Soviet Cheating in FIDE Competition: Keres-Botvinnik, 1948, Pt 3

Part 1 is here: http://www.chess.com/forum/view/general/examples-of-soviet-cheating-in-fide-competition-keres-botvinnik-1948

Part 2 is here: http://www.chess.com/forum/view/general/soviet-cheating-n-fide-competition-keres-botvinnik-1948-pt-2

To date, there have been no files found in the archives of the KGB (estab. 1954), or its predecessors in Soviet state security, the MVD and the MGB.  Therefore, much of the events of 1946 to 1948, within the Soviet camp, comes from hearsay and deduction.

We saw in Part 2 the masterful manueuvering of the Soviet chess authorities into creating the most favorable conditions for putting a Soviet in the World Champion's seat.  They had finagled a majority of the players in the match-tournament and managed to get three out of five stages played in Moscow.

Of the two non-Soviets, Max Euwe was the former World Champion and Sam Reshevsky was the several times American champion.  They were considered two of the top three or four "Western" players (along with Najdorf and Fine).  The concern was that the Soviets were going to manipulate game results among themselves, rather than as individuals, fighting for the title.

"Briefly, the suspicion was that the Soviet players in these tournaments played 'as a team.'  This could take two forms:  (1) the weaker or less politically favored Soviet players could deliberately lose their games to the more favored one ... or else, (2) the Soviet players could agree to a series of short draws among themselves, preserving their energy for games with the western players."

As Botvinnik was the premier Soviet player (and a favorite of Stalin), and Smyslov was the up-and-coming young Russian, suspicion focused on Keres, who had been under a cloud since his wartime chess activities with the Nazi regime during World War II.

This was true even before the competition started.  The Soviet contingent that travelled to the Hague for the first two stages contained a number of chess experts to aid their three players, as well as several apparatchiks and members of State Security.

Each stage of the match-tournament contained ten games played in five rounds.  Each player had a bye once each round.  The true standing were known at the end of each stage.

In the first stage, Keres played Botvinnik in Round 5.  At the time of the game the players stood: Botvinnik (2.5), Keres (2) Smyslov (2-bye), Reshevsky (1.5), Euwe (0).  In each stage, when Botvinnik was to play Keres, Reshevsky was to play Euwe.

It was clear Euwe was bady out of form.  Botvinnik had prevailed over Reshevsky in Round Four of stage one, when Reshevsky blundered away a win in time trouble - a close call for Botvinnik, otherwise Reshevsky would have been in the lead.

Here is the Keres-Botvinnik game: http://www.chessgames.com/perl/chessgame?gid=1032181

1.c4 e6 2.g3 d5 3.Bg2 d4 4.b4 c5 5.b5 e5 6.d3 Bd6 7.e4 Qc7 8.Ne2 h5 9.h4 Nh6 10.O-O Bg4 11.f3 Be6 12.f4 Bg4 13.f5 Nd7 14.Nd2 g6 15.fg6 fg6 16.Nf3 Be7 17.Rf2 Qd6 18.Bxh6 Rxh6 19.Qd2 Rh8 20.Ng5 Nf6 21.Re1 Qb6 22.Nf3 Nd7 23.Ng5 Rf8 24.Rxf8 Bxf8 25.a4 Bh6 26.a5 Qf6 27.Nc1 O-O-O 28.Nb3 Rf8 29.Ra1 Qe7 30.Qc1 Kb8 31.Ra2 Rf7 32.Qa3 Bxg5 33.hg5 Bd1 34.Qc1 Bxb3 35.Rb2 Bd1 36.Qxd1 Qxg5 37.Qe1 Nf8 38.Kh2 Qf6 39.Bh3 Nh7 40.Qd1 Ng5 41.b6 h4 42.Qg4 hg3 43.Kxg3 Rf8 44.ba7 Kxa7 45.a6 Nxh3 46.Qxh3 Qf4 47.Kg2 Qf1 48.Kh2 Rf2 49.Rxf2 Qxf2 50.Kh1 Qe1 51.Kg2 Qe2 52.Kg1 Qe3 53.Qxe3 de3 54.ab7 Kxb7 55.Kg2 Kb6 56.Kf3 Ka5 57.Kxe3 Kb4 58.Kd2 g5 0-1

Keres had White and played the English opening.  Keres unwisely trades a Bishop for Botvinnik's badly placed Knight on h6 (move 18), then errs on moves 32 and 38, leaving himself with the worst of it.  However, at several points in the game, Botvinnik missed the strongest continuations, such as his tit-for-tat error on move 38.

