't *not* exist).

I will point out that we have no precedent for matter/energy's coming into being by any means at all--the "creation" of a painting or the "creation" of a table is really the conversion of pre-existing matter/energy from one (or several) forms into another (or several other) forms--and therefore our intuitive reason for insisting upon its being caused is rather weak. The closest one might say we have is the continual popping into existence of virtual particles, which have at best unknown cause and at worst no cause at all.

Based on the available evidence we have, our space-time reality does not seem to have always existed but converges toward a terminal boundary.  At least that's what it appears when we wind back the clock as far as we can to within 10^-35 seconds of t=0.  Thus, it's not that someone is postulating out of the blue that matter/energy hasn't always existed and came into existence.  On the face of it, that's what it looks like. 

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote: MindWalk replies in red:
stephen_33 wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:
Gabriel1326 wrote:

Naturalism is just not enough to explain life. The laws of science could not have made themselves up. A creator had to do this.

Now this is a valid point.  Agreed.   We also have no convincing naturalistic explanation for the origin of life.

Why? That needs explaining. The 'laws of science' merely reflect the fact that there is underlying order in our Universe. How precisely are we to be certain that such order cannot exist without a creator?

That seems to be racing way ahead of all current knowledge on the subject.

The order of the physical universe is a separate problem of its own.  The problem touched on here goes beyond that: it is the problem of math, the mind and the physical universe.   The existence of mind (consciousness) has always been problematic for the die-hard materialist.  How can the physical create non-physical thought I do not know. I view that as very probably fundamentally unknowable. and consciousness that has no physical dimensions and how can non-physical conscious thought control the physical?  I don't think it does.
 
Then there is the debate about mathematics with mathematical realists (Platonists) on one side arguing that mathematical objects are non-physical abstract objects that are nevertheless truly real, I view that as a mistake; even if I didn't, their non-physicality would seem to prevent them from having physical causal power, so what's the difference between their being "somehow real" and their simply being unreal? while the non-realists argue that mathematical objects have no independent basis in reality and are simply the product of human thought and imagination.  The former may seem like a ridiculous notion but this is actually a matter of ongoing debate with strong points on each side.  For example, the famous mathematician Roger Penrose argues that fractal patterns are not mental constructs, but has its own (Platonic) existence. Fractal patterns can certainly be (roughly) physically instantiated, just as numerosity and quantity and shape can be, but that doesn't make mathematical fractal patterns metaphysical existents any more than it makes mathematical numbers or quantities or shapes metaphysical existents.
 
So how does this relate to the physical universe?  Well, Einstein got us thinking about this problem.  Here's how one mathematician describes it:
 
"The nature of the relationship between mathematics and the physical world has been a source of debate since the era of the Pythagoreans. A school of thought, reflecting the ideas of Plato, is that mathematics has its own existence.  Flowing from this proposition is the notion that mathematical forms underpin the physical universe and are out there waiting to be discovered.  The opposing viewpoint is that mathematical forms are objects of our human imagination and we make them up as we go along, tailoring them to describe reality.  In 1921, this view led Einstein to wonder, 'How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality?'  In 1959, Eugene Winger coined the phrase 'the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics' to describe this 'miracle,' conceding that it was something he could not fathom."
 
Thus, if mathematics (including mathematical formulations of the laws of the universe) are the product of non-physical human thought, then how do we explain the unexpected and improbable coincidence that a product of the non-physical mind should describe physical reality so well?
 
The typical "answer" is that it is just a happy coincidence.  But that is no explanation at all. I have always been mystified by Einstein's and Wigner's attitudes. We use language to describe the world around us; we use the very precise language of mathematics to describe it. As mathematics is how we describe any kind of order, one would expect mathematics to be applicable to physical reality unless physical reality were entirely chaotic. 
 
Respectable arguments for theism have been put forth based on problems like these: the problem of order, Given that we're here, the universe can't be completely chaotic and therefore it must be that it displays order. the problem of human thought, You've got me there. I don't see how having God helps, of course. the problem of human consciousness, I'm not sure how that's intended to be different from the problem of human thought. the problem of "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" to describe the physical universe, But I'd expect that. in a universe displaying order (and, therefore, in one in which we existed). and to this we can add the problem of why the physical universe should exhibit such order and inviolable regularities of nature (physical laws). Would you expect a universe to be completely chaotic? Or to display ever-changing regularities rather than ones remaining the same over time? Is an orderly universe somehow less to be expected?  And if the Platonists are right and the physical laws are not simply descriptions of reality, but non-physical realities that govern the universe, To say that they are somehow real is not the same as to say that they govern the universe. then their existence becomes difficult to explain (i.e., the physical universe functioning according to physical laws that are not themselves physical). To say that the physical universe functions "according to physical laws that are not themselves physical" is to say nothing more than that the physical universe functions according to physical laws--it is to say nothing more than that the physical universe functions in an orderly way, which is at least in principle (and often in practice) describable in the way in which one describes order.
 
There are of course those who object to these arguments.  But regardless of that, they are still valid points to raise.

 

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote:

As I said, that question is a matter of ongoing debate.  Do the physical laws of the universe have a *non-physical* reality of their own independent of the physical, material universe?  Platonists would argue yes, non-Platonists would argue no, and that they're simply a product of *non-physical* human thought and imagination.  Either way, there's no reason why non-physical math should be so effective at describing our physical universe.

