On Determinism and Free Will

There are people who tell us that we cannot know whether God exists but it's possible to work it out logically. Some people consider these questions about free will and God to be important, but they aren't. The reason they aren't important is that we function as we function and whether or not God or free will exist won't change what we are, since we are already what we are, whichever happens to be true.

Extrapolating hypothetically, it follows that God and free will are ideas we have. However, our belief in these ideas may alter how we behave. Addressing the problem of free will, it seems obvious that we as individuals and also we as a society and a collection of societies function as if free will exists and of course, many problems would be caused if it weren't true that we can choose. Some of these problems relate to morality and the group need to impose behavioural standards on individuals.

The idea that choice and free will are illusions has lately become very fashionable, whereas previously these ideas were strongly associated with mental illness. The adherence of influential thinkers to these ideas has altered that situation. However, there's a strong, psychological reason for people who feel disempowered to "wishfully think" that free will is an illusion, since they can abdicate from responsibility, at least in their minds.

It's a strange illusion which, when we act as if it's true, gives every indication of being true. Our science is founded on empiricism and empirically, free will is obviously true. Those who think it isn't, including all the influential thinkers, are guilty of constructing an ideal, universal model, which is highly simplified so that chains of cause and effect form single strands instead of branching strands. They assume the universe functions just like the faulty model they have created and hence they assume determinism to be true, along with the associated illusory nature of free will.

Naturally, there are constraints on our will. We cannot flap our ears and fly to Jupiter. I shouldn't have needed to mention these constraints but those who argue for determinism are naive, since they constantly seem to mention the obvious fact that there are constraints on our free will and that our behaviour is, to a large extent, automatic, habitual and "socialised"; but they seem to equate this obvious fact with a complete inability to choose.

lol, way to assume so many things about people who have a certain view. The way I see it, it's not so easy to tell if someone is naive just based on the view they have; you pretty much need to look at what led them to believe that to get a better idea. I mean, take Hume and his problem of induction. Do I believe him when he says it doesn't make sense for us to think that knowing the past helps us at all in making decisions about the future, no. But if Hume and I got into a debate, he'd probably give me arguments that I wouldn't be able to resolve. I'd have a feeling, somehow induction must be helpful from a rational perspective, yet I probably wouldn't be able to explcitly address Hume's concerns or maybe I'd confuse myself.

Determinism doesn't even mean the non-existence of free will. One can think our actions are pre-ordained to be some way yet still think those pre-ordained ways involve free choices (if I freely choose something, it's still the case that history can only play out one way [whatever way carries out what went into my choice]; and since my choices are guided by who I am and what makes me up, that one way is theoretically predictable). Some might use determinism to argue for the non-existence of free will, but it's not clear that you have to, and a lot of people, like myself more recently, do in fact hold both determinism and free will at the same time.

But, I could see why some might think there is something weird about free choices under a deterministic world; maybe some wouldn't find that "free" really describes anything meaningful strictly speaking. I don't make that argument, but who am I to say that the people who do haven't found valid reasons that I just haven't quite thought of. I'm not going to make an assumption about how they think because there are a lot of things that can get a person to believe something.

<<Do I believe him when he says it doesn't make sense for us to think that knowing the past helps us at all in making decisions about the future, no. But if Hume and I got into a debate, he'd probably give me arguments that I wouldn't be able to resolve.>>

It's my belief that Hume's argument was actually political in nature and aimed at the general acceptance of religion. He is implying that there is nothing we know about the past and the present that allow us to infer that religious ideas are true. This was at a time where it was a serious offence (in some cases a capital one) to deny the truth of religious ideas.

Of course, he's also making the point that although all our knowledge is empirical in origin, We should not presume to prejudge according to past observations too much, since our past observations may be less relevant than we imagine to what we're presuming to judge upon.

You also say "Determinism doesn't even mean the non-existence of free will." Well, some people would agree with you and some would disagree. There's a strand of thought called "compatibilism" and adherents of that would agree with you although I think that most or many would consider them mistaken. It's difficult to understand how, if determinism holds and everything, including your choices, is therefore the necessary result of past states of the universe, that choice can exist in any meaningful way. So people (determinists) are brought to discuss things like the illusion of choice, which, they hold, we are all susceptible to. Personally I can't understand how that could have evolved. There are a lot of good arguments that can be levelled against it.

You go on to say <<But, I could see why some might think there is something weird about free choices under a deterministic world; maybe some wouldn't find that "free" really describes anything meaningful strictly speaking. I don't make that argument, but who am I to say that the people who do haven't found valid reasons that I just haven't quite thought of.>>

That's a pretty good point, although I tend to think that people who accept determinism are the naive ones, who construct a highly simplified, ideal universal model and then expect that the universe should conform to their simplistic ideas.

So you are saying it's naive to think that there is some universal model that explains the universe? :) I mean, it's one thing to say that the current one we have is not sufficient or even nearly sufficient, but to say that there, theoretically, isn't one, no matter how complicated, that does explain everything? How could existence even make sense otherwise? Let's say, event A is caused by, in part, substance B or it's not. You can't beat around the bush and say, well in some sense it was caused by substance B but then it's also not caused by it -- that sort of thing doesn't allign with any possible way of looking at the world; regardless of what substance B is supposed to be, it must have some being that's legitimate, or not contradicted. I believe all determinism is saying is that it's one or the other -- there is some fact of the matter as to what substance B is doing or not doing, at least right now, and that fact will be based on, well, whatever makes that true, be it an interplay of molecules, or something else.

Simply saying that it's "hard to believe" that compatibilism is true doesn't make for much of an argument. Let's say I am deciding between two things. Whatever one choice I do make, will be the one I favored over the other two. That "privileged" choice will be the one that makes it into history. Regardless of this, what made this one choice into history was still the result of my mind feeling free to choose either one, even though I didn't choose both. My mind feeling free may have been caused by something, but that's irrelevant, right? We're not trying to explain what caused this free choice to be here, we're just observing the free choice.

