You might want to read this book
...maybe not.
I would not be surprised to find that IBM hired one or two Russian speakers for the event, but unless you have some footage of them standing behind a marble column with an eavesdropping dish pointed at Kasparov's team, I think that "IBM hired spies" is still considered conjecture in 2019. If it is true, however, I will say this...also Kasparov's fault. Don't just assume that all Americans in your general area are uni-lingual
. If they were in Russia at a tournament, they would not have openings discussions within earshot of anybody. Same applies everywhere. If you are going to imply that their meeting room and hotel rooms were bugged or what have you, well then we're really heading into conspiracy-land and the burden of proof falls on the accuser, not the accused.
On the Caro Kann...as we now know today, if you know your opponent is going to play a certain defense, you are going to prep all the major lines, not one. Since this knight sacrifice would not have borne fruit within Deep Blue's event horizon, it's possible that they hardcoded that particular sacrifice rather than trying to teach Deep Blue how to "value" it correctly, which might have thrown it off on several other fronts unless they spent a ton of time tweaking and testing it. I guess you could argue that this by itself constitutes cheating, but to me it's no different than one GM telling another "hey, watch out for the poison pawn variation tomorrow...". If telling Deep Blue that a single move in single position is the correct one to make in advance of any game occurring, then surely the entire opening book would also have to be considered "cheating".
I agree that a good player doesn’t play a dubious move hoping that their opponent won’t be able to find the best move. In fact, in searching for the best move one must look for the best moves on both sides, given the constraints of the clock. If one sees an inferior move that might trap the opponent if he fails to find the best move, but instead will trap you if he does, then the answer is clear: the player who’s about to move must always assume that his opponent will be able to find the best move.
However, when you are losing anyway, it might be worth a shot. If the opponent is in time-trouble and you’re reasoning that it would be hard to find it in a few seconds, you might go for it, if, say, you need a whole point to win a tournament, and a draw wouldn’t change anything.
Also, it depends on other factors. When Kasparov played the best combination of his life, by his own judgment, the one everyone knows about, the 15 move-ahead combination against Topalov, Kasparov simply plunged in. But if Topalov had instead turned down the sacrifice, Kasparov would have reached an unfavorable position. But Topalov’s curiosity was peaked and he went for it, which was not the best move, analysis showed.
In general, Kasparov always played the man, not the board, being keenly aware of the psychological factors. At one time he was playing exclusively 6. Bc4 in the Naidorf. But against Velimirovic, he chose a different move, not wanting to go toe to toe with a specialist of that line. Even though he was a specialist as well. But he knew his limits. It is this versatility and, of course, new insights into many openings that made him the best. He played a novelty once that Tal felt was especially concocted for him!
That was his lifelong strategy and his research and memory allowed him to be successful with it. But versus Deep Blue he was faced with a new problem. They couldn’t get any printouts, due to that clause that allows printouts only of the official games, which weren’t any. Then, like you said, they went on to assume that the new machine was similar to the first one, which proved to be wrong.
But still, there are differences between machines and humans that one has to take into account. In the opening, they have an advantage and trying to get it ‘out of the book’ as soon as possible might have been worthwhile. He was not afraid of trying that one.
In an open position, with lots of tactical possibilities, the machine is superior. So it is logical to try to veer the game into closed positions.
There are also other factors that affected his thinking process, because he was not facing a human player. For instance, against a human player he might have found a successful sacrifice which ended the game quickly. But against a strong computer, you can assume that if you found a successful sacrifice, then it is not successful at all, because a machine would not allow such strong play to happen.
And yet the same ‘stronger and improved version’ of Deep Blue commited a couple of mistakes in the end of the first game, where Kasparov resigned prematurely in what turned out to be a drawn position. Although years later, new analysis with stronger engines changed that evaluation again. That was a big blow, for a strong player to resign in a drawn position.
Going back to the Caro-Kann, it is true that he played a Caro before in their games, but it is also true that he never played the 4...Nd7 line. I said previously that he played 7...Bd6 against Karpov, but I meant to say that Karpov played that move against him. He only chose 5. Ng5 in the aforementioned line. So he never plays 4...Nd7 before and on the morning of the last game Illescas introduces this very specific sacrifice in case Kasparov who, once again, has never played anything other than the classical line, makes this obscure, premature pawn move...And with IBM hiring two spies...Do we see a connection between the spies and the last minute tweak?
He didn’t do anything out of the ordinary. He’d played the opponent before, at least when it comes to openings, but not only (as I have explained above), so now he correctly reasoned that on its own the machine would not sacrifice on e6 without concrete investments. Since he’d never played 4...Nd7 before, he also tried to surprise the machine (and the GMs behind it) with this ‘reversal of moves’ (pawn before bishop, instead of bishop before pawn), reasoning that the GMs would not think of this line which he never played and specifically of an inferior move like 7...h6? He was perfectly aware that after a capture on e6, Black would be in dire straights, not only against a computer of Deep Blue caliber, but also against any strong GM.
And he almost got away with it. I mean, on that morning Illescas to tweak the code is highly improbable because there would be no last-minute reason to alter a line he’s never played. Unless those two spies had turned out last-minute info about Kasparov’s plan in the opening.
Now, I can see this in hindsight. But at the time, from Kasparov’s vantage point, he placed all of his eggs in the basket of never having played that line before. Which, despite being logical, is not foolproof.