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Does True Randomness Actually Exist? ( ^&*#^%$&#% )

'The phrase ‘phenomena of the large numbers’ reminds me of Dirac’s large numbers hypothesis.'
any idea for the reasoning? It is mentioned here...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1dKvoa2ITw
If you seek the insight behind the key aspect as to why G varies with time, then I recommend the answer displayed on Physics Stack Exchange:
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/500308/what-is-the-justification-for-diracs-large-numbers-hypothesis
There aren’t exactly a nimiety of websites dedicated to the hypothesis contrary to the aforementioned probability theory (I suppose it forms an integral part of QM). Yet, I entrust that you will find a decent selection.
sorry, i totaly messed this one up. was thinking of the benford law and meant to ask if you know the reason for why this pattern happen?
There are various explanations that have been developed to elucidate Benford's law, albeit it is somewhat more ready to prove it mathematically. Moreover, it plays prevalence in Planck's study of thermodynamics, in spite of the subtlety. The following links could be invaluable and furthermore, one should note that Zipf's law asserts that the frequency of a word is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table. In a simplistic mathematical form (I place simplistic so as to stress the beauty of probability theory even when it's not enmeshed with mathematical jargon), the probability of 'finding' the nth most common word is given by the approximation: P(n) = 0.1/n.

One very old idea is that when you don't know what is true, you make as neutral assumptions as possible. So if you know that if a die can give you 6 results and you know nothing else, the best assumption is that all 6 possibilities are equally likely. However, when you move on to taking into account empirical data to revise your model of reality, this fails to be adequate.
why do you assume that all possibilities are equally likely?
If all you have is labels, then you have no reason to favour one of those labels over another. One way of putting it is that in this extreme case where you have no empirical information, the only distribution that respects the symmetry between labels - you know exactly the same about each of them - is the uniform one.
When you replace this by the selection of a prior, this prior can be viewed as a distribution of distributions. Any such prior should still respect the same symmetry, or equivalently, the initial distribution it implies should.
I'm not referring to a physical bias to the die which obey the law of physics. (or a bias to empirical data results from pseudorandom) instead, assume an absolute random... why do we take for granted an equal distribution? (large numbers included)
We don't. It's just that without additional information, you have no more reason to believe the die would be biased towards 1 than that it would be biased towards 6 (these just being interchangeable labels for the outcome of experiments), and so on. There is a symmetry to your uncertainty.
Switch to a coin for simplicity. Suppose you have no reason to believe it is more likely to be biased towards heads than tails (your belief is symmetric with respect to an exchange of the two labels). Then until you get some data, you think there is 50% chance of a head, regardless of how likely it is that the coin is biased (because opposite biases cancel out).

why would a convict want determinism to be true?
because no one could be blamed for wrong doings. it would make all our actions inevitable?
...enter free will and how it all ties in w/ emotion.
Which is why "free will" is defined as a type of randomness, as described and analysed by Conway et al.
king... 'Yes of course, rationality usually wins the day in the end. And I prefer that course as well. Still, challenging perceptions is a dominant pastime of mine.'
that's solely depends on your perception of what is considered to be a 'win' ; )
One very old idea is that when you don't know what is true, you make as neutral assumptions as possible. So if you know that if a die can give you 6 results and you know nothing else, the best assumption is that all 6 possibilities are equally likely. However, when you move on to taking into account empirical data to revise your model of reality, this fails to be adequate.
why do you assume that all possibilities are equally likely?
If all you have is labels, then you have no reason to favour one of those labels over another. One way of putting it is that in this extreme case where you have no empirical information, the only distribution that respects the symmetry between labels - you know exactly the same about each of them - is the uniform one.
When you replace this by the selection of a prior, this prior can be viewed as a distribution of distributions. Any such prior should still respect the same symmetry, or equivalently, the initial distribution it implies should.
I'm not referring to a physical bias to the die which obey the law of physics. (or a bias to empirical data results from pseudorandom) instead, assume an absolute random... why do we take for granted an equal distribution? (large numbers included)
We don't. It's just that without additional information, you have no more reason to believe the die would be biased towards 1 than that it would be biased towards 6 (these just being interchangeable labels for the outcome of experiments), and so on. There is a symmetry to your uncertainty.
Switch to a coin for simplicity. Suppose you have no reason to believe it is more likely to be biased towards heads than tails (your belief is symmetric with respect to an exchange of the two labels). Then until you get some data, you think there is 50% chance of a head, regardless of how likely it is that the coin is biased (because opposite biases cancel out).
Your answer is unsatisfying because it based on empirical information resulted from pseudorandom while ignoring absolute random proposition. we already been thru pseudorandom and your explanation was suffice. now we're back to absolute random and the hypothetical question if it will distribute equally.
anyways, in the meantime i thought of a very simplistic answer to this question, and it simply come down to averaging.
for example, back to your 1,000 x 12M experiment. even if absolute random will have chaotic results like 500k vs 5m, once you average all the 1000 (thought experiments) you should eventually get an equal distribution. and if not... just do more of it.
more precisely... i have no way to be certain if absolute random will propagate into equal proportions in the same rate as pseudo does. however, eventually it should average to equal proportions. i think : )
yea, i wish i knew how to post the video, because as it fly the head keep turning... (usually with this sort of things the illusion just disappear)
on another note, because free will keeps coming up... genetics is also a big challenger to it. maybe even more challenging than physics, because its somewhat main stream?