At this point, Keres could have locked up the pawn structure in front of Black's King, and transferred his rook over to the defense of his own king.  Instead, he depleted the pieces around his king and opened attacking lanes for Botvinnik.

After the adjournment Keres's position deteriorates with continued weak play.  Win for Botvinnik.

They meet next in Round 10 in stage 2.  At the time, the standings were" Botvinnik (5), Keres (4), Reshevsky (4), Smyslov (4-bye), Euwe (1).  If Reshevsky were to beat the hapless Euwe, he would catch Botvinnik with a Keres win.

Botvinnik stated the Keres appeared for the game shaken and nervous.  He attributes it, oddly, to Keres not having had to play for several days. (Botninnik included this game in a book, "15 Games and Their Stories", English translation 1982.)  He writes: "I Told them [Keres and Smyslov], most sincerely ... 'One of you will get six days of rest and lose like a child on the seventh day.' Now the first part of my prophesy had been fulfilled.  After six days rest, Keres sat across from me, pale as death." Perhaps a more convincing explanation might have been that Keres had been "visited" by State Security before the game.

Here are the moves:

1.d4 Nf6 2.c4 e6 3.Nc3 Bb4 4.e3 O-O 5.a3 Bxc3 6.bc3 Re8 7.Ne2 e5 8.Ng3 d6 9.Be2 Nbd7 10.O-O c5 11.f3 cd4 12.cd4 Nb6 13.Bb2 ed4 14.e4 Be6 15.Rc1 Re7 16.Qxd4 Qc7 17.c5 dc5 18.Rxc5 Qf4 19.Bc1 Qb8 20.Rg5 Nbd7 21.Rxg7 Kxg7 22.Nh5 Kg6 23.Qe3 1-0

In any case, Keres played an exceedly weak game. In 1938, Keres had played the Nimzo-Indian against Botvinnik and won the game, by hemming in Botvinnik's bishop pair.  He would do that again in 1951 to Botvinnik and win.  But in 1948, Keres throws theory out the window, with uncharacteristic mistakes on moves 11 to 13 and 16.

Perhaps this was just a bad game for Keres.  A good YouTube analysis can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNrFNXiXcGc]

As the YouTube presenter states, "The moves looked a bit dodgy!"  Botvinnik does finish off Keres in nice fashion however.

Fischer complained about it sometimes. The soviets do even worse: start to comment his game near him when he's playing another soviet player. 

Okay, the Soviet State tried to influence as much as it can the results in chess, but it would be impossible to the soviets to dominate chess without good players. My favorites so far was Petrosian and Tal.

Besides, i read here once that Benko had to give up his place in the candidates tournament so Fischer would have a chance in the world title. I don't know if that really happened, but if it did, I suppose a professional chess player would never gave up a chance to the world title unless someone convincing him. And I guess U.S government did this.

Another influence(I suppose again) was Caruana recently going to the USCF, out of the blue.

I'm just putting another point of view in this discussion.

Specially that time, U.S and the Soviets governments would try anything to prove its supremacy.

My stupid mind thinks there's a great difference between being forced to do something, and choosing to do it. Benko was a smart man. Everybody knew Fischer was the only one who could do it. Benko for the greater good, as they say.

Let me address your two points.  Caruana is an Italian-American citizen by birth.  His parents are Italian, but he was born in Miami, and grew up in New York City until he was 12 years old.

Benko had qualified out of the US Championship and Zonal in 1969.  The USCF obtained permission from FIDE to seed Fischer into the Interzonal, provided one of the three qualifiers stepped aside.  Benko did so, and was hired to be a second at the Interzonal.  There was no coercion, there were no thrown games.  See: http://www.chess.com/blog/JamieDelarosa/fischers-participation-in-the-1970-palma-de-mallorca-interzonal

Why don't you think that Keres was too nervious and in poor shape that year?

Keres had good reason to be nervous, however, after World War II he had strong results within the Soviet Union (i.e. Tallinn, 1945; Tbilisi, 1946; Parnu, 1947; and USSR 15th Championship, 1947 - all 1st place).

So neither his physical condition nor chess form must have been issues.  Being watched, and perhaps warned, by the State Secret Police likely affected him psychologically.

Right before that championship he already was in poor shape at Chigorin's memorial. Also lost to Botwinnik. 

