Attack together with Paul Keres part Six
Attack Together with Paul Keres, Part Six
Attacking in the Style of Keres’ Games, Part Six
Before delving into today’s article, here are direct links to the earlier parts of this series
As in the previous installments, our central theme remains the attack against the king when both players have castled on the same side.
One of the key questions in any attack is: Which squares are the most critical targets? Naturally, these are the squares directly in front of the opposing king. However, it is important to identify exactly which square—or squares—should be the focal point of the offensive. Vladimir Vukovic, the author of one of the greatest books ever written on attacking chess, referred to such squares as “focal points.”
In this installment, we focus on the square g7, situated immediately in front of Black’s castled king. (Naturally, if the roles are reversed and Black attacks, then g2 becomes the focal square.)
In the first game, Keres gradually built up an attack against the Black king. Although the position was objectively equal (both players evaluated it as slightly better for White), Keres deliberately exchanged the light-squared bishops, believing this to be in his favor. This trade weakened several important light squares on Black’s kingside, particularly f5. He then established a knight on f5, signaling the start of direct operations. A subtle but instructive moment followed with 22.Ra3, preparing a rook lift to swing toward the kingside.
This encounter is an excellent example of both attacking and defensive principles. Although Gligoric later expressed dissatisfaction with his move 22...d5, it was, in fact, the best continuation, adhering to the classical defensive principle: counterattack on the flank with play in the center. He also played the fine move 25...Qd7, reinforcing key squares—despite his own commentaries describing it as a mistake.
Once White had positioned his pieces for a kingside assault with 26.Rg3, Gligoric committed a decisive error and overlooked White’s tactical sequence. He later attributed this oversight to fatigue from the previous round. I would propose a different explanation. Boris Spassky—the brilliant world champion who sadly passed away not long ago—once espoused a theory he called “the twenty-one threats.” According to this idea, if one side continues applying pressure with numerous threats (the number 21 is symbolic), it becomes almost inevitable that the defending player will eventually overlook one of them—sometimes even a simple one.
Let us examine this fascinating game, which was awarded the prize for the best game of the third round of the tournament:
A truly instructive game, rich in both attacking and defensive ideas.
In the next example, played in a friendly match, Keres faced an unexpected surprise in the opening. Nevertheless, he responded accurately—Keres, after all, was a consummate opening expert. The position emerging from the opening was roughly equal, but Black committed two mistakes during the transition to the middlegame. Keres immediately seized the initiative, sacrificing a pawn to launch a kingside offensive. He had ample justification for doing so: his pieces were well-coordinated and active, while both of Black’s minor pieces remained stuck on the queenside.
An especially instructive moment occurred when Keres played the slightly inferior 20.Nh5, instead of the stronger 20.Nf5. Both moves exert pressure on the critical g7 square—the central theme of this article—but Nf5 was superior for concrete reasons. This only underscores how difficult it is to conduct an attack with precision. Nevertheless, Keres’ move maintained the advantage, and through a series of accurate maneuvers, he executed a decisive combination, culminating on the g7 square.
Let us now turn to this second brilliant encounter:
An engaging game from start to finish.
To be continued…
