I think you are fooling yourself. Your statement means that if there were a googleplex of such examples, you would be certain about all of them. You would be wrong about some of them (quite a lot actually, with a googleplex to start with).
Small positive numbers are not zero. Even when they are very small.
Does anyone not understand my point that when you have something that may have a quantifiable probability of 1 in (say) a trillion of being false it can be reasonable to be certain it is true, even to "know" it is true, but the epistemological situation is that certainty cannot be justified?
An example is the proposition that with an excellent source of random bits (say least significant bit of analog to digital conversion of thermal noise), the next 40 bits will all be zeros.
It's whether or not one agrees with the way you formulate such a situation. I have a problem accepting the legitimacy of formulating it by quantifying odds in such a manner. I think it's impossible to attribute material odds that something is false (for instance) that we very certainly think to be true. The moment that way of looking at it is accepted, of course that constitutes an acceptance that, epistemologically speaking, we cannot know something. I fundamentally disagree with Dawkins, for instance, that there are definite (or indefinite) odds that such and such an entity may or may not exist. I believe it's possible to know and I think that as soon as he plays this trick, because it is a trick, of quantifying odds, he wins the argument. But he's wrong to do so, to begin with. Someone else will have more evidence to work with than he does.
Regarding the 1. e4 e5 2. Ba6 situation, I do not think there is the remotest chance that it isn't a win for black. The chance of that is zero. Yet there are other things I'm uncertain about, which the powers that be take for granted.