Are you similarly mystified by why nonphysical words should be so effective at describing the physical universe?

tbwp10

I'll be the first to admit that I don't know enough about the subject (mathematical realism vs. non-realism and Winger's  unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics), nor do I have the expertise to properly evaluate it.  But I do know that it is a matter of current, ongoing debate and a valid issue to raise (unlike most of the other "points" raised here by YECs).

tbwp10
MindWalk wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:

As I said, that question is a matter of ongoing debate.  Do the physical laws of the universe have a *non-physical* reality of their own independent of the physical, material universe?  Platonists would argue yes, non-Platonists would argue no, and that they're simply a product of *non-physical* human thought and imagination.  Either way, there's no reason why non-physical math should be so effective at describing our physical universe.

Are you similarly mystified by why nonphysical words should be so effective at describing the physical universe?

"Mystified" is not the proper word.  The problem of non-physical human thought and consciousness is indeed an unsolved problem as you have noted yourself.

MindWalk

In post 27, tbwp10 wrote (in part): There is a general understanding of the term "God" even in philosophy.  In the most basic understanding "God" is understood to be a supernatural, uncaused being that transcends nature.  One does not need to have all the details fleshed out to posit such a being.  If someone understands "God" to be a contingent, created being, then this is the first I've heard of it.

MindWalk replies: I had in mind the general population which while probably not thinking of God as a contingent being might simply not think about that or even, possibly, know about the necessary/contingent distinction, and specifically the part we see in our chess.com discussions. I gather you have in mind something more like what Antony Flew, in his book God and Philosophy, quoted Richard Swinburne as having written in The Coherence of Theism, a description of which Flew says that it "has since become standard throughout the entire English-speaking philosophical world: "A person without a body (i.e. a spirit) present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the universe, able to do everything (i.e. omnipotent), knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, eternal, a necessary being, holy and worthy of worship." (Swinburne, p. 2 of The Coherence of Theism, quoted at p. 9 of Flew, God and Philosophy.) 

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote: <snip>

Based on the available evidence we have, our space-time reality does not seem to have always existed but converges toward a terminal boundary.  At least that's what it appears when we wind back the clock as far as we can to within 10^-35 seconds of t=0.  Thus, it's not that someone is postulating out of the blue that matter/energy hasn't always existed and came into existence.  On the face of it, that's what it looks like. 

I agree, until you get to "hasn't always existed and came into existence." Assuming, as I normally do, that before that point (to which you referred) at which the known laws of physics break down the notion of time still applies and that there is only a finite time before it (and we might as well assume that there was only that teensy-tiny fraction of a second before it), I agree that the universe's existence does not extend infinitely far back in time but that instead the universe had a beginning in time, in the sense of there being a first moment, time t0. However, the universe's having "always existed," though possibly intended to mean that it existed infinitely far back in time, may instead mean only that at any instant of time one might choose, it has existed, which is true of the universe if one is speaking of time rather than of meta-time. Moreover, the universe's having had a beginning in time is not the same as its having "come into existence." We speak of a painting's having "come into existence" (even though we are really speaking not of creation de novo but of the transformation of some forms of matter/energy into other forms of matter/energy) because we know that at time t3 it exists (matter/energy had been reordered) but that at some prior time t1 it did not exist (matter/energy had not yet been reordered), and between t1 and t3, events occurred to make the painting "come into existence," so to speak. But with no time prior to t0, we cannot infer from the universe's having had a temporal beginning that it must have "come into being" from some earlier time when it did not exist, because there *is* no earlier time when it did not exist. The closest we can come is to posit meta-time and to say that in meta-time, the universe went from a meta-earlier meta-time of nonexistence to a meta-later meta-time when it did exist and then suppose a meta-temporal process of universal (meta-)becoming. 

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote:

I'll be the first to admit that I don't know enough about the subject (mathematical realism vs. non-realism and Winger's  unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics), nor do I have the expertise to properly evaluate it.  But I do know that it is a matter of current, ongoing debate and a valid issue to raise (unlike most of the other "points" raised here by YECs).

My inclination is to think of thinking of abstract objects as metaphysically real as a needless reification and of associated problems as among the philosophical illusions that it is the analytic philosopher's job to banish. I had forgotten, but I should address that in the philosophical tract I'm working on. Thanks for the reminder.

If memory serves, I think Bishop Berkeley's account of abstract objects is correct. Berkeley makes fundamental errors in arguing for subjective idealism, but as I recall, I agreed with his account of abstract objects. 

tbwp10

I'm out of my depth here @MindWalk.  I'm going to have to take your philosophy class.  happy.png

PyriteDragon

I think it’s possible that there is no reason why we exist and that we simply just exist.

stephen_33

I view the human race as an aberration of nature.

MindWalk
tbwp10 wrote:
MindWalk wrote:
tbwp10 wrote:

As I said, that question is a matter of ongoing debate.  Do the physical laws of the universe have a *non-physical* reality of their own independent of the physical, material universe?  Platonists would argue yes, non-Platonists would argue no, and that they're simply a product of *non-physical* human thought and imagination.  Either way, there's no reason why non-physical math should be so effective at describing our physical universe.

Are you similarly mystified by why nonphysical words should be so effective at describing the physical universe?

"Mystified" is not the proper word.  The problem of non-physical human thought and consciousness is indeed an unsolved problem as you have noted yourself.

I was drawing a parallel between finding it mysterious that mathematics is applicable to the physical world, on one hand, and finding it mysterious that ordinary English sentences are applicable to the physical world, on the other. Both can be used to describe the world around us. Mathematics is, generally, the more precise way of describing the order of the world.

MindWalk
PyriteDragon wrote:

I think it’s possible that there is no reason why we exist and that we simply just exist.

I certainly see nothing making it logically impossible that that is so. However, we should recognize that it's conceivable that it is *in some other way* impossible that that is so.