I don’t know all the intricacies involved, but for now anyway I believe in free will.
On another note, remember that poster gracian.? Probably spelled it wrong. Anyway, he had some damn good posts earlier this morning. Now he’s gone, I know that Elroch would have been in heaven with that stuff. (Bummer)

One very old idea is that when you don't know what is true, you make as neutral assumptions as possible. So if you know that if a die can give you 6 results and you know nothing else, the best assumption is that all 6 possibilities are equally likely. However, when you move on to taking into account empirical data to revise your model of reality, this fails to be adequate.
why do you assume that all possibilities are equally likely?
If all you have is labels, then you have no reason to favour one of those labels over another. One way of putting it is that in this extreme case where you have no empirical information, the only distribution that respects the symmetry between labels - you know exactly the same about each of them - is the uniform one.
When you replace this by the selection of a prior, this prior can be viewed as a distribution of distributions. Any such prior should still respect the same symmetry, or equivalently, the initial distribution it implies should.
I'm not referring to a physical bias to the die which obey the law of physics. (or a bias to empirical data results from pseudorandom) instead, assume an absolute random... why do we take for granted an equal distribution? (large numbers included)
We don't. It's just that without additional information, you have no more reason to believe the die would be biased towards 1 than that it would be biased towards 6 (these just being interchangeable labels for the outcome of experiments), and so on. There is a symmetry to your uncertainty.
Switch to a coin for simplicity. Suppose you have no reason to believe it is more likely to be biased towards heads than tails (your belief is symmetric with respect to an exchange of the two labels). Then until you get some data, you think there is 50% chance of a head, regardless of how likely it is that the coin is biased (because opposite biases cancel out).
Your answer is unsatisfying because it based on empirical information resulted from pseudorandom while ignoring absolute random proposition. we already been thru pseudorandom and your explanation was suffice. now we're back to absolute random and the hypothetical question if it will distribute equally.
anyways, in the meantime i thought of a very simplistic answer to this question, and it simply come down to averaging.
for example, back to your 1,000 x 12M experiment. even if absolute random will have chaotic results like 500k vs 5m, once you average all the 1000 (thought experiments) you should eventually get an equal distribution. and if not... just do more of it.
more precisely... i have no way to be certain if absolute random will propagate into equal proportions in the same rate as pseudo does. however, eventually it should average to equal proportions. i think : )
There is a confusion of concepts here. I was discussing Bayesian probabilities which are quantifications of belief. These probabilities should respect symmetries in what you know. You appear to be referring to frequentist probabilities associated with the long run statistics of a repeatable trial. It is of course true that these might be anything. For example if someone says "here is a 6-faced die", it might be fair or it might be biased. The probability of each number is something you don't know. But you have no reason to expect one number to be more likely than another. If so, your belief state is to allocate a probability of 1/6 to each face (a set of Bayesian probabilities).

Is it possible to influence the dice by concentrating? I mean, with the mind? I used to play a game called Risk! and in that game, two dice are thrown against three dice with draws counting for the two dice side (defending side). This was around 1974. There were some who thought they could influence the fall of the dice by mental power.
Incidentally ... grammatical note .... one die, two or more dice.
It is possible to imagine you can influence dice with your mind. It is possible to convince yourself that you can do so.
But I have no reason to believe it is possible to do so (and good reason to think not).

@ Uke.. Earlier on it was astronomy that I brought up. I realize you prefer the earthen ware so to speak. They just put together several random stars and give them a name. Kind of strange how they might think that the image below looks like some guy getting ready for archery.

more precisely... i have no way to be certain if absolute random will propagate into equal proportions in the same rate as pseudo does. however, eventually it should average to equal proportions. i think : )
interesting thought. unfortunately we'll never know

If you throw a dice 12m times it is very unlikely to fall on each number 2 m times; no one can tell what the outcome will be; that is why it is random. Random means that each individual throw is independent of all others. Chess and dice is NOT a good comparison. Skill is and experience are involved in chess outcomes and are not random
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