I actually thought compatibilism was more popular than incompatibilism among scholars, although, I could have it wrong.

“At each stage of the game (of chess), the player is free to choose between several possibilities, but each movement will entail a series of unavoidable consequences, so that necessity increasingly limits free choice, the end of the game being seen, not as the fruit of hazard, but as the result of rigorous laws.”

Yeah well that doesn't negate the fact that we can choose moves.

<<but each movement will entail a series of unavoidable consequences>>

Also, I don't know who quoth that but he's a bit free with the concept of unavoidability. All a move does is change the position but it doesn't bring about a particular reply.

<<I actually thought compatibilism was more popular than incompatibilism among scholars, although, I could have it wrong.>>

Probably among Christian theologians it is, but probably not among mainstream philosophers. At least it wasn't a while back ... a couple of decades ago, most philosophers thought compatibilism is more or less an oxymoron. However, this belief in determinism is getting so fashionable that people have to rationalise their incongruous ideas somehow. Compatibilism actually means "well, there are these two incompatible concepts and we believe in them both so we're going to suspend reason".

After all, determinism *literally means* that free will is impossible, since the future is considered to be completely determined. Determinism is a ridiculous concept since it ideologically professes that all causality is linear and there can never be branching causality.

I don't see how it's "ridiculous" to think causality might be linear. If there are observations that suggest that, odds are, it will be in the running. On the other hand I don't think it's crazy to question this either, I'm just saying it's perfectly reasonable to have an inclination that causality might be linear. What would be your idea of "branching causality?" What does it mean? Because I'm not even sure. But my problem with there existing, I don't know, two "different but legitimate paths" (again it's unclear what it means but I'm trying to work with it), is that, for that to be the case, it seems like the person making the choice would have a hard time having a true reality. Like, if a person has x characteristics, but "could" make a completely uncharacteristic decision, to what extent does this person really have x characteristics? To say I "could" decide to become a stuntman rather than a chess player would make me think the characteristics that make me a chess player don't really operate, because if they did they would never make me decide to be a stuntman. And yet I see these characteristics operating right now. So to me throwing out determinism makes things pretty fuzzy. I'm not saying determinism must be true, but are there rational things motivating me toward that view? Absolutely. There are probably rational things motivating you towards your view as well.

But to just summarize complex situations as either ridiculous or not ridiculous really doesn't seem to be taking an honest look at the depth of these issues. I've read philosophy papers; even the authors will often concede that their way of looking at things simply seems to make the most sense, and will often concede to a certain amount of vagueness in their view.

"Compatibilism actually means "well, there are these two incompatible concepts and we believe in them both so we're going to suspend reason"."

No, it doesn't. It means that the reason why we think the two concepts are at odds with each other is, possibly, because our understanding of them is too superficial, and so we have to analyze them a bit better and think about what we really are referring to when, for example, we speak of "free choices." It's not surprising to me that "free choices" could have a more complex meaning than the very simplistic definition "undetermined choices."

That's precisely why we have paradoxes.

<<I don't see how it's "ridiculous" to think causality might be linear.>>

Of course not, but it IS ridiculous to assert that it must be linear, which "determinism" does.

"May be" and "must be" are worlds apart. One is completely naive in this context.

Ok... your problem is easily solved when someone says determinism might be true. While that might sound funny, all that really says is, my reasoning is pointing towards determinism being true, but maybe my reasoning is wrong so I keep open that it might just look like determinism is true while it's actually false. For me, I don't even know what branching paths mean or if they describe anything about the world (aside from, perhaps, a possible, theoretical, imagined world), so I'm not tempted to endorse them.

<<No, it doesn't. It means that the reason why we think the two concepts are at odds with each other is, possibly, because our understanding of them is too superficial, and so we have to analyze them a bit better and think about what we really are referring to when, for example, we speak of "free choices." It's not surprising to me that "free choices" could have a more complex meaning than the very simplistic definition "undetermined choices.">>

I and others disagree with this approach, that's all. We take the viewpoint that determinsism means that the future is determined. If the future is determined, then it cannot be altered, changed or varied as a result of people making choices, random events (there would be no rendomness) or any other cause.

All that is happening is that some people wish to believe in ideas that are logically exclusive to each other. That isn't a paradox at all, since the concept of paradox is only a human invention to describe situations which superficially seem to be logically impossible. If words are to have any meaning, determinism means that the future is fixed. Some people see this in a religious context, with a supposed God whose power or understanding transcends mankind's understanding but this is equivalent to something being meaningless, to a non-religious person, that is, whilst it's a sort of "special, saving case", perhaps, to the religious or believers in God. But God and religion are supposed to be taboo subjects, apparently. So we probably have to use the word "paradox" or "transcendence" as code for these things.

Sometimes I think that the subject of determinism and free will is relevant to chess, because we make so many decisions or choices in the course of a game. This is why I posted the subject.

"After all, determinism *literally means* that free will is impossible, since the future is considered to be completely determined"

I could link you to an academic article I read not too long ago that, convincingly, I think, argues against this. It's an interesting subject.

"then it cannot be altered, changed or varied as a result of people making choices, random events (there would be no rendomness) or any other cause."

It doesn't have to be altered. The fact that I am making a free choice is a part of history. Yeah, I will have chosen only one thing, but that thing, that conforms to my will, is what we see in history. It doesn't mean I didn't think of the other choice during that time, or that if I felt like it I would have felt restricted from making that one instead.

It's just a case of finding the mistakes in the article, so you're welcome to link it. Yes, it's interesting.