He might feel psychological pressure, true. But nobody ordered him to lose. 

Here are the standing for the 2nd Chigorin Memorial, Moscow, 1947.

1st Botvinnik 11/15 * 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 1 0 ½ ½ ½ 1 1 1 1 1

2nd Ragozin 10½/15 0 * 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 1 1 1 ½ 1 1 1

=3rd Boleslavsky 10/15 ½ 1 * ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 1 ½ ½ 1 1

=3rd Smyslov 10/15 ½ ½ ½ * 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 1 1 1

5th Kotov 9½/15 ½ ½ ½ 1 * 0 1 ½ ½ 1 0 ½ ½ 1 1 1

=6th Keres 9/15 0 0 1 ½ 1 * 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 1 ½ 1 1

=6th Novotelnov 9/15 0 ½ ½ ½ 0 1 * ½ 0 1 ½ 1 1 1 ½ 1

8th Pachman 8½/15 1 ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ * 0 1 ½ 1 0 ½ 1 1

9th Trifunovic 8/15 ½ 0 0 ½ ½ ½ 1 1 * ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 ½

10th Gligoric 7½/15 ½ 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 0 ½ * ½ 1 1 1 ½ 1

11th Bondarevsky 6½/15 ½ 0 0 0 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ * 0 ½ 1 0 1

12th Kholmov 5½/15 0 0 0 ½ ½ 0 0 0 ½ 0 1 * ½ 1 ½ 1

13th Kottnauer 5/15 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 0 1 ½ 0 ½ ½ * 0 ½ ½

=14th Plater 4/15 0 0 ½ 0 0 ½ 0 ½ ½ 0 0 0 1 * ½ ½

=14th Sokolsky 4/15 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ * ½

16th Tsvetkov 2/15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 0 0 ½ ½ ½ *

9/15 in that tournament was not a bad showing.  How was he in "poor shape"?  Keres lost to Botvinnik and Ragozin (1st and 2nd places), beat Boleslavsky and Kotov (=3rd and 5th), drew Smyslov (=3rd).  But for an unfortunate loss to Novotelniv, he would have been =3rd.

As I said in the preface, there is no "smoking gun."

However, I believe the games tell the story.  This is not to say Botvinnik should not have won the title.  He was arguably the top player at that time.  Keres, may well have been his, and the Soviet Sports Federation's, insurance policy.

"When the war in Europe ended Keres
returned home, but not before making a deal with Soviet authorities.
He would be 'forgiven' for playing in German tournaments i.e.,
collaborating with the enemy. In return Keres promised not to
interfere with Botvinnik's challenge to Alekhine."

Kenneth Whyld, the book's co-author, said Keres confided to him that
he was not directly ordered to lose but "was given a broader
instruction that if Botvinnik failed to become world champion, it must
not be the fault of Keres." - Oxford Companion to Chess

"In return Keres promised not to 
interfere with Botvinnik's challenge to Alekhine." 

How could he interfere with that after the war? 

" if Botvinnik failed to become world champion, it must 
not be the fault of Keres"

Btw, do you know about the Ultimate Soviet Championship in 1941? Botwinnik has beaten Keres there and several times. Keres's problems with Botwinnik started from that time, not after the war. 

Please, read my comments there:

http://www.chess.com/forum/view/general/soviet-cheating-n-fide-competition-keres-botvinnik-1948-pt-2

"What possible reason could Keres have had for playing a move like 53. Rd3? The answer is obvious. He must have dumped"

"What possible reason could Keres have had for playing 53. Rd3 in this position, unless he was trying to lose the game?"

If that is what one wants to believe, otherwise things are not so obvious. Hans Kmoch for example annotated the game in great detail afterwards in Chess Review 1948 and claimed that the took retreat on the 53rd move was forced, so every 1600 rated player knowing how to draw it is a bit of an exaggeration...

http://www.chessgames.com/perl/chessgame?gid=1032191&kpage=3#kibitzing

Yes, the "Absolute Championship" of 1941 was intended to be sort of a "mini-candidate's tournament" to select an opponent for a title match with Alekhine.

In the match tournament, Botvinnik bested Keres, 1+ 3= 0-.  Botvinnik won the tournament (9+ 9= 2-).  Keres was second place (6+ 10= 4-), ahead of Smyslov, Boleslavsky, Lilienthal, and Bondarevsky.

Alekhine had gotten away from German-controlled territory in late 1943, and remained in Spain and Portugal for the rest of his life.  Keres had played against Alekhine in several NAZI tournaments.

When the Soviet Army advanced and re-took much of Estonia in 1944, Keres fled to neutral Sweden, but was unable to escape to the West.

It appears Keres negotiated his precarious return to the Soviet Union, to rejoin his family in Estonia.

Alexander - Pt 4 (being written now) will encompass the games played in Moscow (stages 3 through 5).

All this conspiracy theory stuff would carry more weight if Keres didn't have a history of losing those sorts of games and those sorts of positions against non-Soviets. 

Bronstein described Keres as a sort of modern day knight who hears the word "tournament" and goes in to win or die fighting. He always did do worse against strategic players such as Botvinnik. Capablanca said that Keres didn't know how to play the endgame. 

Keres had form. 

The key statement in this thread is that there is no evidence of a conspiracy. Jamie is channelling Larry Evans here. Evans argued there was a massive conspiracy too. Of course the Soviets colluded on many occasions. But in this case, Botvinnik won because he was the best player. 

Play through every game of the tournament. Take a look at the quality that Botvinnik demonstrated against all of his opponents. Botvinnik only started playing poorly after he had already won. That could be some conspiracy, or it could be that he relaxed and stopped working so hard. Botvinnik offered a draw to Keres after only five moves in that last game. He clearly didn't want to play. Keres declined, and when Botvinnik offered a draw again four moves later, Keres swore at him! Keres was in a fighting mood, and Botvinnik wasn't interested in playing at all. The last game wasn't evidence of a conspiracy, it's what happens to even the best players when they don't focus.

Portisch, another non-Soviet GM with a strategic style of play, also had a lifetime plus score against Keres. Was he also part of the conspiracy?

This was Capa's verdict on Keres in 1939. Ten years later, Keres still exhibited the same characteristics. 

‘Amongst the new talents there are two who stand out more as great masters than the others: Botvinnik and, on a secondary level, Keres. Also Alekhine, of course; but he is not new; he is old like me. Keres plays admirably well; his sense of fantasy is enormous, his imagination fiery. But his judgment is unsteady. He does not always know if the game in front of him is won, lost or drawn; and when it is won it also sometimes happens that he does not know for sure why and how it is won. Then, understandably, he hesitates and selects his plans more through temperament than through a judgment which has not managed to form. [Entonces, explicablemente, vacila y escoge sus planes más que por un juicio que no ha llegado a formarse, por temperamento.] However, it is a defect to substitute, at certain points in a game, judgment with instinctive impulses which rise up from temperament – aggressive impulses in the case of Keres, defensive ones in other players. In the highly instructive game we played in the Team Tournament which finished in this beautiful city a month ago, I offered him a draw because there was no way at all that it could be won, either by him or by me. Keres did not accept my offer then, and only did so six moves later. How was it that, six moves before, he had not seen with the same clarity as I that it was impossible to force the game? It cannot be believed that Keres would attempt to win against me in an absolutely drawn position, so the only explanation is that his reasoning had not yet crystallized into concrete judgment; to use the same word as before, he was hesitating. ... Against Eliskases, also in that tournament, Keres had to choose between accepting a draw in a perfectly balanced rook ending and trying to force matters with a peculiar king excursion. He picked the latter and lost. Why? Because in circumstances where visual foresight is not sufficient, where accurate judgment is necessary, Keres is still not fully developed.

Source: http://www.chesshistory.com/winter/extra/capablanca11.html This was also published in a book on the AVRO tournament.

I would not say "channeling" Larry Evans.  The games were suspect long before Evans ever wrote about them in his column.  I just had a post about the Anthony Saidy interview with David Bronstein, published just after Bronstein's death, in which Saidy wondered whether the placement of Keres over Botvinnik on the 1952 Soviet Chess Olympiad team was not related to the events of 1948.

Other interesting clues pop up in the literature.  The Soviet apologists approve the Taylor Kingston review of the controversy, as a fair and balanced approach.  That's all fine and good, but Kingston never really "cleared" the doubts.  And tidbits like this just pour gasoline on the fire:

So I asked [Emanuel Sztein] point blank: did he believe Keres was coerced in 1948?  His response: "I know it with certainty."  And Botvinnik was actively complicit?  "Yes."

By the way, Sztein was a Soviet chess insider.  Some may recognize the name as the person who wrote the Introduction to Tal's match book, "Tal-Botvinnik 1960: Match for the World Championship."  The English language edition was published in 1996.